

Japanese Empire in the Tropics

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Japanese Empire in the Tropics

Selected Documents and Reports
of the Japanese Period in Sarawak
Northwest Borneo
1941-1945

Edited and Introduced by
Ooi Keat Gin

VOLUME I

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Ken insists I should keep a full record of what might easily turn out to be a subject of historical interest to those at home whose job it is to write up the history of the war and all the incidents and actions which occurred.

Arthur thinks they are more likely to be kept busy writing our obituaries and telling our families, although our efforts were appreciated, we acted without War Office approval and therefore were remarkably stupid. This seems more than likely.

—Corporal G. W. Pringle, British Military Police Corps,
P.O.W. Batu Lintang Camp, Kuching

When we sail down the river to the sea,
And this jail is just another memory,
We'll be free as we were in days of yore,
And see sights we never saw before.
Let the Dyaks, Indonesians and Chinese fight about it,
They can have their Borneo, we can do without it,
When we sail down the river to the sea,
There will be happy days for you and me.

—Ascribed to A. S. Hardie

*Song sung at Christmas concert, 1943,
Internment and P.O.W. Camp, Batu Lintang, Kuching*

To my mother,
who lived through and survived the years of Japanese rule



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Preface

Compelling historiographical reasons lie behind the compilation, editing, and publication of this corpus of archival documents relating to the Japanese period in Sarawak. Although the Japanese interregnum was brief, its dramatic commencement and equally dramatic conclusion represent a watershed in the history of the young state of Sarawak. The period of three years and eight months under the rule of Imperial Japan's military authorities falls between the century-long governance by Brooke White Rajahs (1841–1941) and the twenty-three year tenure of administration by Colonial Office mandarins (1946–63). Comparatively, the Brooke regime and the period of its rule are grounds well trodden by historians and scholars of other fields. However, the post-Brooke era of 1941–45 and 1946–63, representing the Japanese and Colonial Office administrations respectively, have been generally neglected, particularly the former. Curiously, the Japanese period in Sarawak attracted little attention or scholarship among Western and Japanese scholars and the generation of postwar Malaysian historians.

Nevertheless, in recent years there has been increasing interest in the war period, culminating in an attempt to reassess the Japanese occupation in Southeast Asia by Western and Japanese as well as Southeast Asian scholars. The post-Hirohito era has offered more opportunities and openness to scholars who want to reexamine the war and the role played by the Japanese in East and Southeast Asia. Likewise, with the release of archival documents following the mandatory grace period, historians may now begin to review their interpretations in light of these new materials.

Against this background of recent developments, presented here is a history of the Japanese occupation in Sarawak as narrated by actual participants in the form of their recollections, memoirs, and correspondence. This collection of selected documents in two volumes will assist in the greater understanding of this period of Sarawak's past.

This two-volume work consists of four parts, each part dedicated to events occurring during the denoted period. Parts I and II constitute Volume I. Part I describes the situation before 15 December 1941 in Japan and in Sarawak, the former preparing an offensive whilst the latter did the best it could using the meagre facilities and material available for its defense. Part II relates events from 15 December 1941, the date of the Japanese landings at Miri, to 24 December 1941, which marked the fall of Kuching to Japanese hands. The situation in Kuching and in various outstations is described. Volume II begins with Part III, which gives a detailed picture of life in Sarawak under Japanese rule. The daily trials and tribulations of living as civilian internees and as prisoners-of-war are highlighted. Exposés of purported Japanese "massacres" and "murders" are included in this section. Finally, Part IV, 10 June 1945 to 15 August 1945, presents the period of uncertainty during the closing months of the Pacific War. The day of deliverance, a bittersweet tableau of survivors and dead comrades, and the journey home concludes Volume II.

This undertaking would not have been realized if not for the financial assistance rendered by various parties over the years. I would like to thank the Sarawak Foundation (London) for its support during the early stages of this project in the mid-1980s. The Centre for South-East Asian Studies, University of Hull, has most generously supported my travel in Britain in search of archival materials. Last but definitely not least, I owe the completion of this study to the Research and Development Department of Universiti Sains Malaysia for its handsome grant.

I must take the opportunity to extend my heartfelt gratitude to the copyright holders of the papers reprinted here. For materials

and documents obtained from the Public Record Office, I wish to acknowledge that these materials are British Crown copyright and are here reproduced with the kind permission of the Controller of Her Britannic Majesty's Stationary Office. Similarly, for documents from the collection of the Department of Documents, Imperial War Museum, I would like to thank the Trustees of the Imperial War Museum for allowing their reproduction. I wish to record my appreciation and thanks to Mr. Bruce Elam and his sister, who both kindly gave their permission to reproduce some of the papers of their parents—Papers of E.H. Elam. Many thanks go to Mrs. M. Griffin for permission to reprint documents from the Papers of Alan Griffin.

However, for several papers in private collections the copyright holders could not be contacted, even with the generous assistance of archivists. Mrs. Clare Brown, archivist of Rhodes House Library, took the responsibility to grant permission for reproduction of documents in the Papers of J. S. Wink and the Papers of W. G. Morison. Her successor, Ms. Amanda Hill, most generously undertook the responsibility for allowing the reproduction of materials in three collections, namely, Papers of J. L. Noakes; Papers of Edward Banks, curator of the Sarawak Museum (1925–1937), as part of the Papers of the Brooke Family of Sarawak (1941–1981); and Papers of C. D. Le Gros Clark.

Individuals in their official capacities have rendered, in one way or another, their assistance and hence lightened my workload. Special thanks goes to Mrs. Clare Brown, archivist, Rhodes House Library, Oxford, whose assistance in helping trace copyright holders was beyond measure. The help rendered by Ms. Amanda Hill, successor to Mrs. Brown, is much appreciated. My thanks to the Keeper of Records, Public Record Office, Kew, and the helpful staff in the lending and reprographic counters. Also, my thanks to Mr. Nick Forbes, in matters relating to copyright permission of British Crown materials. Gratefully I acknowledge the assistance rendered me by Mr. Roderick W. A. Suddaby, the Keeper of the Department of Documents, and Mrs. Rosemary Tudge, adminis-

trative officer, Department of Sound Records, Imperial War Museum, London. Ms. Wong Sook Jean, head of acquisitions, Main Library, Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang, deserves an accolade of thanks for all her assistance and understanding. I would also like to register my appreciation to the director and archivist of the Sarawak Museum and State Archives, Kuching, Sarawak, and all the wonderful and friendly staff at the library and in the archives section.

A special tribute must be paid to Ms. Gillian Berchowitz, executive editor, Ohio University Press, for her continued interest in this project and for being patient with me. Many thanks also to Barry Roper of Beverley, East Yorkshire, for his timely assistance.

Sincere appreciation goes to Professor V. T. King, University of Hull, for his support and encouragement; Dr. Paul H. Kratoska, National University of Singapore, for his generous assistance, but more importantly, for his faith in me over the years; and Dr. Yuen Choy Leng, formerly of Universiti Sains Malaysia, who initiated my interest in things Japanese and affairs in East Malaysia (Sarawak and Sabah).

Gratefully I acknowledge a debt of gratitude to my sister, Saw Ean, for typing the manuscript. And to my sister, Saw Lian, and my mother, for all their patience and love, a big thank you.

Ooi Keat Gin
Penang, June 1996

Abbreviations

A.B.C.	America-Britain-China Powers
A.I.F.	Australian Imperial Forces
A.L.F.S.E.A	Allied Land Forces South-East Asia
A.R.P.	Air Raid Precaution
BBCAU	British Borneo Civil Affairs Unit
BCL	Borneo Company Limited
B.N.B.	British North Borneo
<i>BRB</i>	<i>Borneo Research Bulletin</i>
C.C.S.	Casualty Clearing Station
CGS	Chief of General Staff
C.G.Y.C.	Colombo Golf and Yachting Club
C.M.	Camp Master
C.S.M.	Company Sergeant-Major
F.I.C.	French Indo-China
FMSVF	Federated Malay States Volunteer Force
GOC	General Officer Commanding
H.M.R.A.N.	His/Her Majesty's Royal Australian Navy
H.M.S.O.	His/Her Majesty's Stationery Office
I.J.A.	Imperial Japanese Army
IWM	Imperial War Museum, London
<i>JMHSSB</i>	<i>Journal of the Malaysian Historical Society, Sarawak Branch</i>
M.C.C.	Malayan Cadet Corps
Mgr.	Monsignor
M.L.	Motorized Launch
M.P.A.J.A.	Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army

M.T.B.	Motorized Transport Boat
M.V.	Motorized Vessel
N.E.I.	Netherlands East Indies
OC or O/C	Officer Commanding
P.O.W.s	Prisoners of War
PRO	Public Record Office, Kew
Prob.	Probationary
P. & T.	Post and Telegraph
P.W.D.	Public Works Department
R.A.	Royal Artillery
R.A.A.F.	Royal Australian Air Force
R.A.F.	Royal Air Force
R.A.O.C.	Royal Army Ordnance Corps
R.A.S.C.	Royal Australian Service Corps
R.E.	Royal Engineers
R.E.O.C.	Royal Engineers Ordnance Corps
Revd.	Reverend
RHL	Rhodes House Library, Oxford
R.S.M.	Regimental Sergeant-Major
R.T.C.	Rejang Timber Concession
SARFOR	Sarawak Forces
S.C.S.	Sarawak Civil Service
SG	<i>Sarawak Gazette</i>
SMJ	<i>Sarawak Museum Journal</i>
S.P.G.	Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, London
S.R.D.	(Australian) Services Reconnaissance Department
ST	<i>Sarawak Tribune</i>
VP-Day	Victory in the Pacific Day
W.O.	Warrant Officer

Weights, Measures, and Currencies

Local Units	Imperial Equivalent (Approximate)
-------------	--------------------------------------

Weights

1 tahl	1.33 ounces (oz)
1 kati = 16 tahils	1.33 pounds (lbs)
1 pikul = 100 katis	133.30 lbs
1 koyan = 40 pikuls	5,333.30 lbs
1 gantang (dry weight) = 8 katis	10.64 lbs
1 passu = 8 gantangs	85.12 lbs

Measures

1 depas = an arm's length	20.00 inches
1 panchang	108 stacked cubic feet

Currencies

Unless otherwise indicated, all currencies refer to the Sarawak dollar, which, prior to the Pacific War, was tied to the Straits (Settlements) dollar. From 1906 the Straits dollar was pegged to sterling at the rate of \$1 to 2s 4d, or \$8.57 to £1. This rate was generally maintained until the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941.


Volume I

INTRODUCTION

THE JAPANESE PERIOD IN SARAWAK: AN OVERVIEW, 1941-1945

Sarawak occupies the northwestern portion of the island of Borneo, sharing its borders to the northeast with Sabah (formerly British North Borneo), a fellow member state of the Federation of Malaysia, and Negara Brunei Darussalam, and to the southeast and southwest with Indonesian Kalimantan (formerly Dutch Borneo). Sarawak is some 124,485 square kilometers (48,250 square miles) and constitutes about 38 percent of the total area of Malaysia. Despite its large land area, its present population is less than 7.5 percent of the total population of Malaysia.


Topographically Sarawak is divided into three distinct units: an alluvial and swampy coastal plain, a broad belt of undulating hilly terrain, and a rugged and mountainous interior rising above 1,200 meters (4,000 feet). The rivers flowing into the South China Sea form a myriad drainage network crisscrossing the country. Rivers and streams are the natural highways and the most important means of transport and communications, particularly in the inland regions. Three quarters of the country is under dense tropical rainforest, with large areas still inaccessible.



Sarawak, circa 1963.

SOURCE: After Steven Runciman, *The White Rajahs: A History of Sarawak from 1841 to 1946*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960, pp. 188–89; and

BEFORE MALAYSIA



John M. Chin, *The Sarawak Chinese*, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1981, front endpaper.

The territorial borders of Sarawak when it was first granted to James Brooke by the Brunei monarch, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin II, in 1841, covered only the area from Lundu to the Sadong River. Subsequently its political borders were pushed further eastwards at the expense of Brunei and reached its present configuration by 1905. The increase in population was gradual and its spatial pattern had always been scattered and rural-based with a few urban centers of concentration, namely Kuching (the capital), Sibu (the chief port), and Miri (center of the oil industry). The population estimate in 1939 compared to the figures from the census of 1947 are shown below.

Largely as a consequence of Brooke policy and design, the number of Europeans was always small relative to the native population. Table 1.1 illustrates the European numbers vis-à-vis the Chinese and indigenous inhabitants. The majority of Europeans served in the government bureaucracy, which in itself was never elaborate, and had but a skeletal staff. Brooke officers were ably as-

TABLE 1.1
Population of Sarawak in 1939 and 1947

	1939	%	1947	%
Iban (Sea Dayak)	167,700	34.2	190,326	34.8
Chinese	123,626	25.2	145,158	26.6
Malay	92,709	18.9	97,469	17.9
Land Dayak	36,963	7.5	42,195	7.7
Melanau	36,772	7.5	35,560	6.5
Other Indigenous*	27,532	5.6	29,867	5.5
Others [†]	4,579	0.9	5,119	0.9
European	704	0.2	691	0.1
Total	490,585	100.0	546,385	100.0

* Minorities like Kayan, Kenyah, Kedayan, Murut, Bisayah, Punan, Kelabit, Orang Hulu, Dusun, and others.

[†] Include Javanese, Indian and Ceylonese/Sinhalese, Bugis, Filipino, Arabs, Bataks, Siamese, Banjorese, etc.

Source: L. W. Jones, *Sarawak: Report on the Census of Population taken on 15th June 1960*, Kuching: Government Printing Office, 1962, p. 59.

sisted by Malay Native Officers in their dealings with the native inhabitants. Administrative paperwork was usually left to the Chinese court writer and other clerical staff, mostly Chinese or Eurasian and Sinhalese. The small knot of Europeans was further tightened under the Second White Rajah, Charles Brooke (1868-1917), who was insistent on his rule that bachelor officers were preferred; wives and families, considered "distractions," were greatly discouraged from settling in Sarawak. Furthermore, Brooke economic policies were generally prejudicial against European investors lest sophisticated and unscrupulous entrepreneurs took advantage and exploited the native peoples in the pursuit of profits. These circumstances contributed to the small size of the European enclave.

Apart from the bulk of Europeans who served in the Brooke government as administrators, others were personnel of the various Christian denominational missions who served in churches (priests, ministers) and schools (teachers, principals); as workers of European companies and banks (Borneo Company, Sarawak Oilfields) as managers, technical staff, and supervisors; and as administering staff of the handful of European-owned rubber plantations.

On the eve of the Japanese invasion, Sarawak was the picture of an untroubled, idyllic country in the tropics, where indigenous peasant smallholders of rice fields, sago and rubber gardens, coconut groves, and fruit orchards transported their produce in small wooden crafts utilizing the numerous rivers as the main mode of transportation to the bazaar.

According to Japanese military thinking, Borneo possessed economic as well as strategic importance. The economically essential oil fields at Miri (Sarawak), Seria (Brunei), and Tarakan and Balikpapan (Dutch Borneo), were prime targets. The island of Borneo, located within striking distance of both British Malaya and Dutch Java, made its capture a fundamental prerequisite to successful operations in these two territories.

Although Sarawak's importance on the northwestern fringe of


Borneo, with its oil fields and a viable airstrip near Kuching, was established, for lack of resources, British military planners advocated scorched earth tactics in place of defense. Denial schemes were in place to render the oil installations at Miri and Lutong unusable to the enemy. Likewise, the Bukit Stabar Landing Ground, seven miles to the south of Kuching town,¹ was to be held as long as possible, failing which, its destruction was to be effected.

The only military force Britain could afford to deploy for Sarawak's defense, under the 1888 agreement,² was one Indian infantry battalion, the 2nd Battalion of the 15th Punjab Regiment (hereafter 2nd/15th Punjab) under the command of Lieutenant Colonel C. M. Lane. One infantry company with a detachment of one six-inch battery and a demolition squad of Royal Engineers was stationed at Miri and entrusted with the task of executing the oil field denial scheme. The remainder of the forces were deployed to defend the landing ground. SARFOR (Sarawak Forces), consisting of 2nd/15th Punjab Regiment and all local Sarawak and Brunei forces, numbered in total 2,565 officers and other ranks.³

On 13 December 1941, a Japanese convoy left Cam Ranh Bay, French Annam (Vietnam), and headed for northwest Borneo. It consisted of the 35th Infantry Brigade of the 124th Infantry Regiment under the command of Major-General Kiyotake Kawaguchi (referred to as the Kawaguchi Detachment)⁴ and the 2nd Yokosuka Naval Landing Force, flanked by an escort of cruisers and destroyers with two seaplanes for reconnaissance. The battle plan stipulated that "a landing would be made at Miri and Seria to capture and secure the oilfield district and airfields in that area. A large part of the force would then re-establish the Miri oilfield while the main body was to capture the Kuching airbase."⁵ On 15 December, the invasion force anchored off Tanjong Baram (Baram Point). The following day, Miri and Lutong fell; nine days later, at four o'clock on the afternoon of Christmas Eve, Kuching surrendered. Three days prior to the Miri landings, the full denial schemes⁶ at the oil fields were effectively executed. In the case of the Bukit Stabar Landing Ground, however, only partial destruc-

tion was effected. Following the fall of Kuching, the 2nd/15th Punjab retreated into Dutch Borneo, fighting a rearguard action; finally, on 3 April 1941, they surrendered.⁷

For three years and eight months Sarawak was a part of the Japanese Imperial empire. Sarawak, together with Brunei and former British North Borneo, was governed as one military unit by the 37th Army with its headquarters at Kuching.⁸ For administrative expediency, five provinces were created—Kuching-shu, Sibushu, Miri-shu, Seikai-shu (Jesselton), and Tokai-shu (Sandakan). The Japanese were content with controlling the coastal regions



Japanese Invasion of Borneo, December 1941 to January 1942

SOURCE: After Lionel Wigmore, *The Japanese Thrust*, Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1957, p. 179.

and settlements on the major rivers. Apart from the occasional patrols, the interior districts were left relatively ungoverned. All European inhabitants were interned in the main civilian camp at Batu Lintang, three miles to the southeast of Kuching town. The bulk of Allied prisoners of war (P.O.W.s)—Australians, British, Indians, Dutch—were imprisoned at Batu Lintang Camp. Smaller internment camps were established on Labuan Island, at Sandakan and Jesselton. The local inhabitants, apart from shortages and other economic hardships, were generally unmolested by the occupying forces.

On the whole the inhabitants of Sarawak were more bewildered by the Japanese invasion and subsequent occupation than frightened of their new masters. The scant fighting with the retreating British defenders and the absence of physical resistance from the local population made Japanese entry into Sarawak a fairly easy accomplishment. There were a few casualties in Kuching as a consequence of a single air raid prior to the landings but little damage to property.⁹

A military government (*gunseibu*) was established. The sinking of four transports carrying Japanese civil affairs staff resulted in the almost complete domination of military personnel in all branches of the administration.¹⁰ A policy of indirect rule was adopted with indigenous leaders being given positions of authority. Such appointments as well as the retention of native police personnel (mostly Malays) and former Brooke Native Officers (also for the most part Malays, with a few Ibans) by the Japanese were matters of expediency rather than a concerted effort to incorporate natives in the administration.¹¹ Likewise, the shortage of administrative staff also influenced the decision to utilize European personnel, releasing them from internment, in such essential services as "medical, police, water supply, and food production."¹²


The Japanese authorities constituted organizations like the *Ken Sanjikai* (Prefectural Advisory District Councils), sponsored the *kyodo-hei/kyodotai* (local army corps), and organized the *jikeidan* (vigilante corps). Malay and Chinese schools conducted *Nippon-go*

(Japanese language) classes. Rituals like daily exercises, the singing of the Japanese national anthem while facing in the direction of Japan, bowing to the picture of the Japanese emperor, and observing Japanese festivals, particularly the emperor's birthday, were all inculcated. The Japanese-sponsored organizations and the *Nippon-go* lessons were primarily aimed at winning over the support of the local populace.

In Kuching, a Chinese Economic Board was constituted involving most of the leading Chinese *towkays*.¹³ Its objective was to defeat blackmarketeering and smuggling.¹⁴ A multiethnic Women's Board was established to raise funds for the Japanese war effort by demanding that its members, who were prominent women from the various ethnic groups, "go among the women of their own race and persuade them to give up gold, silver and valuables to the Japanese government."¹⁵ This undertaking was generally carried out. It is uncertain, however, whether similar organizations operated outside Kuching, but the Japanese-sponsored Overseas Chinese Association established in Kuching had branches or counterparts throughout the country. For instance, in Sibü it was represented by the Joint Peace Keeping Association.¹⁶

The recapture of Borneo (including Sarawak) was part of General Douglas MacArthur's strategy to secure bases for the invasion of Java. However, his original plan of using an American-Australian force in launching the reoccupation of Java was vetoed by the Allied Joint Chiefs of Staff;¹⁷ however, three separate landings in Borneo by the Australian Imperial Forces (A.I.F.) were approved. Accordingly, in 1945, the 7th and 9th Divisions of the 1st Australian Corps made landings on Tarakan Island (1 May), Labuan Island and Brunei Bay (10 June), and Balikpapan (1 July).¹⁸ Prior to the main A.I.F. landings, personnel from Services Reconnaissance Department (SRD) "Z" Special Unit were dropped behind enemy lines in Central Borneo. Within Sarawak, the Semut Operations of the SRD performed remarkably well in terms of the extensive area they covered, the small losses in personnel, and the large number of enemy casualties.¹⁹

- - - - - Political boundaries
 Land cover BOQmetres
 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 metres



SOURCE: Papers of L. E. Morris, 91/18/1. IWM.

The atomic bombing of Hiroshima, followed by Nagasaki, and Japan's unconditional surrender thereafter, hastened the cessation of hostilities. Following VP-Day, 15 August 1945, several Japanese garrisons continued the struggle; by late October, however, the last of the Japanese units finally surrendered.²⁰ Notwithstanding the

fighting in the interior, the official Japanese surrender in Sarawak took place on 11 September 1945, during a ceremony held on board H.M.A.S. *Kapunda* at Kuching.²¹

This selected set of documents and reports of the Japanese period in Sarawak consists of official papers and reports, private letters, memoirs and recollections, reconstructions based on scribbled notes kept during the years of incarceration, autobiographical papers, and secretly kept wartime diaries of Europeans. The outbreak of the Pacific War caught the European community of Brooke Sarawak, like its counterparts in other colonial possessions in Southeast Asia, by surprise. It was a rude awakening for many European "Tuans" and "Mems" when events moved with such rapidity, preventing them from regaining their sense of composure and perspective following the initial shock.

This collection of papers provides an overview of the period of Japanese military occupation in Sarawak largely through the experiences of individual European participants. It presents a cross section of the experiences of the small group of European settlers in Sarawak during this tumultuous period beginning in the wake of the outbreak of hostilities, capture and surrender, the long years of internment, and release from incarceration following the Japanese surrender. In an attempt to present a balanced viewpoint, included here are also translations of captured Japanese documents and papers, and interrogation reports of captured Japanese personnel.

These archival documents edited for clarity and/or brevity are reproduced accompanied by background information and relevant commentary, thereby allowing the reader an insight into these experiences as recounted by actual participants. Any indecipherable passages are left as they are with conjectural meanings in parentheses; likewise, factual infelicities are left intact but accompanied by explanatory endnotes. Considering the precarious circumstances under which some of these documents were written, no attempt has been made to correct typographical and grammatical errors unless their occurrence disrupts the flow or distorts the meaning of the overall text.

This study is divided into eight sections, namely the situation prior to the outbreak of war; preparation for defense in anticipation of an imminent conflict; the Japanese invasion; attempts at escape, and capture and surrender in the face of the Japanese advance; the *gunseibu* government; the years of detention in P.O.W. and internment camps; of "massacres" and "murders"; and the mixed feelings of anxiety, fear, the exhilaration of release, sadness for those who didn't make it, and sense of relief at the news of the end of the war. Each section begins with a background setting and explanatory notes followed by the introduction of documents. A brief summary of the contents of the document, information regarding the author, and circumstances and background of the document, are given prior to its presentation.

The work is divided into four parts arranged in chronological order. Part I, which covers events prior to 15 December 1941, provides a survey of Japanese prewar strategies and military plans (chapter 1). Balancing this background setting is an overview of the defense plans of Sarawak (chapter 2). The first chapter of Part II records the rush of events from 15 December to 24 December 1941, giving a detailed account of happenings from the Japanese landings at Miri until their bloodless entry into Kuching on Christmas Eve (chapter 3). Part II's second chapter attempts to make sense of the rather chaotic situation in Kuching and in the other outstations in the face of Japanese advance (chapter 4). Kuching witnessed the flight of the Europeans, some of whom managed to escape to Pontianak thence to Java or straight to Australia, others after trekking inland decided to give themselves up, and others still met uncertain fates in the interior. Parts I and II constitute volume I.

Volume II covers parts III (25 December 1941 to 9 June 1945) and IV (10 June to 15 August 1945). Part III, the most extended section, covers three aspects of the war situation. Firstly, the structure and description of the major policies of the Japanese *gunseibu* (military) government (chapter 5). This is followed by the lives and times of European inmates in the Batu Lintang Internment Camp

(chapter 6). The experiences of both civilians and P.O.W.s as "guests" of the Japanese are portrayed in vivid details through the writings and recollections of men and women under dire circumstances. The third section of Part III deals with one alleged "massacre" of European civilians, an unsolved "murder" of a senior Brooke officer, and the purported "murder" of Sarawak's chief secretary by the Japanese (chapter 7). Finally, Part IV describes the events from 10 June 1945, which was the first sighting of an Allied aircraft across the Kuching skies, to 15 August 1945, the date of Japan's official unconditional surrender, which marked the end of the Pacific War (chapter 8).



PART I

BEFORE 15 DECEMBER 1941



CHAPTER 1

JAPANESE PREWAR STRATEGIES AND MILITARY PLANS

AS EARLY as the period following the Great War (1914-18), the Japanese took an interest in the affairs of Borneo. Like elsewhere in Southeast Asia, there were Japanese immigrants in Sarawak and British North Borneo. They came as individuals, generally in professions such as barber, dentist, physician, and, for most young female immigrants, as prostitutes. Several Japanese also became petty traders, market gardeners, or rubber plantation owners. In addition, some were representatives of corporations or members of trade missions; these two categories had semi-official status.¹

In 1937, the Japanese government established a think-tank organization known as the Institute to Promote Pacific Relations, or Showa Kenkyukai. The economic advantages of Borneo, particularly given its oil fields, were highlighted by the Showa Kenkyukai. Its members were instrumental in advocating imperial designs over Borneo.²

Planners in the Japanese military during the years leading to Pearl Harbor had outlined strategies and made preparations in the event of the occupation of the vital "Southern Area," namely the

countries of Southeast Asia. These plans were continually revised and pruned; when actual occupation was effected, implementation of these plans was initiated, and subsequent changes were incorporated in accordance with the internal local situation and external wartime conditions. The policies of military government and administrative procedures in the occupied territories were laid out by the Tokyo planners; Japanese field commanders and their civilian counterparts were expected to execute these policies and procedures in their respective domains.

DOCUMENT 1 illustrates the extent of Japanese prewar penetration in the British territories of northwest Borneo. It is an abstract entitled "British Territories in North Borneo" from an intelligence report made by the Allied Landing Force South-East Asia (A.L.F.S.E.A.) command. The report was based on captured Japanese documents and written by Australian intelligence officers sometime after their landings in North Borneo, Brunei, and Sarawak. This twenty-four page document is dated 28 September 1945.

DOCUMENT 2 provides an insight into the activities of the Showa Kenkyukai prior to the war and during the wartime years. This document is drawn from an Australian interrogation report. The interrogation session with Seki Yoshihiko, a senior civilian official (*Gunzoku*) of the Japanese 37 Army administration in Borneo, was conducted sometime in early June 1946. Seki, however, "was only a minor official in the Institute . . . engaged in purely academic research in the Research Department, had very little to do with matters on a high level that affected JAPANESE foreign policy." The final report of the interrogation, dated 15 June 1946, was submitted as Item 2181 of Intelligence Bulletin No. 237 to Lieutenant Colonel A. C. L. Dredge, Officer Commanding South-East Asia Translation and Interrogation Centre (SEATIC).

DOCUMENTS 3 and 4 contain the military orders and policies relating to the occupation and governance of occupied territories in the Southern Area. The agreement between the Japanese Impe-

rial Army and the Imperial Navy pertaining to their joint establishment of military administration in the occupied areas is in DOCUMENT 5. DOCUMENTS 3, 4, and 5 are translations of captured Japanese papers. All three documents are classified under "Japanese Plans and Operation in S.E. Asia" issued as a Special Intelligence Bulletin marked "SECRET." In its preamble is stated, "This is a Special Bulletin consisting of translations of documents which were collected and sent to SEATIC by FIELD FORCES, and were designed to present a general picture for use in the Supreme Allied Commander's despatches of Japanese plans and operations in South East Asia during the war."

All five documents are kept at the Public Record Office (PRO), Kew, United Kingdom, listed under the WO Series, that is, War Office Papers.

DOCUMENT 1

Japanese Penetration in Northwest Borneo Prior to 1941

"British Territories in North Borneo." Extract from Australian Landing Force South-East Asia (A.L.F.S.E.A.), Wartime Intelligence Report (W.I.R.), No. 52, 28 September 1945. WO 208/105. PRO. pp. 16-17, 19-20.

The Japanese began to take an active interest in Borneo shortly after the 1914-18 war through the medium of economic missions and emissaries. A gradual expansion took place. As is usual, individual Japanese made their appearance as hair-dressers, masseurs, dentists, importers and fishermen, but meanwhile investments were being made by some of the leading commercial houses of Japan. Then came an influx of agricultural settlers and fishermen. Branches of the Borneo Fishery Co. Ltd. (Head Office: Tokyo), were established at Sandakan, Tawau and Banggi Island, with a factory on Siamil Island near the entrance to Darvel Bay. About

160 Japanese were employed on Banggi Island. There was a fishing fleet of fast motor boats, and 500 Japanese were in employment at the beginning of 1941. A prosperous Japanese colony existed in the Tawau district whose estates and holdings amounted to 44,820 acres producing—in order of importance—rubber, cocoanuts, hemp and vegetables. There was a smaller colony in Kuala Belait. . . .

The Japanese had the appearance of self-sufficiency. They maintained towards the local peoples an even demeanour not untinged with authority. In the Tawau district of B.N.B. [British North Borneo] most of the Chinese were dependent on the Japanese for their livelihood. When the Japanese had political or economic ends to achieve they could be friendly and hospitable. . . .

JAPANESE PENETRATION

Prostitution, forerunner of Japanese commerce, was early in evidence and survived after the more modern Japanese businesses had been established. It is noteworthy that the Japanese Mission to B.N.B. in 1924 was reported to have been financed by the Japanese Foreign Office to the extent of 15,000 yen. It operated under the auspices of the South Seas Association whose interests today extend throughout the "Southern Regions." The previously mentioned Borneo Fishery Co Ltd., floated in December 1933 with a capital of 1,000,000 yen, was subsidized by the Formosan Government. As was to be expected, Mitsubishi was not wanting in investments.³

The Japanese Consul at Sandakan had consular jurisdiction over B.N.B., Brunei, Sarawak and Labuan. The Consulate was established in 1937 and the Consul had a Japanese staff consisting of a chancellor and two clerks, in addition to whom two Japanese peons and a Sikh watch-man were employed. The Consul received from Japan remittances which were known to be particularly heavy in the latter half of 1940. He was a subscriber to the "Singa-

pore Nippo" of whose Chinese edition he regularly received 20 copies which he distributed among the Chinese population. There was a secret internal and external Japanese courier service.

Members of Japanese commercial concerns as well as individually employed Japanese were disposed towards "buying over" officials and others who might have been in possession of useful information or the means of obtaining it. The Japanese catered for the tastes of their "prospects"—whether they were for money, women, drink or ambition. It was stated on reliable authority that costly Christmas presents were given to a few officials in some areas of B.N.B., but no comment was offered as to whether these overtures had the desired effect. (The desired effect, in this instance, probably was to establish cordial relations which would [preclude] the growth of suspicion). It was opined, early in 1941, that the majority of the British officials were inclined naively to regard the Japanese as a commercial rather than a military and political menace.

In general, the Japanese concentrated their attentions on members of the indigenous population including the Malays and possibly to a lesser extent, the Indians and Chinese. In Kuching the Japanese mixed freely with other Asiatics, especially Malays. Some had married native women, or nominally had adopted the Mohammedan faith. Information dated June 1941, from an official source, stated *inter alia*:

The Japanese were fostering a very definite whispering campaign designed to shake confidence, inspire fear, sow treachery, and thereby weaken the local Government and popularize themselves. The Dutch authorities in the Netherlands East Indies attained considerable results from 'listening posts' established throughout the country for reporting on bazaar rumours, coffee shop talk, barber shop talk, club and association and market place talk. Reports on all items of news culled by listening posts were received at Central Headquarters from District Headquarters, where they were collated and assessed.

DOCUMENT 2

Showa Kenkyukai, the Institute to Promote Pacific Relations

Intelligence Bulletin No. 237, 15 June 1946; A.C.L. Dredge, Liet.-Colonel, G.S.I.A. Officer Commanding. ITEM 2181 INTERROGATION of SEKI Yoshihiko. WO 203/6317. PRO.

I. FOUNDATION AND ORGANISATION

The Institute to promote PACIFIC Relations was formed in TOKYO in [19]37, after the CHINA Incident had begun.⁴ The Institute was originally intended to study the factors governing the international settlement of problems arising in the PACIFIC Ocean. A further aim was that the Institute, in the ways delineated below, was to open the eyes of the JAPANESE to face the situation, and to try and influence other nations, in particular, AMERICA.

There were about fifty specialists employed by the Institute, some of whom were permanent employees, others merely temporary. The work of the organisation was divided among several departments, as follows:—

(a) *The Research Department* concerned itself in investigating the political, economic, social and anthropological characteristics of the PACIFIC Areas. The results of its researches were published as books or in the Institute's magazine.

(b) *The Publication Department* published the work of the members in book form or in the monthly magazine "TAIHEIYOO" (The PACIFIC). Important articles were often translated into English.

(c) *The General Planning Department* arranged lectures, held several times a year, which endeavoured to educate the mass of the people on PACIFIC affairs. In addition, discussion groups were held every month in relation to current PACIFIC problems. Sometimes, the conclusions of the Discussion group, consisting of members of the Institute and a few well informed guests, were submitted to the Government as the opinion of the Institute.

(d) *A Department of General Affairs* was concerned with matters relating to finance, personnel, accounts and general administration.

2. ACTIVITIES BEFORE THE WAR

... However, one problem which beset all members of all departments was how to overcome JAPAN's serious overpopulation question, by peaceful means. At the beginning of [19]39, after lengthy research and much discussion, the Institute submitted an Opinion to the Government that negotiations be opened with HOLLAND, for the purpose of buying part of DUTCH NEW GUINEA, for JAPANESE colonisation.⁵ ... Indeed to some extent, it can be regarded as having been an Advisory Council to the Foreign Office.

In addition, early in [19]38, very strong proposals were made to the Government to negotiate an armistice with CHIANG KAI SHEK, since the opinion of the Institute was that a prolonged war, as that in CHINA might become, would be disastrous to JAPAN. There was apparently much discussion between the Government and the Institute on this point, but eventually the view put forward by the military prevailed. This view was that, since the whole of CHINA's coastline was in the hands of the JAPANESE Army thus permitting the CHINESE no exit to the sea, the country was blockaded. The pitifully few industries had been taken away and there was no proper system of communications. The CHINESE Army, torn by internecine strife, would have to conclude a negotiated peace.

Several times in [19]39 and [19]40, the Institute gave private warning to the Government of the danger which lay in permitting JAPANESE-AMERICAN relations to deteriorate further. ...

3. ACTIVITIES ON OUTBREAK OF WAR

On the outbreak of war, the purpose of the Institute was altered. It now had to concern itself only with advising the Army in deal-

ing with the host of problems which arose when JAPAN's southern blitzkrieg proved so successful. The Institute was rapidly expanded and all its resources mobilised for the war effort. Specialists were sent to the occupied areas they knew best, to advise and continue their research. . . .

5. PERSONNEL

The names of the senior advisors and heads of departments of the Institute were:—

NAGATA Hidejiro:-	President (now dead)
NOMURA Kichisaburo:-	Adviser
KURIBAYASHI Tokuichi:-	Adviser
TSURUMI Yusuke:-	General Director
KASAMA Akio:-	Chief of General Affairs Dept. (now dead)
KANAI Kiyoshi:-	Chief of General Planning Dept.
HIRANO Yoshitaro:-	Chief of Publication Dept.
YAMADA Fumio:-	Chief of Research Dept.

6. PUBLICATIONS

The most important books published by the Institute, composing the work of its members are:—

1. Ethnological Survey of the PACIFIC Area.
2. Natural Features in the PACIFIC Area.
3. The BRITISH Empire and the PACIFIC.
4. Political Study of AMERICA.
5. An Economic Study of AMERICA.
6. A Sociological Study of AMERICA.
7. The Economic Structure of JAPAN.
8. A History of the Agricultural Policy of the DUTCH EAST INDIES (An original work written by source)
9. Economic Conditions in SIAM.

10. A Study of the PHILIPPINES from the political, ethnological, sociological and economic points of view.

11. A Study of AUSTRALIA from all aspects.

DOCUMENT 3

Orders Relating to the Occupation of the Vital Southern Area

Special Intelligence Bulletin: Japanese Plans and Operation in S.E. Asia—Translation of Japanese Documents, 21 December 1945. WO 203/6310. PRO. Document 2.

1. Imperial HQ has drawn up plans for the occupation of a Southern Area essential to the Empire's defence and existence, and to the establishment of a new order in Greater East ASIA.

2. GOC [General Officer Commanding] Southern Army in co-operation with the Navy will immediately occupy the vital Southern Area in accordance with the following instructions:—

Orders for the commencement of offensive (occupation) operations will be issued separately.

i. Area to be occupied includes the following essential places:—The PHILIPPINES, British MALAYA, NEI [Netherlands East Indies], a part of BURMA.

ii. While these operations are in progress, maximum order must be maintained in THAILAND, and FIC. [French Indo-China], so that CHINA will be sealed off by those areas. If the THAI and Indo-Chinese Armies resist, these areas also may be fully occupied.

iii. Propaganda and deception will be employed as important means of facilitating conduct of operations.

iv. When order has been restored, in occupied areas, materials essential for homeland defence will be seized, and military administration set up in those areas to ensure means of maintaining the army.

3. GOC CHINA Exped[itionary]. Army, GOC Defence Forces and GOC FORMOSA Army will supply all necessary help to GOC Southern Army in the course of these operations.

4. Detailed instructions will be given by CGS [Chief of General Staff].

By Imperial Decree. 15 Nov[ember] 41. SUGIYAMA
Gen.

Chief of Gen[eral]

Staff.

DOCUMENT 4

The Administration of the Occupied Territories in the Vital Southern Area

Special Intelligence Bulletin: Japanese Plans and Operation in
S.E. Asia—Translation of Japanese Documents, 21 December
1945. WO 203/6310. PRO. Document 3.

Imperial HQ—Army Branch 25 Nov[ember] [19]41.

1. GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. Commanders of combined operations forces co-operating closely together will set up military government in occupied territories in this area, and will join in achieving our object in this war.

2. The objects of military government are to plan the speedy acquisition of resources for homeland defence, the restoration of law and order, to devise means of making the army of occupation self-supporting and to contribute to the success of the war.

3. In carrying on military government, means must be devised for utilising any existing government machinery. Collaboration should also be encouraged by respecting traditional systems and national customs. By these means, the burden on the army will be reduced, thus enabling it to proceed to its objective.

4. The general principles of military government will be laid down by operational force commanders, and army commanders will be responsible for the efficient functioning of military governments in operational areas.

5. General instructions for military government will be issued by

the Army Staff, and it will be the responsibility of military government authorities to lay down guiding instructions based on these for the establishment of local administrative machinery.

6. Administration organisations will have branches at important localities in occupied territories. The heads of the administrative organisations will receive orders from the military government authorities, and will be responsible for carrying them out in their own areas. However, for peace preservation, they will be subject to the orders of the appropriate commanders of infantry formations.

II. ADMINISTRATION

7. It will be necessary to have overall control of administration, but all efforts must be made to respect national customs and traditional systems, in order to avoid interference in the details of civil government.

8. During the war, the great burdens which will fall on natives on account of the acquisition of natural resources and the process of making the army self-supporting must be borne with the utmost patience. Any requests regarding welfare, which are contrary to this object, will be refused.

9. British, American and Dutch citizens will be treated according to the Imperial Policy. They will be given instructions on how to co-operate with the Military Government, and measures will be devised for removing or changing the opinions of those who do not comply. Any authority possessed by Axis Nationals⁶ will be respected, but further extension of their powers must be rigidly controlled.

10. Steps will be taken so that existing police and volunteer forces, with military support and backing, may take on the task of preserving law and order.

11. Judgments on civil affairs will be made by local authorities, and military affairs will be settled by military law.

III. FINANCE, CIRCULATION, CURRENCY, COMMERCE

12. The main object of plans for finance and currency is to reduce to the minimum the burden incurred by JAPAN as a result of

her Southern policy, and to build up her power to wage economic warfare.

13. Expenses necessary for the upkeep of army units will in future be met locally, in accordance with the policy of local self-maintenance.

14. Existing financial systems will be utilised for the present, and improved if necessary. An annual increase in income will be planned. As far as expenditure is concerned, army requirements will have first priority.

15. As a rule every effort will be made to use existing local currency. Where this is impossible, occupation notes, specially printed in accordance with foreign currency regulations, will be used.

16. From the outset of military government, commerce and bills of exchange will be controlled. In particular, any commerce with the enemy in such specially important commodities as oil, rubber, tin, tungsten and quinine will be checked, and the prosecution of economic war facilitated.

IV. THE [D]ISCOVERY AND [A]CQUISITION OF [R]ESOURCES

17. It is our chief aim to devise speedy methods for the exploitation and acquisition of resources necessary for waging war and for Homeland Defence, and to plan the expansion of the Empire's military power.

18. It is planned to use supervised civilian labour in the acquisition of these vital resources. Selection of these civilians will be made after consultation with the appropriate branch of the central authorities.

19. At first the important factories and workshops among those commandeered will be under military control. However, it is intended to hand them over to civilian control as quickly as possible.

20. Comparative tables for the important resources to be acquired in the various areas are given as an appendix.

21. Essential resources mobilised in the area of an operational army will be disposed of in accordance with the "Mobilisation of Resources Plan" of the central authorities. Materials necessary for

the maintenance of the operational army will be utilised on the spot in accordance with the "Distribution Plan" of the central authorities.

22. The army will do its utmost to assist in the transporting of materials back to JAPAN, and will use all available commandeered shipping for this purpose.

V. COMMUNICATIONS

23. Initials [*sic*; Initial] management of railways, shipping, harbours, air traffic, signals and postal facilities will be in the hands of the military authorities.

VI. NATIONALS

24. Japanese nationals already resident in the various areas will co-operate with the government and help in the assesment of materials. They will be under military supervision. Nationals who are to be sent out after the beginning of the war will be selected with extreme care as regards character, etc. In every case preference will be given to those nationals who have previously resided in the area in question, and are now in JAPAN.

25. Resident Chinese will be urged to dissociate themselves fully from the CHIANG KAI SHEK party and to give their support to our policy. Those who do not comply will be removed immediately.

26. We must avoid giving premature encouragement to local Independence Movements. These should progress gradually according to local circumstances, and should be guided and controlled by the general plan.

VII. RELIGIONS

27. We shall maintain the existing religions, and try to allay doubts in the minds of the local people by respecting their customs. These religions should be fitted into our cultural policy.

VIII. PROPAGANDA

28. We must first cultivate in the minds of the local people an attitude of trust towards the Imperial Army. Then [gradually] they will be indoctrinated with the policy of liberation in East Asia, so that they will be available for use in our operational schemes. Security of property rights and destruction of the hated white races' power should be [played] up in propaganda.

Appendix to Document 4: Table giving specifications for exploiting and requisitioning of vital materials in the various regions of the Southern Area.

<i>Region</i>	<i>Commodity</i>	<i>Unit</i>	<i>1st Year Target</i>	<i>Notes</i>
DUTCH EAST INDIES	O Oil	1000 Tons	600	Exploitation and requisitioning target
	O Nickel Ore	1000 Tons	100	
	* Bauxite	1000 Tons	300	
	O Manganese Ore	1000 Tons	20	
	Tin	1000 Tons	10	
	Raw rubber	1,000 Tons	100	Requisitioning targets.
	Cinchona bark	Tons	1,000	
(Incl. DUTCH BORNEO).	Quinine	Tons	100	
	Castor bean	100 Tons	5	
	Tanning materials	1,000 Tons	30	
	Copra	1,000 Tons	150	
	Palm Oil	1,000 Tons	30	
	* Industrial Salt	1,000 Tons	10	
	* Maize	1,000 Tons	100	
PHILIPPINES.	O Manganese Ore	1,000 Tons	50	Exploitation and requisitioning target.
	O Chlorine Ore	1,000 Tons	50	
	O Copper Ore	1,000 Tons	100	
	* Iron & Steel	1,000 Tons	300	
	Manila hemp	1,000 Tons	75	
	Copra	1,000 Tons	150	Requisitioning targets.
				Exploitation and requisitioning target.
BRITISH MALAYA	* Bauxite	1,000 Tons	100	
	O Manganese Ore	1,000 Tons	30	

<i>Region</i>	<i>Commodity</i>	<i>Unit</i>	<i>1st Year Target</i>	<i>Notes</i>
	* Iron Ore	1,000 Tons	500	_____
	Tin	1,000 Tons	10	
	Raw Rubber	1,000 Tons	100	Requisitioning
	Copra	1,000 Tons	50	target
	Tanning materials	1,000 Tons	5	_____
BRITISH BORNEO	O Oil	1,000 Tons	500	Exploitation and requisitioning target

Notes on Table

1. These figures are the essential minimum[m].
2. The target figures for the 2nd and subsequent years will be fixed according to current conditions.
3. Materials marked O are those regarding which it is not necessary to stick closely to the figures given here. They must be exploited and sent to JAPAN in as great quantities as possible.
4. Materials marked *. Quantities of those are to be increased as shipping space is available.

DOCUMENT 5

Army-Navy-Central Agreement for Establishing Military Administration in Occupied Territories

Special Intelligence Bulletin: Japanese Plans and Operation in S.E. Asia—Translation of Japanese Documents, 21 December 1945. WO 203/6310. PRO. Document 4.

1. Policy.

The Military Government will be controlled by the Army and Navy working in co-operation to achieve the objects of this war.

2. Summary.

i. The central body will hold combined conferences on the subject of military government when reports from localities indicate that this is necessary.

ii. After deciding primary and secondary responsibilities in each area, the establishment of Military Administration will be undertaken by the service given chief responsibility, in co-operation with the other. In view of the foregoing clause, local Army

and Navy force commanders will establish liaison machinery as considered necessary.

3. In each area, the OC [Officer Commanding] of the service given primary responsibility, will work in close collaboration with the OC of the service given secondary responsibility. They should pay attention to the following basic matters:—

- (a) Administration of occupied territory.
- (b) Maintenance of peace.
- (c) Obtaining and exploitation of resources.
- (d) Economy, finance and circulation of currency.
- (e) Postal services and signals, harbours, railways, shipping and air traffic.
- (f) Information and propaganda.
- (g) Control of enemy property and other establishments, etc.

4. The allocation of responsibility for carrying on military administration is laid, in outline, as follows[:]

After consultation between the senior commanders of the local army and naval forces, changes can be made depending upon the requirements of the situation.

i. Areas where the Army has the primary responsibility (and, therefore, the Navy the secondary):

HONGKONG, the PHILIPPINES, BRITISH MALAYA, SUMATRA, JAVA, BRITISH BORNEO and BURMA.

ii. Areas where the Navy has the primary responsibility (and therefore, the Army, the secondary):

DUTCH BORNEO, CELEBES, MOLUCCA[S] Archipelago, [LESSER SUNDAS], NEW GUINEA, BISMAR[C]K Archipelago, GUAM Island.

iii. The navy will establish bases at the following points in areas for which the army has primary responsibility. The local army commander will do his utmost to supply navy requirements in such things as construction of installations and barracks and food supply. For deciding the allocation of port duties and the localities where essential installations are to be established, central and local agreements will be separately formed.

HONGKONG, MANILA, SINGAPORE, PENANG, SOURABAYA, and DAVAO. The control of shipbuilding installations in the above areas and in BATAVIA and RANGOON, (excluding those for small craft) will be the responsibility of the Navy. The navy will do its utmost to supply the repair requirements of shipping attached to the army.

iv. Where military installations have been set up in areas other than those mentioned in the preceding paragraphs as a result of conference between the local army and navy commanders, these will be treated in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph.

v. Other points.

(a) [P]oints re movement of shipping.

In areas of sea where shipping must be protected, control of shipping will be in the hands of the navy. Control of shipping attached to the army will be decided by the local army and navy commanders.

(b) Points re control and use of enemy property and various installations.

i. A general principle will be that enemy army and navy installations will come under control of the army or navy commander on the spot. Agreements will be made centrally and locally on the subject of air installations.

ii. Other details will be covered by the provisions i, ii, and iii above, and will be decided by the army and navy on the spot. Control of factories, billets, warehouses, docks, jetties, hospitals, sanitary installations and serviceable shipping necessary to the services will be decided by mutual agreement and examination.

(c) Points re the air-force and signals.

Air movement and signals between occupied countries and JAPAN and between occupied countries will be decided centrally and locally.

Notes

1. Points agreed on for the conduct of operations will not be limited by this agreement.
2. Control of captured and confiscated shipping will be transferred to JAPAN (in general those ships over 500 tons).
3. This agreement is subject to revision or adjustment according to the development of operations.

CHAPTER 2

THE "DEFENSE" OF SARAWAK

AS EARLY as the 1850s, James Brooke had argued on countless occasions that Sarawak could not stand on its own but needed a "Protective Power" against predatory countries. He sought this protection from his home country but was shunned; similar feelers sent to the governments of the Netherlands, Belgium, France, and Italy were unsuccessful. Finally, in 1863 Great Britain granted recognition of Sarawak as an independent and sovereign country. "Protection," however, "was not accorded till 1888," during the reign of Rajah Charles, "and then it was offered, not asked for, and was granted, not in the interests of Sarawak, but for safeguarding of Imperial interests, lest some other foreign power should lay its hands on the little State."¹

Thereafter, under the 1888 Agreement with Great Britain, all relations with foreign countries would be conducted by Her Majesty's government, which would undertake to protect Sarawak from without. Internal administration remained in the hands of the Brooke Rajahs. In accordance with this agreement, Britain undertook to despatch troops and equipment to Sarawak during the

late 1930s, when it was generally certain that war in the East was inevitable. The only British military presence in Sarawak prior to the Japanese invasion, however, was a 1,050-member infantry battalion, the 2nd/15th Punjab Regiment.

During the mid-1930s, the Royal Air Force (R.A.F.) made preliminary studies for the siting of landing grounds; Kuching, Miri-Lutong, and Bintulu were each to prepare a suitable airstrip for use by the R.A.F. But no military aircrafts were stationed on Sarawak soil. Likewise, the Royal Navy was absent in the waters off northwest Borneo, where three protectorates of Great Britain were located.

British military planners at Singapore, responsible for the defense of three British Borneo territories, were clearly aware of the prevailing inadequacy of defense measures. General Officer Commanding Malaya, Lieutenant-General A. E. Percival, following a two-day tour of Kuching in late November 1941, remarked of the situation:

Nobody could pretend that this was a satisfactory situation, but at least it would make the enemy deploy a bigger force to capture the place than would have been necessary if it had not been defended at all and that, I think, is the true way to look at it. . . . The best I could do was to promise to send them a few anti-aircraft guns and to tell them of the arrival of the [battleship] *Prince of Wales* and [battle-cruiser] *Repulse*, which were due at Singapore in a few days' time—not that I expected the anti-aircraft guns to be of much practical value but I felt that the moral effect of their presence there would more than counterbalance some slight dispersion of force. Unfortunately war broke out before they could be dispatched, so the people of Kuching did not even have that comfort.²

The following nine documents are abstracted from the notes kept by J. L. Noakes, who held the position of secretary for defense, director of air raid precautions, and security officer of Sarawak at the outbreak of war with Japan. This highly exhaustive report, hereinafter referred to as Noakes's Report, particularly with regards to details of the movements of Europeans, was com-

posed during the internment years at Batu Lintang, Kuching. Nevertheless when commenting on the activities of British and Japanese military forces, Noakes warned of the report's reliability and accuracy.

This report had [sic; has] been drawn from the memory of the Secretary for Defence and from evidence supplied to him by other prisoners during the early days of internment. It is hoped that most of the information given is accurate, but the report cannot be regarded as complete and, therefore, it is subject to amendment if, and as, further information becomes available. All information herein regarding the movements and actions of both British and Japanese Military Forces must be held to be subject to revision. [Section XX, A, para 1, p. 42]

How these notes were written during those trying years of internment, cleverly hidden (its discovery quite likely meant death), and safely retrieved after the war is described here in the author's own words.

The greater part of this report was written during the first six months of 1942, but substantial additions were made subsequently during imprisonment as further information came to hand. No official documents were available for reference purposes and all information contained in the report was obtained from the internees or drawn from my own memory. The chance of my paper falling into Japanese hands was ever present and was a considerable source of anxiety. Knowing full well the consequence of detection I found it difficult to concentrate upon my writing and for this reason I offer no apology for grammatical weaknesses and imperfect construction.

For the best part of three years the papers were buried, or hidden in the false bottom of a box, or secreted in the hollow legs of my camp stretcher. The Internment Camp was frequented by inquisitive Japanese soldiers and officials and surprise searches occurred from time to time. Once, during such a search, the papers were removed by walking boldly into the hut and carrying them off from under the noses of the Japanese searchers.

The papers were still legible when release came and they were handed to Brigadier [C. F. C.] MacKaskie [Macaskie] [Head, British Borneo Civil Affairs Unit (BBCAU)] in Labuan in September 1945. I arrived in New Zealand on 28th October 1945, but the papers did not reach me till 16th December. My anxiety to have the draft typed and forwarded to London, and my poor health, both precluded the hope I had entertained of redrafting the report. It appears in its present form substantially as it was first written. [Preface]

A copy of Noakes's Report is lodged at Rhodes House Library, Oxford, United Kingdom.

DOCUMENT 6 describes the background and reasons for the presence of British forces in Sarawak while DOCUMENT 7 gives details of British Imperial Forces present on the eve of the Japanese invasion. DOCUMENT 8 presents the Brooke government's viewpoint as to the inadequacy of military protection offered by Britain in the defense of Sarawak.

Details of the "denial schemes," a strategy which would be implemented in the event of an enemy invasion, are described in DOCUMENT 9. These scorched earth measures were chiefly designed for denying the oil fields to the enemy. To complement the British troops, the Brooke government had mobilized its civil servants, the Sarawak Rangers, and other voluntary bodies for the defense of the country. The constitution and deployment of these local forces are described in DOCUMENT 10. DOCUMENT 11, which lists the aerial and naval defense measures in Sarawak, reveals the inadequacy of these efforts as a consequence of the lack of appropriate equipment and expertise of personnel.

In spite of the general weaknesses and shortcomings of these defense measures, it is commendable that the then Brooke ruler, Rajah Charles Vyner's senior officers agreed to remain at their posts at all costs rather than enact a complete evacuation in the face of an invasion. The order to remain at their respective posts is given in DOCUMENT 12. DOCUMENT 13, however, contains the plans for the evacuation of the European civilian population in the event of the outbreak of hostilities.

DOCUMENT 14 provides an account of the defense position in Sarawak on the eve of the Japanese invasion, highlighting the military unpreparedness of the country.

From the description of the defense situation on the eve of invasion, Noakes was highly critical of British military commitment to Sarawak. Noakes, in no uncertain terms, pointed out the helplessness of Sarawak's defense situation. Urged by him as Sarawak secretary for defense, Lieutenant General A. E. Percival, general office commanding, Malaya Command, Singapore, visited Sarawak in November 1941 to review for himself the inadequacy of defense measures. It was indeed a pathetic situation; however Percival had other more urgent priorities to attend. Sarawak was but a side theatre in the overall scenario of a war with Japan.

DOCUMENT 6

Reasons for the Presence of British Forces in Sarawak

J. L. Noakes, "Report upon Defence Measures Adopted in Sarawak from June 1941 to the Occupation in December 1941 by Imperial Japanese Forces; Also an Account of the Movement of British and Sarawak Military Forces during the Japanese Invasion of Sarawak," 15 February 1946. MSS Pac.s.62. RHL. Section III, pp. 9-10.

1. Under the Treaty of 1888 between Great Britain and Sarawak the Imperial Government guaranteed protection against foreign powers.

2. As early as 1935 representatives of the Royal Air Force visited Sarawak in search of suitable sites for R.A.F. Landing Grounds. Construction of the Bukit Stabar (7th Mile) Landing Ground was commenced on 1st April 1936 and finished (including the first extension of 700 to 800 yards) in May 1938 and the Ground was opened in September 1938. The Miri (Lutong) Ground was commenced later in 1936, was extended twice, from 700 yards to 800

yards and then to 1 000 yards, and the first [l]anding on it was made in September 1939. The Bintulu Landing Ground was commenced late in 1936 also and it would have been finished by November 1939 but was abandoned a few weeks before.

3. Towards the cost of construction of Landing Grounds the Sarawak Government originally contributed £25,000 to be used by the R.A.F. and to be regarded as an Imperial Defence Contribution. The Air Ministry voted an additional £25,000. Expenditure on the Bukit Stabar Landing Ground was approximately £25,000, so it may be said that the Sarawak Government paid for this ground and the Air Ministry for Bintulu and Miri.

4. The Miri Landing Ground was a grass-surfaced strip, 1,000 yards in length, near the coast, [b]ecause of its length and surface it was not greatly favoured, a fact recognised by the R.A.F. when denial was ordered on 8th December 1941.

5. The Bukit Stabar Landing Ground was of "T" construction, with grass surface. It, too was too short for general use, but extensions put in hand in 1941 were designed to make it large enough to carry all but the heaviest of planes. These extensions were not completed before the outbreak of war with Japan.

6. The reason for the presence of troops in the Miri Oilfields is self-evident. It is only surprising that so few troops were stationed there.

7. Prior to March 1941, His Highness the Rajah had recognised the probability of war with Japan and had reminded the British Government on several occasions of the responsibility of that Government for the defence of Sarawak under the 1888 Treaty. His Highness also pointed out that the Landing Grounds constituted a source of danger to Sarawak, since two of them were fit for use yet were undefended.

8. In March 1941, His Highness addressed a further letter to H. E. the British Agent, for the consideration of the British Government. His Highness stated that Sarawak would continue to contribute to the British War Fund to the limit of the country's resources and in return His Highness expected Great Britain to take over all responsibility for the defence of the State and the cost thereof. His Highness would, however, agree that Sarawak should

bear the cost of raising and maintaining local forces. In due course His Excellency the British Agent intimated that the terms of the letter were acceptable to the British Government.

9. About the same time Lt. Col. Bruce-Steer arrived in Kuching with instructions to report on defence measures necessary. He recognised that Kuching occupied an important strategical position for the defence of Borneo, particularly South-West Borneo and the Dutch defensive positions and airfields situated therein, while the Bukit Stabar Landing Ground might be used to great advantage by an invading force for attack on Singapore and shipping.

10. As a result of his report (and probably also because of the aforementioned letter of March 1941 from His Highness the Rajah) it was decided to send the 2/15th Regiment to Kuching. In April 1941 the first detachment, under Lt. J. H. C. Brown, arrived and was stationed at Bukit Stabar Landing Ground. Work was put in hand to construct barracks at Batu Lintang and by May the Camp was sufficiently near completion for occupation. On 13th May the remainder of the 2/15th Punjab Regiment arrived to take up quarters therein. Lt. Col. J. Peffers commanded until he was transferred to Burma in October, when his place was taken by Lt. Col. (then Major) G. H. [sic; C. M.] Lane, M. C. Major Davies and a detachment were [then] transferred to Lutong. Later, Captain (later Major) W. Slatter replaced Major Davies (who returned to Singapore) and brought reinforcements, making about 150 men in all.

11. The reason for, and the role of, the 2/15th Punjab Regiment was therefore, in June 1941, as follows:

(a) To keep attackers off the Lutong Refinery and Miri Landing Ground long enough to allow those entrusted with the Miri Denial Scheme to put that Scheme into effect. The role of the detachment of [Sarawak] Rangers, and later [2nd] Loyals [Regiment], stationed at Lutong, was identical.

(b) To defend Kuching against attack, having regard for the strategic value of Kuching in respect to the defence of South-West Borneo, and to safeguard the Bukit Stabar Landing Ground until such time as it might be denied the enemy by destruction.

DOCUMENT 7

British Forces in Sarawak on the 8 December 1941

J. L. Noakes, "Report upon Defence Measures Adopted in Sarawak from June 1941 to the Occupation in December 1941 by Imperial Japanese Forces; Also an Account of the Movement of British and Sarawak Military Forces during the Japanese Invasion of Sarawak," 15 February 1946. MSS Pac.s.62. RHL. Section II, pp. 7-8.

A. Military

1. Officer Commanding Troops, Sarawak and Brunei, Major (later promoted Lt. Col.) C. M. Lane, M. C.[,] Kuching.

2. Officer Commanding Troops, Lutong, under O/C Troops, Sarawak and Brunei, Major W. Slatter, Lutong.

3. Major Lane was in command of the 2/15th Punjab Regiment of approximately 1 050 officers and men. About 900 were stationed at Kuching and 150 at Lutong, the site of the Oil Refinery near Miri.

4. In addition, Major Lane exercised local command over the following personnel:

- (a) Captain B. G. Cahusac, Intelligence Corps, attached to the Security Branch, Sarawak Constabulary, Kuching.

- (b) Captain J. E. O'Donnell and three officers and a detachment of the Indian Medical Service, Kuching.

- (c) Sergeant J. Feeley of the East Yorks. Regiment, and Sergeant E. W. Reynolds of the Loyal Regiment, Cypher Sergeants, Kuching.

- (d) Staff Sergeant Davidson and three other ranks of the R.A.O.C. Kuching.

- (e) Lt. Marsden of the Royal Engineers, Kuching.

- (f) Captain J. R. Asher and ten British other ranks of the Royal Artillery, and Jemadar Mohd. Khan and forty Indian other ranks: all at Lutong, Miri.

- (g) Lt. W. St. P. M. Hancock and six British other ranks of the Royal Engineers, Lutong, Miri.

(h) Lt. G. G. Withers and twenty-four British other ranks of the 2nd Loyal Regiment, at Lutong, Miri.

5. The 2/15th Punjab Regiment was well equipped with motor transport, both in Kuching and Miri. In addition, they had about ten Bren-Gun carriers. They were well supplied with rifles, ammunition, stores, equipment, fuel oil, etc., and had four eighteen-pounders in Kuching, with a number of anti-tank rifles and mortars.

6. The Royal Artillery at Lutong manned two six-inch naval guns emplaced on the coast of Lutong, Miri.

7. The Royal Engineers were stationed at Lutong to co-operate with the Sarawak Oilfields, Ltd. in the denial of the Lutong Refinery and Landing Ground.

8. The Loyals were required to provide protection for the denial parties at Lutong and Seria.

B. Air

1. A Royal Air Force Detachment consisting of six men under Corporal C. P. Kirkland was stationed at the Bukit Stabar Landing Ground, Kuching and operated the R. A. F. Direction Finding Station.

2. A small supply of bombs, flares, etc. was held at the Bukit Stabar and Miri Landing Grounds.

C. Naval

1. Mr. Henley-Joy and three other Charge Hands were stationed at Kuching and operated the Naval Direction Finding Station at 2nd Mile.

2. H. M. S. "KEDAH" carried out intermittent patrol along the north coast of Borneo until September [1941]. From then to the outbreak of war with Japan she was used principally to transport Sarawak Oilfields Ltd. machinery from Miri to Singapore.

DOCUMENT 8

The Inadequacy of British Forces in Sarawak

J. L. Noakes, "Report upon Defence Measures Adopted in Sarawak from June 1941 to the Occupation in December 1941 by Imperial Japanese Forces; Also an Account of the Movement of British and Sarawak Military Forces during the Japanese Invasion of Sarawak," 15 February 1946. MSS Pac.s.62. RHL. Section XIII, pp. 23-24.

2. In October 1941, the Secretary for Defence addressed a long memorandum to the Chief Secretary on the subject of Defence and pointed out that in his opinion the defence measures taken by the British Government were totally inadequate and the small force stationed in Sarawak, whilst inviting attack, could provide no satisfactory opposition to a determined invading force, thus bringing to the inhabitants of the country suffering out of all proportion to the damage inflicted on the enemy. The Secretary for Defence did not know of any naval measures to be taken to ensure the safety of the shores of Sarawak and he doubted if any satisfactory scheme existed. Similarly, it appeared that Sarawak towns and villages could be attacked with impunity from the air. No anti-aircraft guns or plane detection devices existed in the country. Though the strategic value of Kuching in relation to the defence of Borneo, and consequently Singapore and Java, was recognised in military reports, the military force in Kuching was, in his opinion, quite inadequate to repel a determined enemy force.

3. A copy of the report was given to O/C Troops, who expressed himself in general agreement, and forwarded a copy to, the General Officer Commanding, Malaya Command [Lieutenant-General A. E. Percival].

4. The Committee of Administration reviewed the position and agreed that it was extremely unsatisfactory. The Secretary for Defence was authorised to proceed to Singapore and take up the matter with the General Officer Commanding, Malaya Command.

5. Before the Secretary for Defence could leave, O/C Troops re-

ceived a confidential letter from the General Officer Commanding, in which that officer suggested that neither O/C Troops nor the Sarawak Government appeared to realise that the defence of Sarawak was only a component part of the general scheme of Empire defence.

6. About the 17th November 1941, the Secretary for Defence interviewed the General Officer Commanding, Malaya Command, at Fort Canning, Singapore, and placed his views before that Officer. The General Officer Commanding stated that he was fully aware of the position but he could do nothing, for the time being, to improve it. He admitted that land, sea and air forces in the Far East were inadequate, but Sarawak was as well off, at least, as other British possessions and Protectorates. Sarawak, in common with all parts of the British Empire, should show a bold and brave front, continue to co-operate to the best of the country's ability, and rely upon the Imperial Government to do everything in its power to improve defences as more forces became available. The General Officer Commanding stated that he wished to increase the military force in Kuching when men became available and he would like to see Royal Air Force planes stationed at Kuching. He could promise two Beoffers anti-aircraft guns for Kuching within the next six months.

7. The Secretary for Defence told the General Officer Commanding that the Sarawak Government, far from intending to retard the Allied war aims in any way, was only desirous of seeking improved defences adequate to repulse a determined enemy and secure Allied supremacy in the Far East. He instanced Sarawak's war expenditure and pointed out that the Government was prepared to spend much more on defences determined by the Imperial Government. It appeared that the fault lay not in the will of the Imperial Government to provide help or in the desire of Sarawak to co-operate, but in the inability of the Imperial Government to supply men and implements of war.

8. The Secretary for Defence invited the General Officer Commanding, to visit Kuching and the General arrived in Kuching on 27th November 1941 and left on 29th, travelling on H.M.S. "VAMPIRE."

9. One result of the visit of the General Officer Commanding to Kuching was that the role of the 2/15th Punjab Regiment was changed. O/C Troops was instructed to concentrate on the defence of the Bukit Stabar Landing Ground, at the expense, if necessary, of coastal and river defence against naval landings. There must be no retreat from the Landing Ground unless the enemy attack reached such a strength as to render positions absolutely untenable. In the words of the General Officer Commanding[,] "There have been too many retreats. You in Kuching must stand and fight."

10. The alteration in the role did not come as a surprise to O/C Troops, since that officer had suggested the amendment some time earlier. Nevertheless, it was necessary to reconsider all defence plans for the Kuching District and to make extensive alterations. His reorganisation was not completed by 8th December 1941.

11. As a matter of interest, the General Officer Commanding met the Supreme Council¹ during his visit and explained his conception of Japanese attack. He considered that the main Japanese attack would develop on the Malaya-Thailand border, coming south from Indo-China.

12. On the 27th November 1941 the "Warning" of war with Japan telegram was received—on the day of the arrival of the General Officer Commanding in Kuching. The "Warning" telegram meant that very strained relations existed with Japan, probably resulting in war, and all precautionary measures should be taken at once.

DOCUMENT 9

The Denial Schemes

J. L. Noakes, "Report upon Defence Measures Adopted in Sarawak from June 1941 to the Occupation in December 1941 by Imperial Japanese Forces; Also an Account of the Movement of British and Sarawak Military Forces during the Japanese Invasion of Sarawak," 15 February 1946. MSS Pac.s.62. RHL. Section IV, pp. 11-14.

A. The Miri Oilfields Denial Scheme

1. This scheme embraced the denial of the fields at Miri, Belait and Seria, together with plant and equipment, and included the refinery and sea pipe lines at Lutong. Since the Seria and Belait fields are in the State of Brunei, Miri only will be referred to herein though the scheme embraced all fields.

2. From the beginning of the Miri Oil Denial Scheme, the Overseas Defence Committee decided that in the event of a major war in the Far East the Borneo Oilfields would not be relied upon as sources of supply for oil of any nature, even though the Sarawak Oilfields Ltd. was under an agreement with the Sarawak Government to maintain an oil stock of 10,000 tons of fuel oil for naval purposes.

3. The original scheme for denial was prepared before it was realised that the Brunei fields at Belait and Seria would turn out to be so rich. The scheme consisted of removal of certain vital machine parts. The personnel would evacuate up the Belait River and the parts would be dumped in the lakes. This scheme had many defects and was later abandoned.

4. The principle was established that responsibility for denial would be with the British Government and all claims for compensation would be an Imperial liability. Denial would be an Imperial Commitment.

5. The second scheme consisted of the removal of essential parts to Singapore by warship and personnel would be evacuated if possible. Early in 1939 a scheme for demolition of the sea oil lines was added to, the general denial scheme and was known as "Emergency Denial." This consisted of laying submarine charges on the sea lines, with cables to the General Manager's office and the Residency, so that should there be no time to put the general denial scheme into effect, the lines would be blown up from either place. The charges could also be fired from the sea loading stations at Lutong. Charges were installed by the Royal Navy and cables by the Royal Engineers and fortnightly cable tests were made by the Sarawak Oilfields Ltd. and sent to Singapore. In [?] during a severe thunderstorm, the charges exploded and four of the five lines were

put out of action, thus exposing defects which induced the authorities to cut out the cables to Miri, leaving the sea loading station as the sole firing point. The Sarawak Oilfields Ltd. relaid the lines and the Royal Navy laid much heavier charges on them.

6. The Dutch Denial Schemes all consisted of pure destruction and it was realised eventually that this was preferable to schemes consisting of removal of parts. Thus the next scheme was one of "maximum destruction" to be carried out by the Sarawak Oilfields Ltd. and a detachment of the 2/15th Punjab Regiment, assisted by [Sarawak] Rangers (Force of the Sarawak Constabulary) was stationed in the Lutong Refinery area to enable the maximum time of destruction being available and also to prevent any possible interference with the Sarawak Oilfields Ltd. employees engaged on destruction. Later, detachments of Loyals and Royal Engineers arrived to assist in the work.

7. Messrs. Lees and Martin, experts from the Middle East, visited the fields in August 1941 and as a result of their report it was decided to close down part of the field. All spare parts resulting from this partial closure were to be transferred to Singapore. All pumping wells were to be cemented and production reduced to 1200 tons daily from the gas lift wells at Seria. Work was started on the scheme and the first shipment of parts on H.M.S. "KEDAH" on 4th September 1941, after which regular shipments left on His Majesty's ships for Singapore. As work proceeded various personnel were released and left the field, mainly for the Middle East. The Miri machine shop was dismantled and sent, with all European and Asiatic staff, to Singapore. Geological data was sent to Australia.

8. All European women and children had left Miri on 8th and 10th August 1941, in accordance with a strong recommendation from the Commander-in-Chief, China Station, and the Sarawak Government took steps at once to advise still other Sarawak European women to leave. Inducement was supplied to the wives of Senior Government Officers by offering financial assistance and free passages to Australia, and by the 8th December 1941[,] only a few European women remained.

B. The Miri (Lutong) Landing Ground Denial Schemes

1. Two schemes existed: (a) Emergency and (b) Permanent.

2. The first scheme consisted of stretching hawsers across the ground at frequent intervals and anchoring them at the ends. The net thus formed was raised from the ground on 64-gallon oil drums. Authority for denial rested in the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, and the scheme was put into effect about one month before the outbreak of war with Japan, remaining thus until permanent denial was effected on 12th December 1941.

Sarawak Oilfields Ltd. employees were entrusted with the preparation and execution of the scheme.

3. The second scheme, similar to that for the Bukit Stabar Landing Ground, consisted of blowing craters with explosives at points in accordance with a diagram planned to provide the utmost damage to the surface and the drainage system. The Sarawak Oilfields Ltd. designed and sank demolition chambers at each point, after much materials forwarded by the Royal Air Force had been received and discarded as useless. Charges were prepared and kept in canisters at the side of the ground. The Authority for Denial was the Air Officer Commanding, Far East or, in critical circumstances, Officer Commanding Troops, Lutong. Sarawak Oilfields Ltd. personnel and the Royal Engineers detachment were responsible for the execution of the scheme.

C. Bukit Stabar (7th mile) Landing Ground, Kuching, Denial Schemes

1. Two schemes existed: (a) Emergency and (b) Permanent.

2. For the purpose of the first scheme, empty 64-gallon oil drums and large drain pipes were grouped around the perimeter of the landing ground. The Kuching Corps, Sarawak Volunteers, was entrusted with denial and each Section Commander was supplied with a plan of the layout. Authority for denial rested in the Air Officer Commanding, Far East. Upon receipt of authority, the

drums and pipes were to be rolled out to their pre-arranged positions, thus providing obstacles considered sufficient to prevent planes from landing. Practices were held often but the scheme never actually came into effect.

3. The second scheme, similar to that for the Miri Landing Ground, consisted of blowing craters at 64 points, in accordance with a diagram planned to provide the utmost damage to the surface and the drainage system. Demolition chambers were sunk at each point at various depths depending on the rock strata below, and the charges were prepared and kept in canisters at the side of the ground. As for the first scheme, authority for denial rested in the Air Officer Commanding, Far East, though O/C Troops also held authority to order denial if he considered that critical circumstances warranted destruction.

4. All practical work on both schemes was carried out by the Director of Public Works, Kuching, and his assistants, and to them all credit is due for the efficient manner in which permanent denial eventually was effected.*

D. Denial of the Royal Air Force Direction Finding Station at Bukit Stabar Landing Ground, Kuching

1. The Royal Air Force Detachment, under Corporal C. P. Kirkland . . . held instructions to destroy equipment in the Station if ordered to do so by the Royal Air Force authorities or by O/C Troops.

E. Denial of the Direction Finding Station at 2nd Mile, Rock Road, Kuching

1. The Charge-Hand-in-Charge, Mr. Henley-Joy . . . was said by O/C Troops to have instructions to deny the Station if necessary. The Secretary for Defence was given no information and subsequent events indicate that had the civil authorities been consulted before denial was carried out, then O/C Troops' system of tele-

phonic communication would not have been broken down on the night of the 23rd/24th December 1941. . . .

F. Denial of the Brooke Dockyard and Workshops, Kuching

1. This scheme consisted of the removal of essential parts from the machinery and taking them up river by launch and under guard, there to dump them in the river if capture appeared imminent or Kuching fell into enemy hands. If time permitted, the caisson of the Dockyard would be towed out on the tide and sunk. The Manager, Brooke Dockyard and Workshops, was entrusted to carry out the scheme on instructions from the Secretary for Defence.

G. Denial of Oil Supplies, Kuching

1. Before the 8th December 1941, oil supplies were well dispersed[.] A scheme was prepared for the denial of civil supplies, with the exception of kerosene oil which, it was agreed, should not be destroyed. Military stocks were dispersed also and denial, if required, was the concern of O/C Troops. The Royal Air Force held a stock of fuel in a dump at Pending, which place was to be held by a Company of the 2/15th Punjab Regiment in the event of attack and it was agreed that denial should be entrusted to the Company Commander through O/C Troops. The Company referred to above failed to deny the Pending fuel . . . and the troops passing through Siniawan on the 25th December 1941 failed to destroy the oil stocks situated there. . . .

H. Immobilisation of Vessels

1. This scheme consisted of (a), temporary denial by removing vital parts, and (b), permanent denial by sinking. It was drawn up

by the Secretary for Defence and was entrusted to the Shipping Master. Authority for immobilisation was contained in the Defence Regulations.

I. Denial of Wireless Transmitting Sets

1. Since all transmitters would be in use up to the last moment and O/C Troops could not guarantee sufficient protection to operators, general instructions were issued to all operators to remove and destroy essential parts only if it appeared likely that the sets would fall into enemy hands. There were no privately owned transmitters.

J. Immobilisation of Vehicles

1. This scheme consisted of immobilisation by the removal of vital parts and authority was contained in the Defence Regulations, the Rules of which would be made public upon the outbreak of war.

K. Denial of Currency

1. The scheme consisted of burning Notes held by the Treasury and the Chartered Bank and was entrusted to the Treasurer and the Manager respectively.

Conclusion

1. Schemes A, B and C were fully known to the Sarawak Government and the Government officials and other civilians were allotted a major role in operations. Schemes D and E were to be effected by R.A.F. and Naval personnel and Schemes F, G, H and I

and J were for the most part of a civil responsibility. No mention is made herein of any scheme for the denial of military stores and equipments, arms, vehicles, vessels, etc. since this matter was the concern of O/C Troops and he did not acquaint the Secretary for Defence of his intentions in the event of retreat. . . .

2. In addition to those schemes already mentioned, plans were prepared to destroy all maps of value to an enemy, documents of a secret or confidential nature held in all Government offices, currency, codes and cyphers.

3. It was decided that if an enemy invaded at Kuching, the Treasurer, with documents relating to State Securities and other financial matters, and the Deputy Secretary for Defence, with certain important Defence documents, would both proceed to Bau and thence to Pontianak, if necessary.

4. No plans were made for the denial of electric light plants (except at Miri), water supplies (except at Miri), sanitary system and municipal and medical services, as the Government considered that any such denial would cause suffering to the inhabitants out of all proportion to the benefits conferred on an enemy occupying authority by leaving them intact.

DOCUMENT 10

Local Organization for the Defense of Sarawak Existing on 8 December 1941

J. L. Noakes, "Report upon Defence Measures Adopted in Sarawak from June 1941 to the Occupation in December 1941 by Imperial Japanese Forces; Also an Account of the Movement of British and Sarawak Military Forces during the Japanese Invasion of Sarawak," 15 February 1946. MSS Pac.s.62. RHL. Section I, pp. 1-6.

A. Defence Secretariat.

1. Secretary (also Director of Air Raid Precautions and Security Officer) Mr. J. L. Noakes, Kuching. Deputy Secretary and Liaison

Officer, Kuching, Mr. E. H. Elam. Assistant Secretary (also District Officer, Naval Reporting Officer, Censor and Food Supply Officer, Miri) Mr. D. R. Lascelles. Office Assistants: Mrs. K. O'Connor and Miss E. Bates, Kuching.

2. All Heads of Departments, Residents and District Officers held a copy of the Sarawak Defence Scheme. This secret document detailed the duties of officers in the event of circumstances leading up to and culminating in an outbreak of war with a foreign power.

3. The Secretary for Defence was the official Government representative in all matters concerning the defence of Sarawak. He was directly responsible to the Chief Secretary and it was his duty to put into effect, or issue instructions to put into effect defence policy as determined by the Sarawak Government on all matters of defence. He was required to maintain an office organised to carry out his secretarial duties, which included the cyphering and de-cyphering of all messages exchanged between His Majesty's Government and the Sarawak Government.

B. The Air Raid Precautions Department

1. Director (also Secretary for Defence and Security Officer) Mr. J. L. Noakes, Kuching. District Warden, Kuching, Mr. E. W. Cousens. O/C Medical Auxiliary Service (also Principal Medical Officer) Dr. M. P. O'Connor, Kuching. Deputy Officer in Charge of Medical Auxiliary Service, on half-time duty, Dr. (Mrs.) E. M. Gibson, Kuching. Evacuation Officer (also Executive Engineer, Public Works Department) Mr. G. T. Myles, Kuching. District Warden, Sarikei (also Rubber Regulation Officer) Mr. L. Moscrop. District Warden, Sibü (also Executive Engineer) Mr. T. A. Reid, District Warden, Miri (also O/C Customs and Shipping) Mr. R.J. Bettison.

2. All District Officers in out-stations other than those mentioned above were District Wardens in addition to their other duties.

3. Officers were established at Kuching, Sibü and Miri. At the first, thirteen junior staff were employed; at the second, one; and at the third, two.

4. Voluntary workers who were registered as members of the Passive Defence Services in all four centres (Kuching, Sarikei, Sibü and Miri) totalled approximately 1 500[.]

5. The Director of Air Raid Precautions was appointed on the 15th February, 1941[.] He was responsible for carrying out policy in accordance with the direction of the Sarawak Government and upon him devolved the work of organising Air Raid Precautions whenever required throughout the country.

6. In November, 1941 he was authorised by the Sarawak Government to proceed with an evacuation scheme which he had drawn up for the district of Kuching.

C. Security Branch, Sarawak Constabulary

1. Security Officer (also Secretary for Defence and Director of Air Raid Precautions) Mr. J. L. Noakes, Kuching. Assistant Captain B. G. Cahusac of the Intelligence Corps. Junior staff of four detectives.

2. The Security Officer was responsible for political security. His office carried out the supervision of political suspects and maintained records of Japanese and certain other aliens and suspects.

3. Captain Cahusac assisted in the office with the kind permission of O/C Troops. Such experience and information as he obtained was available for military purposes.

D. Censorship

1. Chief Censor (also Postmaster-General) Mr. W. G. Tait, Kuching. Assistant Censors (in addition to other duties) Mr. J. B. Archer, Kuching; Mr. W. Lowry, Kuching; Mr. C. S. Were, Kuching; Mr. D. R. Lascelles, Miri; Mr. R. J. Bettison, Miri; Mr. F. L. Mansel, Sibü; Mr. W. S. B. Buck, Sarikei.

2. In all out-stations other than those mentioned above, District Officers were authorised to exercise certain powers of censorship if required.

E. The Sarawak Coastguards

1. Commanding Officer (also Shipping Master) Captain A. W. G. Gibson, Kuching; Assistants Mr. J. M. Crawford, Kuching; Mr. Tuah Bin Kasah, Kuching.

2. The Sarawak Government officially authorised the formation of this force in August, 1941, for watching and safe-guarding the shores of Sarawak and conducting the examination of vessels. The organisation was not extended beyond the First Division and the Force consisted of 120 Coastguards and 120 recruits.

F. The Sarawak Constabulary

1. Commissioner, Lt. Col. W. H. Kelley, Kuching. Assistant Commissioner, Mr. R. C. Talbot, Kuching. Prob. Assistant Commissioner, Mr. J. S. Wink, Kuching. Assistant Commissioner, Mr. D. V. Murphy, Sibü. Prob. Assistant Commissioner, Mr. W. Phillips, Miri; Adjutant, Datu Pahlawan Abang Haji Mustapha, Kuching.

2. The Sarawak Constabulary was constituted a military force under the Sarawak Constabulary Order and became subject to the Army Act, with certain modifications, by an amendment to the Order Published in September, 1941.

3. . . . It was comprised mainly of Sikhs, Malays, Dayaks and the men were untrained in military tactics, being, in fact, policemen.

G. The Sarawak Rangers

1. Officer Commanding, Lt. Col. (local rank) W. H. Kelley, Kuching; Second-in-Command, Captain (local rank) R. W. Large, Kuching. Adjutant, Lt. W. Bruce, Kuching (seconded from Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders). Sergeant-Major, M. A. Stafford, Kuching (seconded from the Manchester Regiment).

On the 18th December 1941, Messrs. G. D. Bayram, A. Strath-Whyte, C. B. Kent and S. F. Woodliffe, of the Sarawak Oilfields, Ltd. Miri, were commissioned 2nd Lieutenants in the Sarawak Rangers in Kuching. . . .

2. The Sarawak Rangers was constituted a military force in September 1941, under the Sarawak Rangers Order. On the 8th December 1941 the force consisted of 400 men, mostly Sea-Dayaks.

3. When the Commander-in-Chief, Far East [Air Chief Marshall Sir Robert Brooke-Popham], visited Kuching in July 1941, he emphasized the danger of war with Japan and the urgent need for local forces to assist the Imperial Forces in the defence of Sarawak. The Sarawak Government desired to assist in every way and it was decided to raise a force of 400 men at once, increasing to 800 later. The name "SARAWAK RANGERS" was suggested by the Commander-in-Chief, though he had no knowledge of the former existence of a force under that name. It was never the intention of the Sarawak Government that the new force should be a re-birth of the old, but unfortunately many obtained that impression. It was decided that the role of the Rangers should be that of a harassing, forward force, trained in jungle warfare, and the Commissioner, Sarawak Constabulary, proposed to hand over approximately one hundred of his men, known as 'Force B' and used hitherto to garrison certain out-stations in the rebel areas. These men were to be used as a nucleus and recruiting for the remainder was commenced. However, recruiting was slow and the Commissioner was badly handicapped by lack of officers to train the new force. The Commander-in-Chief, Far East, was asked for assistance and Lt. W. Bruce, of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders was sent. This officer had no knowledge of Malay or Dayak and was not conversant with local conditions so the Sarawak Government as[ked] Malaya Command to second 2nd Lt. Pegler, an officer of the Sarawak Civil Service who had been allowed to join the Military Forces in Singapore some time earlier. The request was granted and this officer arrived in September. He was given the local rank of Major. Some difference of opinion arose over the question of Command of the Rangers and Major Pegler resigned and returned to Singapore. His place was taken by Captain Large, hitherto Security Officer. O/C Troops agreed to allow Captain James of the Military Intelligence Service, to do service in the Security Office, thus filling the vacancy caused by the transfer of Captain Large. From then onwards training and recruiting proceeded rapidly, but much valuable time had been lost and it could not be

said, on the 8th December 1941, that the Sarawak Rangers were in any way fit to carry out the role allotted to them.

H. The Sarawak Volunteers, Kuching Corps

1. Commanding Officer, Major R. E. Edwards, Kuching (also Director, Public Works Department). Second-in-Command, Captain C. L. Newman (also Director of Agriculture) Kuching. Adjutant Major F. W. Crafter, of the East Surrey Regiment, Kuching. Assistant Adjutant, 2nd Lt. C. S. Sergel (also Superintendent Lands and Survey, 1st Division) Kuching. Liaison Officer, 2nd Lt. W. Harnack (also Director of Lands and Survey) Kuching. Transport Officer, 2nd Lt. A. D. Dant (also Local Manager, Messrs. Sime Darby & Company Limited) Kuching.

Officer Commanding No. 1 Company (Demolition and Field Engineering) 2nd Lt. J. W. Pim (also Executive Engineer, Public Works Department) Kuching.

Officer Commanding No. 2 Company (Mobile Workshop) 2nd Lt. C. F. Birt (also executive Engineer, Public Works Department) Kuching.

Officer Commanding No. 3 Company (Field Ambulance) 2nd Lt. B. J. C. Spurway (also Assistant, Agriculture Department) Kuching.

Officer Commanding No. 4 Company (Motor Ambulance) 2nd Lt. B. J. C. Spurway, and Second-in-Command 2nd Lt. J. A. G. Benson (also Assistant[,] Treasury Department) Kuching.

Officer Commanding No. 5 Company (Supply and Issue) 2nd Lt. K. N. Black (also Manager, Sarawak Steamship Company, Limited) Kuching.

Officer Commanding No. 6 Company (Motor Transport) 2nd Lt. D. B. Stewart (also Acting Conservator of Forests) Kuching.

Officer Commanding No. 7 Company (Internment and Prisoners of War Camp) Captain A. Keir (also Director, Education Department) Kuching.

Officer seconded to 2/15th Punjab Regiment, River-Boat Patrols, 2nd Lt. J. O. Gilbert, Kuching.

Medical Officer, 2nd Lt. L. J. Clapham (also Medical Officer) Kuching.

Company Sergeant-Major Moran.

2. The total strength of the Kuching Corps, officers and men, was approximately 250. Major F. W. Crafter was seconded to the Sarawak Government in November 1941, in response to an application to the General Officer Commanding, Singapore [Lieutenant-General A. E. Percival]. Company Sergeant-Major Moran, of the Loyal Regiment, Singapore, was seconded to Sarawak for duty in the Volunteers at the request of the Sarawak Government.

Miri Corps

3. Commanding Officer, Major R. L. Daubeny (also Resident, 4th Division) Miri.

Honorary Appointments: Captain L. A. Boone, 2nd Lieutenants B. B. Parry, B. L. Webster, G. Rogers.

Company Sergeant-Major Bayford, of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, Singapore, was seconded to Sarawak for duty at the request of the Sarawak Government.

4. The total strength of the Miri Corps, officers and men, was approximately 60 on the 8th December 1941. By that time, however, the Corps had practically ceased to exist since the majority of the recruits were Sarawak Oilfields, Limited, employees engaged in dismantling the oilfields and preparing to put the destruction scheme into effect prior to departure for Singapore. Many had, in fact, left for Singapore. Volunteers were issued with arms and equipment on the 9th December but these were recalled on the 12th and sent to Kuching on the 14th when the Oilfields were evacuated by the Military and Sarawak Oilfields, Limited personnel.

I. Naval Reporting

1. Naval Reporting Officer, Kuching, Mr. G. A. C. Field (also Acting Superintendent of Customs).

Naval Reporting Officer, Miri, Mr. D. R. Lascelles (also Assistant Secretary for Defence, District Officer and Food Sup[p]ly Officer, Miri).

2. By arrangement these officers reported all movements of vessels (other than local vessels) to Naval Intelligence, Singapore.

3. Look-out Posts along the coast and local patrol launches from Tanjong Datu to Tanjong Sirik, were required to report movements of ocean-going vessels to the Secretary for Defence and the Naval Reporting Officer, Kuching, through their Heads of Department.

4. At Miri, Mr. Lascelles carried out the duties of Naval Reporting Officer and Detaining Officer (in addition to his other duties). When Norway was attacked by Germany, two Norwegian ships "Temeraire" and "O. B. Sorensen" were detained there for about fourteen days before instructions were received to permit them to sail to Singapore. The work of the Naval Reporting Officer at Miri consisted mainly of reporting movements of all merchant shipping to London and Singapore and the issuing of certain information and instructions to masters of vessels calling at Miri. At first it was necessary to board all ships but later it was found possible, with the assistance of the Sarawak Oilfields, Ltd. pilots, to cut out the boarding of tankers. Later still, however, the boarding of all tankers had to be resumed and continued.

The institution of the "navicart" system, carrying with it in the case of the ships navicart the control of all bunkers, led to an increase in all work. Requests for bunkers had to be referred to London by cypher telegram for approval. Restriction was imposed on the bunkering facilities to ships not in possession of ships' "navicart," these being chiefly Japanese.

At Miri, the oil-loading sea-liners area was a Prohibited Area and with the installation of the shore batteries at Lutong an examination anchorage was fixed where ships wishing to take in an oil cargo, or bunkers, had to await boarding and examination before proceeding to the lines. The Detaining Officer co-operated with the shore battery regarding controlling movements of shipping from the anchorage to the lines. The examination of ships' holds was instituted and ships were searched to ensure that no armed force was on board ships waiting to proceed to the lines. The proce-

ture involved considerable work at sea and it was found advisable to alter the "Doreen" to make it better fitted for boarding work, which in rough weather often involved considerable risk. The alteration was approved early in 1941.

Soon after the entry of Italy into the war [September 1940] an Italian was found on a Greek ship and arrested, and later sent to Singapore[.]

A squad of boarding police was formed in Miri composed of regular police who had shown ability to stand up to rough sea work in a small launch.

The shore battery fired on two occasions to prevent ships entering the lines, once due to a ship failing to use the examination anchorage and once due to a mistake by O/C Battery in the signals flown. No damage was done in either case.

The control of oil cargoes was carried out by the Customs Department under Singapore directions. The Naval Reporting Office was concerned merely with the control of bunkers.

When censorship restrictions were increased the Naval Reporting Office served as a means of passing on shipping communications on behalf of Allied shipping firms and ship-masters.

J. Air Reporting

1. The Secretary for Defence, Kuching.

The Director of Public Works, Kuching (for weather reports).

2. By a system of codes, all officers in charge of stations along the coast of Sarawak, patrol launches, look-out posts and certain inland stations, were required to inform the Secretary for Defence immediately upon sighting aircraft of any kind. The Secretary for Defence decided upon further action, which might mean informing Air Force Headquarters, Singapore, or Singkawang II aerodrome [in Dutch Borneo].

K. Coastal Lights

1. The Shipping Master, Kuching.

2. This officer was required under the Sarawak Defence Scheme to exercise control over all coastal lights in accordance with instructions issued by the Naval Authorities, Singapore.

L. Coastal Lookouts

1. The Shipping Master, Kuching, for guards for posts in the First Division.

The Postmaster-General, Kuching, for wireless equipment and staff.

2. Officers in charge of Coastal Lights in Divisions other than the First were required to maintain a constant watch and report suspicious movements to the Secretary for Defence, Kuching.

In the First Division, coastal patrol launches were allotted beats from Tanjong Datu to Tanjong Sirik, and came into full operation on 8th December 1941.

DOCUMENT 11

Aerial and Naval Defence Measures in Sarawak

J. L. Noakes, "Report upon Defence Measures Adopted in Sarawak from June 1941 to the Occupation in December 1941 by Imperial Japanese Forces; Also an Account of the Movement of British and Sarawak Military Forces during the Japanese Invasion of Sarawak," 15 February 1946. MSS Pac.s.62. RHL. Sections XI and XII, pp. 21-22.

Aerial Defence Measures in Sarawak

1. No equipment existed in Sarawak for the detection of approaching planes. Similarly, no anti-aircraft defence equipment existed and no planes of any type were stationed in Sarawak.

2. The Dutch Aerodrome of Singkawan[g] II was twenty minutes' average flying time from Kuching, and was the nearest aerodrome to Sarawak.

3. On 24th November a large plane flew over Kuching and the Bukit Stabar Landing Ground for forty-five minutes, making north-south and east-west flights at a great height. Markings could not be distinguished. The Secretary for Defence informed the Royal Air Force authorities in Singapore, as he was convinced it must be a Japanese plane. It was decided then that, in the event of future unidentified planes visiting Kuching, the Secretary for Defence or O/C Troops would send a code message to Singkawan[g] II aerodrome and aircraft would be despatched to force the visitor down or, in the event of war, to engage the enemy. Subsequently several code messages were sent for help, but fighters appeared over Kuching once only and then far too late to engage the enemy.

4. On several days just prior to the outbreak of war with Japan unidentified planes (almost certainly Japanese) visited Miri, but nothing could be done beyond informing Singapore.

5. For all practical purposes, therefore, no facilities existed for the defence of any part of Sarawak against aerial attack.

Naval Defence Measures in Sarawak

1. The role of the Sarawak Coastguards . . . and coastal patrols and look-outs . . . were purely of a reconnaissance nature and useful only for obtaining and conveying information regarding approach of enemy aerial and naval units.

2. Two naval six-inch guns, manned by a detachment of Royal Artillery, were placed at Lutong, Miri, to defend the Refinery against naval attack, but both guns were dismantled on 12th December 1941.

3. No minefields were laid along the coast of Sarawak and no information is available of plans for the naval defence of Sarawak. It is known, however, that when the Japanese landed at Miri and Kuching, Dutch bombers operated very effectively from Dutch Borneo [and Dutch] submarines were also in action.

DOCUMENT 12

Instructions to Government Officers to Remain at Their Posts

J. L. Noakes, "Report Upon Defence Measures Adopted in Sarawak from June 1941 to the Occupation in December 1941 by Imperial Japanese Forces; Also an Account of the Movement of British and Sarawak Military Forces during the Japanese Invasion of Sarawak," 15 February 1946. MSS Pac.s.62. RHL. Section V, p. 15.

1. In June 1941, the Chief Secretary issued definite instructions to be followed by Senior Government Officers in the event of invasion. It was clearly pointed out that officers in charge of districts were expected to remain at their stations provided that, if the inhabitants of any district moved en masse then the Officer in Charge of the Station would be at liberty to follow. Residents were instructed to review the duties of all Senior Government Officers in their Divisions and were given authority to relieve officers employed on non-essential work if invasion eventuated.

2. These instructions were confirmed by telegram on 1st December 1941.

3. Fortunately, His Highness the Rajah was absent from the State in November and December 1941, thus obviating any need for plans for the safety of his person.

4. In Kuching, plans were prepared in accordance with instructions mentioned in para 1. The Secretary for Defence urged the Chief Secretary to plan for his personal withdrawal with Military Headquarters, if necessary, in order to continue the Sarawak Government elsewhere in Borneo, but this the Chief Secretary declined to do, stating that it was his duty, in the absence of His Highness the Rajah, to stand by the people. It was agreed that the following officers should stay at their posts if invasion eventuated:

The Chief Secretary;

The Secretary for Chinese Affairs;

The Commissioner of Trade and Customs;

The Principal Medical Officer and Medical Officers;

The District Warden and all members of the Passive Defence Services;

The Controller of Food and his assistants for as long as they could be useful;

The Secretary for Defence, who was also Director of Air Raid Precautions.

5. The Treasurer, Judicial Commissioner and Deputy Secretary for Defence were authorised to leave Kuching directly upon threat of invasion. . . . Most of the other Senior Officers were members of one or another of the State Forces and thus, with the exception of the Shipping Master and his Coastguards, would come under the command of O/C Troops.

DOCUMENT 13

Evacuation of the Civilian Population

J. L. Noakes, "Report upon Defence Measures Adopted in Sarawak from June 1941 to the Occupation in December 1941 by Imperial Japanese Forces; Also an Account of the Movement of British and Sarawak Military Forces during the Japanese Invasion of Sarawak," 15 February 1946. MSS Pac.s.62. RHL Section VI, p. 16.

1. Military resistance might be offered to an invading force at Kuching and Miri and therefore plans were considered for the evacuation of the civil population from those two places.

2. *MIRI*. Blast-proof runways were constructed from the town to the hills inland and the people were trained to use these means to exit. The possibility of failure to evacuate Sarawak Oilfields Ltd. personnel to Singapore was foreseen and it was agreed that in such a case the Assistant Secretary for Defence would lead the party inland. Supply dumps were made at 9th Mile Riam Road and Beleru and Lepok Leju.

3. *KUCHING*. The Director of Air Raid Precautions prepared a scheme in February 1941 for the evacuation of air raid refugees from the town to Batu Lintang Road and material to house 1,000

persons was purchased. When the 2/15th Punjab Regiment arrived in June to take up quarters in the newly constructed Batu Lintang Camp, it was decided that the first plan would be inadequate. Many discussions took place and the military authorities urged the formation of plans for the evacuation of all people in the Sibu Laut and Kuap [Quop] areas and from the *simpangs* [confluence] at Kuching along the north bank. It was pointed out that such a scheme could not possibly be effected in the short time allowed between notice of invasion and fighting, so it was abandoned and plans were prepared to warn the people in the Sibu Laut, Santubong, Muara Tebas, Samarahan and Kuap areas to hide or destroy all vessels and evacuate inland from their *kampongs* [villages] to avoid all contact with invading forces. Plans were prepared also to provide accommodation for Kuching evacuees who might have no place to go to in the country. In November 1941 the Director was authorised to proceed with plans, and building of huts at Landeh and Batu Kawa commenced under the supervision of Mr. [G. T.] Myles of the Public Works Department. Mr. [E.] Banks travelled the coastal districts, coaching the inhabitants in local evacuation as described above.

DOCUMENT 14

The Defense Position in Sarawak on 8 December 1941

J. L. Noakes, "Report upon Defence Measures Adopted in Sarawak from June 1941 to the Occupation in December 1941 by Imperial Japanese Forces; Also an Account of the Movement of British and Sarawak Military Forces during the Japanese Invasion of Sarawak," 15 February 1946. MSS Pac.s.62. RHL. Section XIV, p. 25.

1. Sarawak had no cause to feel secure on the 8th December 1941.
2. Food supplies were plentiful and large stocks were held in reserve, but the country relied to a great extent on imports of food.

Since war with Japan would mean the severance of supply lines, prolonged hostilities would probably result in severe food restrictions.

3. Economically, Sarawak depended to a great extent on exports, principally rubber. War would mean a partial or total loss of power to export and economic collapse might result.

4. Politically, there was little cause for worry. The Chinese were solidly behind the Government and the Malays could be relied upon to follow a course of passive indifference. The Dayaks were calm, but their loyalty depended upon fair treatment and economic stability. They might become troublesome if food stocks ran out and the country became involved in economic difficulties. The very few Japanese in Sarawak could be kept in internment without difficulty and there were no dangerous Secret Societies or Fifth Column organisations capable of embarrassing the Government.

5. The majority of the natives of Sarawak did not view Japanese aggression with any great concern. They had never experienced modern warfare and had no desire to be embroiled in a conflict which they neither understood nor wanted. At the same time they were loyal to His Highness the Rajah and sympathised with the Allied War Aims. They were willing to contribute money to the British War Effort and thus demonstrate their loyalty, but beyond that they would not go. A war with Japan would not be their concern. So long as His Highness ruled in Sarawak the Government would be respected, although active, or even passive, hostility to a strong Japanese invading force need not be expected. The Chinese had stronger feelings on the subject and were more actively anti-Japanese, but they, too, feared war. They understood the consequences of Japanese invasion far better than the natives partly because their own nation was at war and partly because they had more to lose, but even so[,] they had no intention of joining in mass, armed opposition.

6. The Sarawak Constabulary Force was adequate for all normal police work, but was in no sense a strong, military force. The newly formed Rangers could not be expected to carry out the role allotted to them for some time to come. The Volunteers were enthusiastic, but raw, as their training had been light and the role given them


was far beyond their limited capabilities. The Coastguards were well disciplined and comparatively well trained in their duties, but their role in the scheme of defence was a minor one.

7. Defence would be put up at two places only—Miri and Kuching, and the first place would be defended only until the Permanent Denial Scheme could be completed. In Kuching, the military garrison was admitted to be totally inadequate.

8. Defence against attack from the air was non-existent and demoralisation of the civil population (and, for that matter, of the military force) would result from unopposed bombing raids by the enemy.

PART II

15 DECEMBER 1941
TO 24 DECEMBER 1941



CHAPTER 3

THE FALL OF SARAWAK

WHEN WAR broke out with Japan following the attack on Pearl Harbor in the Hawaiian Islands, the authorities in Sarawak activated all measures for the defense of the country. The most significant action was the implementation of the various denial schemes, namely disabling the oil installations and the landing grounds. In Kuching, the greater part of the defense measures were put into action. Apparently there was a breakdown in communication among certain parties in the civilian defense set-up, but more telling was the non-coordination of action between the civil service volunteers and military personnel. Consequently, many groups were cut off from one another. One by one, European government officers, including the chief secretary, Cyril Drummond Le Gros Clark, were rounded up by the Japanese.

All the documents in this section except DOCUMENT 18 are from Noakes's Report. The piecing together of all the diverse activities ranging from implementation of denial schemes at the oil fields in Miri to the chaotic situation in Kuching was the unenviable task of the chronicler. Noakes, however, made his point about

the inadequacy of British commitment to Sarawak's defense as promised under the terms of the Treaty of 1888 when the status of the country was transformed from an independent state to a British protectorate. With heavy sarcasm, he emphasized the fact that Kuching "was occupied without any resistance." It is true that there were no military plans to defend Kuching, and Noakes, as a Brooke officer, felt that Britain had failed to exercise its role to its protectorate. Britain should have at least come forth to assist Sarawak in its hour of need as a moral obligation.

DOCUMENT 15 describes the state of affairs in Kuching when declaration of hostilities between Great Britain and Japan became publicly known. Sarawak, as a protectorate of Great Britain, accordingly declared war on Japan. DOCUMENT 16 gives an account of the work involved in carrying out the denial schemes at the Miri oil fields, the refinery at Lutong, and the Miri landing grounds. DOCUMENT 17 provides details of the augmentation of defense measures at Kuching, air raids over Kuching, and the arrival of evacuees from Miri.

The activities of a part of the Kuching Central Detachment of the Sarawak Constabulary is presented in DOCUMENT 18. It is extracted from the Papers of J. S. Wink. Wink held the post of probationary assistant commissioner in the Sarawak Constabulary stationed at Kuching. Local members of the constabulary who were drawn from various ethnic groups did not undergo military training. It was unlikely also that European commissioners and assistant commissioners had such formal training. The Papers of J. S. Wink are in the possession of Rhodes House Library. This collection, owing to sensitive matters relating to the Sarawak Constabulary, is classified under "Restricted Access."

As DOCUMENT 19 indicates, scarcely any fighting or casualties accompanied the fall of Kuching to Japanese forces. The majority of Brooke officers remained at their posts. They were all subsequently rounded up and sent to the internment camp at Batu Lintang, on the outskirts of Kuching. DOCUMENT 20 presents a fairly detailed account of how individual Brooke personnel went

about their duties until the arrival of the Japanese, their surrender, their treatment by Japanese soldiers at the time of capture and thereafter, and their eventual internment at Batu Lintang. DOCUMENT 21 provides an overview of the military situation in Kuching and its vicinity up to the occupation of the town by Imperial Japanese Forces.

DOCUMENT 15

The Outbreak of War with Japan, 8 December 1941

J. L. Noakes, "Report upon Defence Measures Adopted in Sarawak from June 1941 to the Occupation in December 1941 by Imperial Japanese Forces; Also an Account of the Movement of British and Sarawak Military Forces during the Japanese Invasion of Sarawak," 15 February 1946. MSS Pac.s.62. RHL. Section XV, pp. 26-28.

1. At 4 a. m. on the 8th December 1941, the Secretary for Defence received a telephone message from O/C Troops, asking for a meeting at once. When the meeting took place fifteen minutes later at the Batu Lintang Camp[,] the Secretary for Defence was informed that Mr. Henley-Joy, Charge-Hand in charge of the Naval Direction Finding Station, had by accident heard while on duty wireless messages stating that the Japanese were attacking Pearl Harbour and Manila Bay. Whilst realising that the information received might possibly be incorrect, O/C Troops and the Secretary for Defence decided to anticipate war with Japan by taking "war" precautions at once. However, news of the bombing of Singapore was received shortly afterwards and there appeared no reason to doubt that a state of war existed, or would exist within a very short time, [b]etween Great Britain, (and therefore Sarawak) and Japan.

2. The Secretary for Defence informed the Chief Secretary by telephone of the position, and while awaiting the arrival of the Chief Secretary in the office, he requested Mr. [C.] Corbin, in charge of the Electric Power Station, to extinguish all street lights. As the Chief Secretary arrived, a telegram was received from the

Royal Air Force, Singapore, ordering all street lights to be extinguished forthwith, so the order was relayed to principal outstations immediately.

3. All local officers in charge of war operations under the Defence Scheme were called to the Defence Office and informed of the position. Since no official intimation of war with Japan had been received, other than the telegram from the Royal Air Force, [t]he Chief Secretary was reluctant to proceed with plans, but preparations proceeded and when the British Broadcasting Corporation was heard to broadcast at 6.30 a.m. that a state of war did, in fact, exist, officers in Kuching and throughout the country were instructed to enforce the "War with Japan" plans.

4. Male Japanese nationals in Miri were interned immediately and at 9 a.m. the Commissioner of Sarawak Constabulary in Kuching reported that the male Japanese in the Kuching District had been rounded up and a force had left for the Samarahan Estate¹ to arrest the Japanese at that place.

5. At 8 a.m. a telegram ordering the permanent denial of the Miri and Seria Oilfields was received and relayed to Miri. Denial commenced at once, in accordance with the pre-arranged plan.

6. During the morning, the Secretary for Defence, with the approval of the Chief Secretary, took the following action:

(a) Arranged for the immediate mobilisation of the Sarawak Volunteers, Sarawak Constabulary Reserve, Coastguard Reserve and Passive Defence Services.

(b) Arranged the immediate issue throughout the country of an order enforcing a state of emergency in Sarawak.

(c) Arranged for the enforcement of emergency regulations consequent upon the proclamation of a state of emergency.

(d) Arranged for the enforcement of the Air Raid Precautions Regulations.

(e) Instructed the Shipping Master to arrange for the occupation of coastal look-out stations and launch look-out anchorages, and to commence launch patrols.

(f) Instructed the Postmaster General to bring his war-time duty roster into force.

(g) Issued regulations for the control of vehicles.

While this work was being carried out, reports were received of

unidentified planes over the coast and the first news of enemy action near the shores of Sarawak came with a call for help at 9 a.m. from s.s. "Nellore" which was being bombed by enemy aircraft about a hundred miles north-east of Kuching. At noon a telegram was despatched to His Excellency the British Agent in Singapore, informing him of all action taken. At 2 p.m. the first official information of war with Japan was received by telegram from His Excellency the British Agent and he requested an early reply giving particulars of action taken. As this had been done before he telegraphed, he was informed accordingly.

7. It had been agreed previously that in the event of war with Japan the Commanders of the local forces in Kuching should place themselves and their men [under] the command of O/C Troops, provided that Government employees enlisted in the Sarawak Volunteers should be allowed to carry out their normal duties as far as possible and interference with normal police duties should be avoided. Instructions were issued accordingly.

8. In Miri the work of destruction proceeded smoothly and by 5 p.m. of the 8th much of the work had been done. Lutong became a blazing inferno and dense clouds of smoke hung over the fields from Miri to Seria. Work continued up to the 13th December. . . .

9. Prior to the outbreak of war many of the inhabitants of Miri and Kuching, with country homes or relatives or friends in the country, had left the town. Many others had arranged to do so upon the outbreak of war, and so on the 8th and for days afterwards[,] people left by vehicle and boat for all parts of the country. Miri was evacuated more quickly than Kuching, and by the 9th the first town was almost deserted. There was no panic in either place, however, and it was remarkable how quietly and efficiently, without fuss or demonstration, the Chinese of Kuching made their own arrangements and carried them out. Many shops were closed, but one or two representatives could be found in most of them. The Malays in the Kampongs of Kuching, too, evacuated quickly, most of them occupying the Landeh Evacuation Camp which the Government was building.

10. The behaviour of the population of Kuching could be described as good on the whole. There were minor scares in the kampongs and the natural timidity of the Malays was apparent in their

actions, but they caused the Government no great embarrassment. This could not be said of the majority of Datu-Datu of Kuching, however, since most of them left Kuching for the interior, giving no thought to their responsibilities as Headmen and representatives of the Government. On the other hand, the majority of the Chinese behaved loyally and to those who assisted the Government from 8th to 24th December 1941, all credit is due.

11. During the morning of the 8th no instructions were received concerning the control of coastal lights and the Secretary for Defence considered whether or not he should advise the Chief Secretary to take independent action. However, he decided to wait till the last possible moment and at 2.30 p.m. the "Lights Control" telegram arrived from the Singapore Naval authorities. This was transmitted to all coastal stations in time for them to arrange for all coastal lights to be extinguished that night and henceforth.

12. News of the outbreak of war caused an instant change in the attitude of all Government employees, many of whom up to that time had refused to believe that war would eventuate. It should be noted that no blame can be attached to those who shared that view, since the official wireless propaganda broadcasts of the A.B.C. powers had succeeded in promoting a widespread feeling of false security against the possibility of effective action by Japan in the Pacific. Those officials who knew better had generally obtained this information from secret sources and therefore were powerless to convince the doubters of the need for the fullest concentration on all defensive works. However, the outbreak of war changed all that, and from the 8th December onwards until the fall of Sarawak, the great majority of Government officials European and Asiatic alike, worked untiringly to expedite all defence work entrusted to them.

DOCUMENT 16

Denial of the Miri Oilfields, Lutong Refinery, and Miri Landing Grounds

J. L. Noakes, "Report upon Defence Measures Adopted in Sarawak from June 1941 to the Occupation in December 1941 by

Imperial Japanese Forces; Also an Account of the Movement of British and Sarawak Military Forces during the Japanese Invasion of Sarawak," 15 February 1946. MSS Pac.s.62. RHL, Oxford. Section XVI, pp. 29-30.

1. At 9 a.m. Sarawak Standard Time on 8th December 1941, Sarawak Oilfields Ltd. employees and the Detachment of Royal Engineers and Loyals commenced the Permanent Denial Scheme. Organisation was good and by 5.30 p.m. the following major works had been carried out:

- Pumping Station, water and oil, Pujit, immobilised.
- Padang Liku water pumping station immobilised.
- Electric Station, Miri, immobilised.
- Boiler House and small machine shops blown up.
- All but one wharf crane blown up.
- Main and Marine wharf partially destroyed.
- Sea oil-loading lines at Lutong blown up.
- Sea loading pumping station at Lutong blown up.
- Trumble plant No. 2 at Lutong blown up.
- Boiler House at Lutong partially demolished.
- Dephlemeters Nos. 2, 3 and 4 at Lutong, blown up.
- Storage tanks, run-down tanks and mixing and blending tanks, fired.
- Main pump house at Lutong immobilised.
- Much equipment disposed of.

2. On the 9th the work of denial was continued and the same day arms and equipment were issued to the Volunteers. Stores were recalled on the 12th in preparation for despatch to Kuching. . . .

3. On the 10th and 11th destruction was continued, much of the time being spent on improving on the work already done.

4. On the 12th, in accordance with instructions received from the Royal Air Force Headquarters in Singapore, Sarawak Oilfields Ltd. employees and the Royal Engineers put the Permanent Denial Scheme for the Miri Landing Ground into effect. A number of the charges failed to explode and recharging was carried out. The same day the two six[-]inch naval guns at Lutong were dismantled. One was transported successfully to Miri and loaded on to H.M.S. "Lipis," but the other unfortunately was lost in the Miri River off the Lutong ferry.

5. On the 10th the Sarawak Government decided to send the "Maimuna" to Miri to evacuate Rangers and their families and Volunteer equipment to Kuching. This vessel arrived in Miri on the 12th and shortly afterwards on the same day H.M.S. "Lipis" arrived from Singapore with instructions from the Naval Authorities to assist in evacuation. The same day, too, Belait and Seria [in Brunei] Sarawak Oilfields Ltd. employees and troops arrived in Miri having completed their part of the Permanent Denial Scheme.

6. About the same time, O/C Troops, Lutong, expressed doubt concerning the destruction of the sea oil loading lines. Tests were carried out and the technical experts of the Sarawak Oilfields Ltd. there gave the opinion that destruction had been completely successful.

7. S.S. "Shinai" (formerly "Canadian Beaver") of 3,865 tons dead weight, registered in Vancouver and owned by G. L. Shaw of Shanghai, her Master Captain G. C. Walker, arrived in Miri on the 13th.

This vessel carried a cargo of coal loaded at Palembang, Sumatra, for Shanghai. On the 7th she was out of Hongkong on her way to Shanghai when she was ordered back to Hongkong and was the last vessel to leave that port on the 7th with instructions to make for Singapore or a neutral port. Enemy planes were seen but Captain Walker evaded attack and successfully brought his ship to Miri on the 13th. There was considerable unrest amongst the Chinese crew and many of them refused to work the ship any further. However, they were persuaded to continue to Kuching and advantage was taken of the presence of the vessel in Miri to evacuate 42 troops, who would, incidentally, ensure the good behaviour of the crew during the voyage.

8. On the 13th, loading of the "Maimuna" and H.M.S. "Lipis" was completed and that evening picked Sarawak Oilfields Ltd. employees, military personnel, Rangers and their families, embarked on the two aforesaid vessels and s.s. "Shinai". . . .

9. On the 13th some disturbance was caused in the Miri Food Market by Sarawak Oilfields Ltd. Asiatic employees regarding future food supplies. The Assistant Secretary for Defence addressed them personally in the Market and they returned home quietly.

10. Japanese reconnaissance planes visited Miri every day from the 8th to the 14th December and the Japanese authorities must have had full knowledge of happenings there.

11. The only European Sarawak Oilfields Ltd. employee left behind in Miri, after the evacuation by sea, was the General Manager, Mr. B. B. Parry, who considered it his duty to stand by the Asiatic personnel who had been thrown out of employment and had every reason to anticipate distress in the future. Furthermore, there were still many Sarawak Oilfields Ltd. matters to clear up, including the payment of Provident Fund, disposal of vessels, vehicles, food stocks, stores, etc. Actually no Provident Fund was paid before the arrival of the Japanese, but all Asiatic personnel not retained in employment were paid one month's salary in lieu of notice. The Sarawak Government offered to arrange for transport to Kuching and work for unemployed left behind in Miri and agreed to take over the majority of the Sarawak Oilfields Ltd. vessels in Miri as soon as they could be sent to Kuching, but these arrangements were not effected before the arrival of the Japanese forces in Miri.

12. The Permanent Denial Scheme for the Miri Oilfields and Miri Landing Ground was well carried out. Very wisely, the order for denial had been given immediately upon the outbreak of war and consequently those entrusted with the work had time, not only to carry it out before enemy attack, but were able to improve on the destruction scheme by examining the work done and completing it where necessary and destroying minor plant[s] that had been excluded, as of lesser importance, from the scheme.

DOCUMENT 17

The Situation in Kuching from 9 to 23 December 1941

J. L. Noakes, "Report upon Defence Measures Adopted in Sarawak from June 1941 to the Occupation in December 1941 by Imperial Japanese Forces; Also an Account of the Movement of British and Sarawak Military Forces during the Japanese Invasion of Sarawak," 15 February 1946. MSS Pac.s.62. RHL. Section XIX, pp. 35-41.

1. Although no event of outstanding importance occurred in Sarawak until the occupation of Miri on the 16th [December 1941], all defence plans were pushed ahead feverishly.

2. Air raid precautions were examined and improved; security measures were overhauled; censorship was tightened; coastguards were posted to stations; the training of the Sarawak Rangers and Volunteers was intensified; the Rangers took up new defence positions determined by O/C Troops; the Volunteers went into barracks; food supplies were dispersed; work on the evacuation schemes was intensified; and vehicles, engines, equipment, etc. were commandeered for Government and military purposes. Air reporting continued apace as Japanese planes were very active along the coast.

3. The Military forces under O/C Troops were busily engaged in improving the defensive positions about the Landing Ground, moving stores to new dumps and re-arranging old, preparing river blocks, moving Companies to new posts and generally making every effort to prepare to resist the Japanese.

4. On the 13th Japanese planes visited Kuching at noon but did not attack. On the 14th, at 12.30 p.m. and on the 15th at 12.45 p.m. they reappeared but again they did no damage. Each [t]ime they appeared the Air Raid "Warning" signal was sounded and Passive Defence personnel turned out quickly. In no case was there any panic. The shop-keepers judged their hours of danger, after the first two visits, to be in the middle of the day and accordingly from the 15th onwards all shops were closed between 9 a.m. and 4 p.m. On the 18th two "Warnings" were sounded and on the 19th Kuching was bombed. . . .

5. On the 15th "Maimuna" led H.M.S. "Lipis" into the Sarawak River. . . . The first vessel anchored at Pending and the second proceeded to Kuching, berthing at 6 p.m. All 29 wounded were taken to hospital at once. Europeans came ashore and were accommodated by the Europeans [resident in Kuching]. The following day the engineering staff repaired engine defects that had developed in H.M.S. "Lipis," while the Sarawak Oilfields Ltd. staff debated their position. Some of them doubted if the ship would reach Singapore, as she was an old, unfit ship; others considered that adequate anti-aircraft armament (non-existent in Kuching) and naval

support should be supplied; and still others considered the diligent and efficient Acting Captain, Mr. Parry Thomas, could not be expected to take the ship to Singapore without assistance. The Sarawak Government was anxious to obtain the services of more Europeans and could place any persons who wished to stay. Mr. Connack, in charge of the Sarawak Oilfields Ltd. evacuees, called them together to discuss their position. Meantime, the position of H.M.S. "Lipis" had been made clear by the Singapore Naval Authorities. The vessel was to proceed to Singapore under her own power without delay. It was agreed at the meeting that 44 of the party should proceed on the ship and the remainder of 12 would remain in Kuching. All these 12 men were placed in work at once. No written agreement was prepared—time did not allow—but the verbal agreement with the Sarawak Government was as [follows:]

6. The 12 men would join the Sarawak Government temporarily in whatever capacity the Government should decide; but they would be free to leave later for Singapore, if they so desired, in order to rejoin the Sarawak Oilfields Ltd. The Sarawak Government would be responsible for their salaries and Provident Fund and commitments so long as they stayed in Government employment, and such salaries and commitments would be in accordance with the ruling Sarawak Oilfields Ltd. salary scheme. Particulars of salaries would be sent from Singapore but meantime the Sarawak Government would give adequate advances. (The particulars promised never arrived.)

7. H.M.S. "Lipis" sailed at 3 p.m. on the 17th. Machine guns and ammunition were supplied by O/C Troops and gun positions were sand-bagged. The ship carried Captain [*sic.*; Lieutenant] [G. G.] Withers and his Loyals, Mr. Connack and 43 of the Sarawak Oilfields Ltd. employees, Captain [J. R.] Asher and his Royal Artillery Detachment, Mr. Cunningham-Perdriau and his Straits Settlements Detachment of Sikh Police, Sergeant-Major J. Axon and four Japanese internees: (Sasuki, from Miri, and Kurabayashi, Mori and Kurasaki from Kuching, to Singapore for security reasons). News was received later that the vessel had arrived safely in Singapore.

8. Mr. T. F. Jefferson had made arrangements by wireless from Miri for employment in the Posts and Telegraphs Department in Kuching. He commenced duty on the 16th. The remaining eleven

Sarawak Oilfields Ltd. employees who stayed behind in Kuching were allotted duties as follows:

Messrs. G. D. Bayram, C. B. Kent, A. Strath-Whyte and S. F. Woodliffe, to the Sarawak Rangers as Second Lieutenants. Their commissions were never gazetted.

Mr. J. Adams to the Posts and Telegraphs Department.

Mr. G. Sargent to the Defence Secretariat.

Messrs. W. J. Woodgate, T. C. Leaman, and Pemberton, to the Food Control Department.

Mr. A. Mackie to the Public Works Department.

Mr. P. Hume to the Air Raid Precautions Department.

9. At 7.30 a.m. on the 16th a disturbing, indefinite message was received from the Miri Wireless Station. . . . The Secretary for Defence expected Japanese occupation of Miri but of course he had no more knowledge of Japanese movements than anyone else, as O/C Troops had not passed on any Intelligence information, if he had it. When the Miri Wireless Station failed to come on the air again, he telegraphed his suspicions to the authorities in Singapore and also told them that codes and cyphers were probably in enemy hands. At 10 a.m. the look-out at Kuala Baram came on the air and reported the presence of 11 naval ships off Lutong. He was told to send someone to Lutong to investigate and at 11 a.m. he reported that the Japanese were in possession of the coast, that the Miri police had surrendered and that Europeans were under arrest. The occupation of Miri was then regarded as certain and the Singapore authorities were informed accordingly. Messages picked up from Brunei indicated the occupation of Kuala Belait and Seria also.

10. Miri was the wireless link between Kuching and Marudi. With Miri gone the Postmaster General had to establish contact with Marudi by another route. On the same day, the 16th, he asked Bintulu and Limbang to assist, but there is no record of any wireless contact with Marudi from the 16th onwards.

11. The two wireless operators at Kuala Baram showed great devotion to duty and should be highly commended for their courage. Though surrounded by Japanese forces they continued to transmit messages concerning Japanese naval and military movements. On the 19th they reported that the enemy appeared to be searching for them, so orders were given for the set to be dismantled and taken to

Marudi. They were not heard again. On about the 18th the Secretary for Defence suspected that the messages were being dictated by Japanese and accordingly he informed Singapore that Kuala Baram information should be treated with suspicion, but the operator's last message makes it clear that these suspicions were unjustified.

12. Dutch bombers attacked the Japanese Naval forces at Miri on 17th, 18th, 19th[,] 20th and 28th and inflicted some damage. At least one Japanese destroyer was sunk. Dutch air losses are not fully known but two planes, at least, were lost. The first, a Dornier flying-boat, landed, disabled with one engine out of action, in the river opposite Marudi Fort at 8.45 a.m. on the 17th. The District Officer of Marudi, Mr. [D. C.] Hudden and Fathers [H. C.] O'Brien and Feldbrugge[c] of the Marudi Roman Catholic Mission rescued Flying Officer Brassechers, Sgt. Pilot Holm, Wireless Operator Roen and a fatally wounded mechanic who died at noon. The plane sank at 10 a.m. with one dead mechanic inside. Father Feldbrugge led the three airmen at 9 p.m. from Marudi for Long Linau with the intention of escaping inland.²

13. The Miri internees saw a Dutch Glen Martin shot down over Miri on the 19th. It is believed that the two occupants escaped by parachute. The pilot, Lt. Hans Greneveldt, certainly escaped. He landed at Riam Road and made his way to Beluru where he met Mr. Parry, and probably the District Officer, Mr. Hudden.³ . . . The second occupant of the plane, an Asiatic, name unknown, is said by Dutch internees to have returned to Miri in disguise and to have worked his passage to Kuching and later to Pontianak, where they met him, still undetected by the Japanese.

14. On the 15th, and several times later, small white balloons were seen in the air over Kuching after a visit by Japanese planes. The balloons were always very high and apparently stationary. They were very difficult to see and observers who spotted them were accused of allowing their imagination to work, but proof of their existence came later when we were asked by Singkawang II Aerodrome if we were using small white balloon weather indicators.

15. S.S. "Shinai" arrived at Pending on the 16th.⁴ . . . Captain Walker stated that his crew refused to work the ship any further

though he was most anxious to get to a port in Java. There was absolutely [*sic.*] no prospect of obtaining a crew in Kuching or, indeed, in all Sarawak. The Naval Authorities in Singapore were informed of the position but replied that the ship must sail. The [S]hipping Master [Captain A. W. G. Gibson] and the Secretary for Chinese Affairs [E. M. Selous] met the crew but were unable to induce them to change their minds. The men were given permission to spend their leisure time ashore and to establish a land camp for use in the event of air attack. On the 23rd the Naval Authorities wirelessly that "Shinai" must sail at once with her own crew and the men might be informed, for their own peace of mind, that the route to be taken would be fully patrolled by Allied planes and that all vessels using the route so far had come through without incident. We were told that we could use forceful methods, if necessary, to induce the crew to work the ship. However, there was no time left to put these instructions into effect.⁵ . . .

16. On the 18th the District Officer, Bintulu [J. R. Outram], was requested to send a reconnaissance party into Miri and if possible obtain information of the Europeans. He replied that he had already made the necessary arrangements. The party left Bintulu on the 18th and returned on the 24th. They were turned back at Niah with a message from Abang Ismawi, Native Officer. He stated that the Europeans were in custody and Miri was completely in Japanese hands. He would continue to fly the Sarawak flag.

17. On the 19th all holders of the Sarawak Defence Scheme were ordered to destroy their copies and take special precautions for the safety of code-books.

18. At noon on the 19th Kuching and the Landing Ground were attacked by Japanese bombers. One oil dump was destroyed and total casualties amounted to 33 dead and 78 wounded. . . . The Chief Secretary sent a message to His Excellency the British Agent giving particulars and pointing out that the morale of the Asiatic Population was at a very low ebb, particularly because of the complete absence of aerial defence measures. He stated also that the medical staff was totally inadequate to cope with further attacks, as there was only one European surgeon in Kuching. On the 21st Dr. C. P. Allen of the Malayan Medical Service, arrived by plane bringing certain much needed medical supplies. After examining the

medical position, Dr. Allen protested that Kuching was in no particular need of his services and he informed Singapore accordingly. Before a reply could be received the Japanese commenced their attack on Kuching. . . .

19. In the early hours of the morning of the 19th searchlights were turned on the Oya light-mast at the mouth of the Oya River, indicating that Japanese naval vessels were patrolling southwards from Miri along the coast. The Naval Authorities in Singapore were informed.

20. Again on the 19th came news from the Resident, Fifth Division at Limbang [J. G. Anderson], that the Japanese at Temburong would be in Limbang that night. He destroyed confidential papers and after an exchange of farewell telegrams with Kuching, went off the air. Actually the Japanese entered Brunei on the 20th [*sic*; 22nd] but they did not occupy Limbang until the 29th. . . .

21. Mr. C. B. Horn of the Borneo Company Ltd. Salim, Sibu, arrived in Kuching on the 19th and offered his services on war duty in any capacity. The Shipping Master required reliable men to take charge of the look-out posts at Tanjong Po and Tanjong Datu, so it was decided to send Mr. Horn to Tanjong Po. The Secretary for Defence pointed out to him the responsibilities and danger of such a commission and explained the duties. Mr. Horn accepted the work and after a short term of coaching he left on the 22nd and arrived and took over at Tanjong Po on the 23rd. Mr. Horn had not resigned from the Borneo Company Ltd. and his position vis-a-vis his Company and the Sarawak Government could not be decided as the Manager was away in Singapore, but the Chief Secretary agreed that Government would reimburse Mr. Horn for any financial loss incurred during his employment by the Government. A message was sent to the Manager and he replied that the Company agreed to the employment of Mr. Horn by the Government.

22. The presence of a few remaining European women in Kuching was giving some concern as it was realised that they would be an embarrassment to the Europeans if Kuching were attacked and they would certainly suffer ill treatment and internment if captured, though Asiatics would probably evade such treatment. The Women—doctors and nurses excepted—had no claim on Government for any special consideration as they had remained in Sara-

wak against all advice. . . . Mrs. Martine and child and Mrs. Cargill and child went to Dahan Estate of their own accord on 20th. It was agreed to send the others to Simanggang, from whence they could make their way overland to Dutch Borneo, if necessary[.] Accordingly, the "Margaret" left Kuching for Lingga on 21st with the following persons on board:

Father J. Paisley of the S.P.G. Mission, in charge of the party;
Mrs. Paisley and two infants;
Mrs. Munro and two infants;
Mrs. Bonheim and Master P. Bonheim;
Mrs. Elam and one infant;
Miss A. A. Oliver;
Miss K. Houghton;
Mrs. Corbin;
Mrs. Trail;
Mrs. Mercer.

The party arrived at Simanggang on the 21st.⁶ . . .

23. At approximately 2 a.m. on the 23rd the whole population of Kuching was aroused and driven into a state almost of panic by the sound of a siren, very loud, at about two-minute intervals, coming from the direction of Pending. The note was that of a ship in distress and the Secretary for Defence, who was sleeping in his office, suspected that the "Shinai" was aground and telephoned the Shipping Master[.] The Shipping Master went to Pending to investigate and meantime the Pending Signal Station was asked the reason for the siren but could not reply that the signal came from "Shinai." Later, the Shipping Master stated that when he boarded "Shinai" he found Captain Walker intoxicated and exhibiting a revolver. The Captain stated that the crew had refused to obey his orders and the siren was sounded to obtain the assistance of the Military Guard at Pending. As no such assistance appeared necessary the Shipping Master left. Captain Walker's behaviour caused much consternation in Kuching; many people panicked and took to the roads leading inland. Action under the Defence Regulations against the Captain was considered, but pressure of work intervened. The Shipping Master placed a guard on "Shinai" in charge of Mr. Crawford against any further irresponsible acts. From 23rd

to 28th the officers and crew of the ship spent the daylight hours in a rubber garden at Pending and the nights on the ship.⁷ . . .

24. On the 20th the Chief Secretary and the Secretary for Defence moved their offices to Maderaseh Melayu for the reason that defence matters now overshadowed all others, and the closest collaboration was required between the two officers. Immediate decisions were required almost continuously and these could be obtained only by combining the two offices. Safety from air attack was another consideration.

25. At 11.30 a.m. on the 23rd Kuching had another air-raid "Warning"—the first since the 19th . . . but this time the planes did not visit Kuching. They were reported from Tanjong Datu Look-out Station and Lundu, flying in a south-easterly direction, but did not reach Kuching and a later message from Singkawan[g] II showed that they had visited that aerodrome and done some damage—easily repaired—to the ground. The "Warning" in Kuching showed large gaps in the Passive Defence Services, as many personnel had fled the town after the bombing of the 19th. On the whole the Despatch Riders' Service and the Chinese section of the Air Raid Wardens' Service were firmest. The Auxiliary Fire Service remained sound also. The Medical Auxiliary Service was seriously depleted and the Salvage and Rescue Service was the worst. Though the Malays had not suffered from the bombing their morale was almost completely broken and only a very few of them remained in Kuching to assist. Desperate efforts were made to bolster up morale among the Chinese members—the Malays had to be completely written off—and it is to their credit that, although a great many of them were missing, the reason was generally that they were busy taking their families to the country; and indeed, this done, many of them returned to their duties.

26. At 3.30 p.m. on the 23rd, two flights, each of three Japanese planes, appeared over Oya and dropped two bombs, but there were no casualties and practically no damage. A few minutes later the planes raided Mukah and dropped three bombs without causing any injuries or damage. There were no military objectives in or near either of these two villages.

27. Also on the 23rd, the Resident, Third Division, Sibul [A.

MacPherson], informed the Chief Secretary by wireless that he was in favour of dispersing all food stocks among the population, and he added the curious sentence "the Datu can take over and carry on." He was informed that Government should continue to control the food stocks.

28. By the 23rd all routine Government work was in a state of abeyance. Practically all Government employees, Asiatic as well as European, were attached to some Defence Service; trade had ceased except for two or three hours daily and the town bore a deserted appearance. For months the Staff of the Defence Secretariat had worked day and night and lately other Government offices had been working long hours of overtime. The strain was very heavy but men were now working with almost unbelievable speed and efficiency. A new spirit had taken control. Personal comfort was forgotten and men found themselves capable of sustained physical and mental achievements, hitherto unsuspected. There had been much criticism, before the war, of European Government officers by, mostly, the Asiatic personnel and most of it was undoubtedly justified. High salaried officials, scarcely troubling to work, sat back caring for nothing but their own selfish comforts, and hid behind their slogan of "work for the good of the natives." But the war with Japan changed all that. Then they freely chose the path of self-sacrifice and showed that they were still capable of bigger and better things.

29. The Troops, too, worked much harder than ever before. Their plans had been altered and adjustments had to be made with all speed. Whether or not they succeeded, will be discussed in succeeding chapters.⁸ The Troops, too, had come in for some criticism before the war, but if there was any fault, then the officers were to blame. Lt. Col. [J.] Peffers had been remarkably successful in his efforts to co-operate with the civil authorities and during his term of command in Sarawak there had been no friction. Later, however, several small and relatively unimportant differences did occur, very often occasioned by a military system not sufficiently flexible to allow for a civil administration running parallel to a military organisation. Orders from Singapore were apt to be interpreted too literally, without regard for local conditions (though appeal to Singapore almost invariably brought the reply—"co-operate with the

local administration.") Heavy demands for men and material continued to be made on Government Departments even though these organisations were taxed far beyond their peace-time capacities and were incapable of further expansion because of lack of skilled staff and labour in Sarawak. But if there were difficulties, nevertheless they were overcome in some fashion by the goodwill which existed between the civil and military authorities, and this feeling of goodwill was due in great part to the excellent behaviour of the Troops. When they first arrived in Kuching the people went about in fear. Women and children kept indoors and men feared to walk at night. However, the Troops soon showed that they were well disciplined and law abiding, and rapidly became the friends of all.

DOCUMENT 18

A Report on the Activities of the Kuching Central Detachment of the Sarawak Constabulary

Sarawak Constabulary 1938-1942. Papers of J. S. Wink, MSS
Pac.r.11. RHL.

Strength—Three platoons of approximately forty men in each platoon.

Number one [P]latoon Malays.

Number two Platoon Dyaks.

Number three [P]latoon Sikhs.

[1941]

On orders of the C. S. [Chief Secretary] I [J. S. Wink, probationary assistant commissioner, Sarawak Constabulary] arranged for the internment of all Japanese adult males in the Kuching district.

Was informed verbally by the Commissioner of Sarawak Constabulary, Mr. W. H. Kelley, that the Constabulary would be a combatant and not a civilian force, and would assist the 2/15 Punjabis commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Lane. I accompanied Major Ross Thompson the Commissioner [Sarawak Constabulary], and Mr. [R. C.] Talbot [assistant commissioner, Sarawak

Constabulary] to [E]ighth Mile, and inspected the lines which were to be occupied by Mr. Talbot and his Company. Arranged to inspect my lines the following day.

Accompanied Lieutenant [later Captain F. W. G.] Crossland O.C. "D" Company, and reced [reconnoitered] the area to be covered by my Company. Until then no reconnoitering had been done in this area, no map was available, and no fields of fire had been cut. No trenches or weapon pits had been dug.

I returned to Kuching at noon, when fifteen Japanese bombers approached from the North and split up into two flights, one flight bombing the landing ground at Seventh Mile, and returning to bomb Kuching, and the other flight proceeding to Pontianak. Aproximately twenty bombs were dropped in Kuching, and ten at the landing ground. The line of bombing was from the Hindu Temple, Ban Hock Road to the Borneo Co. Ltd. Total casualties amounting to thirty two dead and seventy four wounded. Spent the afternoon picking up dead and wounded. The Borneo Company benzine store was set on fire. Casualties were mainly Chinese women and children who had failed to reach shelter. There were no casualties amongst those who took shelter. Police casualties consisted of one Sikh shot in the leg at Padungan, and one Dyak shot while guarding the benzine store. Guards were placed on property which had been damaged by bombs, and more guards were placed in areas around unexploded bombs. Other Police were occupied in picking up casualties.

My Company had no equipment or ground sheets. Sacks were purchased for use as packs. Fifty rounds of ammunition per man were issued. I sent a chit to the [Commissioner] requesting that he make arrangements for rations.

The civilian population in Kuching were leaving very fast, the bazaar was empty and there were no coolies. An unexploded bomb was reported to me in Ban Hock Road. I accompanied Lieutenant Hancock, R.E. and we endeavoured to explode this bomb without success. Another unexploded bomb fell in the septic tank in Padungan. This we left alone.

I dug for an hour and a half on the unexploded bomb but it rained and the hole became full of water. I could feel the fins of the bomb but could not get it out. Arranged for immediate release of short term prisoners from Jail in event of serious raid or invasion.

The morale in town was very bad, and many of the passive defence services had left. No operation orders had as yet been received from the O.C. Troops 2/15[th Punjab].

The bazaar was almost empty. Three men were away without leave. I was instructed verbally by the Commissioner to tell the men to supply themselves with three days rations, as the Chinese contractors were unable to supply rations. The men had no money so paysheets were sent in.

I arranged with the Hon. Mr. J. B. Archer,⁹ who was a member of the Special Police, that in the event of my being called out he would take over the policing of the town, assisted by Inspector Awang Joinie, the O.C.[D], to whom the safe key was given. These men were all disarmed, and were to be used for civil police work only. Destroyed my copy of the Defence Scheme and also alien files by burning them on instructions of the Secretary for Defence.

Pay sheets not returned. Men were still without rations. Guards were maintained on Borneo Company's Building, unexploded bombs, and a kerosene store.

The following posts were manned by the Kuching Central Constabulary at this time:—Satok Bridge, Wireless Station, D.F. Wireless Station, Treasury, Chartered Bank, Brooke Dockyard, Rice Godowns, Lorna Doone Wharf, Defence Office, Post Office, unexploded bombs, Padungan and Ban Hock Wharf, Water Tower. (Internment Camp guarded by Depot men.)

11 p.m. Telephone call received from the Commissioner instructing me to withdraw all Police from their posts and from the barracks, and to take them to battle stations at 7 1/4 Mile. The Police bus was the only transport. Many of the Sikhs and Malays failed to report, but the Dyaks were all present. The demolition of the landing ground was in progress. This order was carried out by 2.30 a.m.

5.30 a.m. Took up battle stations. Reconnoitered positions for weapon pits. Commandeered three hoes and dug Weapon pits. The men cleared fields of fire with bayonets. Operation orders which had been issued by the Adjutant of the 2/15[th Punjab] failed to include any mention of the armed constabulary. O.C. "D" Company did not issue any orders regarding our duties. We had no equipment, ground sheets, food, transport, communications or reserve ammunition.

I proceeded to Tenth Mile by motor cycle to try to find food for the men, and met Mr. R. G.[sic; C.] Talbot on a similar mission. Heavy rain fell and the men were soaked and hungry. There were Jats [Japanese] on our left flank and in the rear. Pickets were posted and the men lay down with their arms. After dark Lance Corporal Gokal Singh, I/C Advance Picket, brought in a section of Punjabis armed with L.M.G. [light machine gun], who stated that the enemy had reached the Seventh Mile and had cut off our retreat to the Landing Ground fortress, and that we were to withdraw to the "R" Company lines. We arrived at "R" Company lines an hour later, and found them embusing. An Indian officer confirmed that we were cut off from the Landing Ground fortress. Heavy firing had started, and I was of the opinion that it was mortar fire accompanied by shelling from the sea. There was also heavy machine gun fire. The Indian officer told me that I should withdraw my men to Batu Kitang, this was done without incident. On arrival at Batu Kitang I stationed one section at Batu Kitang and another section at Pangkalan Kranjie, to cover the right and left branches of the Sarawak River. Mr. [A. D.] Trail of the Chartered Bank sent a bus for me to go to Siniawan, and from there I went to Bau to see if the District Officer had any information. I then returned to Pangkalan Kran[j]ie.

Word came through that the [2/15th] Punjabis were withdrawing, so I left the sections on the river and withdrew with the remainder of the men to Siniawan, where we were able to get a little rice. The leading Chinese in Siniawan stated that due to the influx of refugees from Kuching only twenty six bags of rice were left in

the bazaar. I left one section of men in Siniawan and sent another section to Buso, as it was thought that the enemy might endeavour to cut us off by an attack from Buso having cut through from Sibu Laut and Sungei Tengah Estate. The sections at Kranjie and Batu Kitang were withdrawn when the Punjabis started to arrive. Inspector Mohammed Sirat and Sgt. Rebi were dispatched in plain clothes by prahu down river to try and get information.

I arrived at Bau with a platoon of Dyaks and after feeding the men, returned towards Siniawan filling in mud holes in the road. Here I met the Commissioner in a lorry, and he stated he was going through to Bau and Krokong. The Punjabis started coming through, and when the last lorry was through we returned to Bau where I met the Commissioner and was ordered to withdraw with my men to Krokong. We left Bau on foot at 10.30 p.m. Dispatched Insp. Abang Mazurki with Sgt. Maksud Ali to cover the path from Bau to Grogo (Lundu path)[.]

1.30 a.m. Arrived at Krokong with one platoon of Dyaks. The Commissioner had already gone through some hours before. The men at Krokong stated that they had all been disbanded by the Commissioner but not paid. As I had no food or money to give the men I had no option but to release my platoon from further duties removing their equipment but permitting them to retain their rifles and ammunition with which they promised to try and hinder the enemy in any way possible. They were unwilling to volunteer for service in Dutch Borneo, and I did not consider that they could be forced.

It is extremely difficult to render a just recapitulation, but certain facts seem clear and these are appended hereto.

[ADDENDA]

Sarawak Volunteer Force was officially disbanded by the O.C. Troops, who retained the services of several of the officers for service with the Punjabis. The O.C. Troops apparently did not require the services of the Commissioner or myself. I later volunteered for

service with the Punjabis and Major Ross Thompson stated he would ask the O.C., but I heard no more about this.

[Ordered by O.C. Troops to turn in our arms & ammunition to the Punjabis as we were in Dutch Territory?]

(1) The original operation orders which had been planned for several months, of which I received a copy when acting for the Commissioner in August, detailed a plan of defence designed to cover any invasion from S[ungei] Rambungan to Santubong and South along the [Quop] River to Serian Road.

The Northern line could withdraw parallel to the coast as far as B[atu] Kawah [Kawa], while the [Eastern] line would withdraw to Rock Road.

Lines of withdrawal were carefully planned, and ammunition[,] petrol and food dumps were established at Siniawan, Tondong and Buso—See attached rough plan.

Early in December, General Percival, G.O.C. Malaya, arrived in Kuching and completely changed these plans, ordering the creation of a Landing Ground Fortress with weak advance lines of Rangers, Coastguards and river patrols, leaving no lines of withdrawal and necessitating the withdrawal of Punjabis from the North and East in order to protect the South and West fronts. . . . The O.C. Troops, therefore had to cancel the plans which he had worked on for nearly a year, *after* war had broken out, and had only two weeks in which to re-arrange everything. Faced with a shortage of men, labour, the complete absence of air support, naval support and anti-aircraft, and not being familiar with the upper and lower Sarawak jungle, the O.C. Troops was in a very difficult position and the absence of orders, verbal or otherwise, the lack of organization as far as rations, communications and transport for supporting forces such as Rangers and Constabulary, is more excusable.

(2) Nevertheless it is considered that the officers commanding companies attached for duty to the 2/15th Punjabis should have had the situation explained to them in more detail, and that written or verbal orders should have been issued either by the O.C. Troops or the Commissioner or the O.C. "D" Company.

On the 24th no orders were received by me from these H.Q.'s[.]

Added to that was the complete lack of mention of the duties of the Armed Constabulary in Operation Orders No. 2 which were issued about a week before the invasion, even [then] this unit had been ordered to co-operate with the Military.

(3) The lack of equipment could not be helped. The men had uniforms, rifles and fifty rounds of ammunition, but only a very few had rain coats, and we had no web equipment, water bottles, ground sheets, trenching tools or spare rations.

The men had been ordered to supply themselves with rations but with no money and the pay sheets not returned, they could not purchase any. I consider this question should have been resolved by the Commissioner and the O.C. Punjabis.

DOCUMENT 19

The Capture of Kuching Town by Imperial Japanese Forces

J. L. Noakes, "Report upon Defence Measures Adopted in Sarawak from June 1941 to the Occupation in December 1941 by Imperial Japanese Forces; Also an Account of the Movement of British and Sarawak Military Forces during the Japanese Invasion of Sarawak," 15 February 1946. MSS Pac.s.62. RHL. Section XX, pp. 42-58.

A. The First Knowledge of the Approach of Japanese Forces and Subsequent Action taken by the Civil and Military Authorities

1. At 9 p.m. on the 23rd December 1941, the Secretary for Defence met O/C Troops for a few minutes. They met again at 11 a.m. on the 24th for fifteen minutes. At 4 p.m. on the 24th Kuching was in Japanese hands, and the Secretary for Defence was a prisoner. . . .

2. At 9 p.m. on the 23rd December 1941, an urgent message from O/C Troops brought Major R. E. Edwards (O/C Kuching Corps, Sarawak Volunteers) and the Secretary for Defence to Force Headquarters. O/C Troops informed them.

(a) that he was advised by Singapore Headquarters of the movements of a strong Japanese naval convoy from Miri towards Kuching, but probably destined for Pontianak;

(b) that the Naval Direction Finding Station at Kuching had picked up, recognised and located, Japanese naval wireless signals as the enemy vessels proceeded south-westwards; and

(c) that instructions had been received to carry out the Permanent Denial Scheme for the Bukit Stabar (7th Mile) Landing Ground at Kuching.

3. O/C Troops ordered Major Edwards to post the Sarawak Volunteers to war stations and then to proceed at once to the Landing Ground and commence Permanent Denial.

4. The Secretary for Defence returned to his office and informed the Chief Secretary of the situation. It was decided that the Deputy Secretary for Defence [E. H. Elam] should proceed to Field Headquarters at the Landing Ground, taking with him the most important Defence documents. The Treasurer (Mr. B. A. Trechman) and the Judicial Adviser (Mr. H. Thackwell-Lewis) would proceed to Bau in accordance with pre-arranged plans.¹⁰ . . . These three officers were instructed accordingly. All other officers with duties under the Defence Scheme, were called to the office.

5. Meantime, at 10 p.m. a wireless message was received from the Salak Coastguard Patrol Launch, stating that strange vessels were off Santubong. The message was passed to O/C Troops.

6. Directly this message was received it was decided to put denial plans into effect insofar as it was possible to do so at this stage. The reasons for this decision were as follows:

(a) Prior information received by O/C Troops (SEE para 3) indicated that Japanese naval forces were definitely off the Kuching Coast.

(b) The latest message (see par 5) having come from a Coastguards Patrol (the members of which were thoroughly reliable and had no knowledge of the Japanese progress down the coast) could be regarded as reliable and indicated that the Japanese intended to invade from the Santubong side.

(c) Kuching could be reached from Santubong by medium speed vessels in three hours. The time factor was all important.

(d) Military forces were concentrated at the Landing Ground

(except for patrols and small military detachments at Pending, Bukit Biawak, Bintawak, Bukit Siol and Tanjong Embang, between the Landing Ground and the sea) so any Japanese movements up the Santubong River would meet with negligible resistance. O/C Troops did not intend to defend the town.

B. The Destruction of Certain Official Secret and Confidential Documents¹¹

1. The first work put in hand after the decision indicated in Section "A", par 6, was the destruction of all secret and confidential documents (other than those taken by the Deputy Secretary for Defence . . . , maps and plans which might be of military value to the enemy. . . . A fire was lit in the Defence office and destruction commenced. The Postmaster General burnt all his papers in the Post Office, and early in the morning of the 24th the Director of Public Works (Major [R. E.] Edwards) returned from the Landing Ground and destroyed his papers in the Public Works Department office.

2. The Secretary for Defence destroyed all his copies of Departmental and Colonial Office Cyphers and informed Malaya Command accordingly. He was left with "B.G." Cod[es], "Locod" for local use, an R.A.F. Transportation Cypher and a Code for use between Tanjong Po Look-out and himself.

C. Denial Schemes Effected During the Night of 23rd-24th December 1941

THE BUKIT STABAR (7TH MILE) LANDING GROUND, KUCHING, PERMANENT DENIAL SCHEME

1. . . . By midnight of 23rd-24th all charges were ready for firing. The percentage of misfire was high (about 50%) but these were all reprimed and refired. At 8.45 a.m. on the 24th demolition was reported complete. The result was considered to be very satisfactory

and all credit is due to Major Edwards and his assistants. During the operation three caterpillar tractors on the ground were destroyed.

THE BUKIT STABAR (7TH MILE) R.A.F. DIRECTION FINDING STATION, KUCHING, (SEE SECTION IV "D")

2. At 11 p.m. on the 23rd the R.A.F. Detachment . . . at the Landing Ground, received orders to dismantle the Direction Finding equipment. All equipment was taken to Field Headquarters. The wireless receiver subsequently was conveyed as far as Krokong, where it was destroyed. The Component parts of the bombs in the Bomb Store were collected by Captain [C. L.] Newman (Sarawak Volunteers) and dumped in the river opposite Batu Kawa on the morning of the 24th.

THE NAVAL DIRECTION FINDING STATION AT 2ND MILE, ROCK ROAD, KUCHING. (SEE SECTION IV "E")

3. The Secretary for Defence found the Direction Finding Station blazing at 11.30 p.m. on the 23rd. All internal equipment was completely destroyed. The Postmaster General has stated that in all probability the fire caused the cutting of telephonic communication beyond this place and Kuching, as the damaged power lines nearby were known to have fallen across the telephone wires, causing dislocation. This meant, of course, that the Secretary for Defence and Forward Military Detachments in and near Kuching were completely cut off from telephonic communication with Field Headquarters at a time when such a connection was of vital importance. Neither the Secretary for Defence nor the Postmaster-General was informed that the Station was to be destroyed by fire and so the Postmaster General was given no opportunity to safeguard the telephone wires.

THE BROOKE DOCKYARD AND WORKSHOPS, KUCHING

4. At 10 p.m. on the 23rd the Secretary for Defence issued the

Acting Manager of the Brooke Dockyard with instructions to carry out the Denial Scheme. At midnight (23rd-24th) he reported that all parts were ready for transport up river. The Shipping Master was then instructed to supply a launch. As O/C Volunteers (Major Edwards) and other Volunteer Officers were at the Landing Ground and the telephone wires had been cut . . . all the Secretary for Defence's efforts to obtain a Volunteer guard, as arranged previously, were fruitless, and the Shipping Master was informed that the launch must proceed without a guard.

OIL SUPPLIES, KUCHING

5. The Denial of the Thomson Road Oil supplies [and] . . . [t]he failure to deny oil supplies at Pending and Siniawan. . . .

IMMOBILISATION OF VESSELS

6. The Shipping Master and the Manager, Sarawak Steamship Company, Limited, (Mr. K. N. Black), together commenced the partial denial of vessels at Kuching. The "Gladys" was scuttled off Tanjong Priok, but only essential parts were removed from the "Margaret," as it was thought that this vessel (and others) would be required later. Launches were left intact as all were either in use or standing by for duty. The "Maimuna" also was standing by. The "Rejang" was at Sibu under the control of the Resident, Third Division.

7. It is emphasized that at this time (10-12 p.m.) it was only known that the Japanese were off Santubong and it was confidently expected that O/C Troops would keep the Secretary for Defence (and consequently the Shipping Master) advised of military movements. Furthermore, O/C Troops was expected to require all small craft not on duty for transport and reconnaissance. Thus, complete denial could not be effected until O/C Troops indicated that he no longer required the vessels. All Government launches were in use on some essential service.

8. The only transmitting sets in Kuching (other than the R.A.F.

and Naval Direction Finding Sets) were Government owned, and in use. These sets were in use right up to the moment of capture. The Japanese surprise did not give the operators the time to remove essential parts.

IMMOBILISATION OF VEHICLES

9. Here again, Japanese surprise was effective, and many vehicles, civil and military, were captured in good running order.

CURRENCY

10. In June 1941 \$7,000,000 were sent to Singapore for safe custody. It is not known if the money was destroyed before the Japanese entered Singapore. Cash held by the Treasury in Kuching amounted to about \$940,000 on the 23rd December 1941. The amount of cash held by the Chartered Bank in Kuching on the same date is unknown.

11. At 10 p.m. on the 23rd, the Treasurer instructed the Government Auditor (Mr. A. G. Taylor) to take over the destruction of currency in the Kuching Treasury in accordance with pre-arranged plans. . . . The Government Auditor took the keys and proceeded by car to the Treasury, where he collected all ten and five dollar notes from the main safe and took them by car in two trips, to an incinerator at the Brooke Dockyard. The total value of these notes was about \$800,000. This work was finished by 4 a.m. on the 24th. One dollar notes, notes of smaller denominations and coins, were not destroyed because (the Auditor states) of lack of time. Their value amounted to about \$140,000 and presumably they fell in Japanese hands.

12. It is presumed that the Manager of the Chartered Bank took the Bank's more valuable securities when he escaped from Kuching. . . . Other securities were destroyed by Messrs. [K.] Gillett, [D. C.] White and [E. M.] Selous on the morning of the 24th. (See "E", paras 16-18). It is not known how much currency held in the Chartered Bank fell into Japanese hands.

D. Movements of Certain European Civil Officials, from 11 p.m. on the 23rd to 6 a.m. on the 24th December, 1941.

THE SECRETARY FOR DEFENCE

1. At about 11 p.m. on the 23rd December, the Secretary for Defence found that all telephonic communication with O/C Troops had been severed. As it was most important to keep the Civil and Military Authorities in communication, he took the Chief Secretary and the Shipping Master in his car to Batu Lintang Camp, only to find it vacated except for Lt. (Later Captain) J. E. S. Temple and a few soldiers who were preparing to leave. Lt. Temple could not give any information regarding the whereabouts of O/C Troops, so the party proceeded to Force Headquarters, but it also had been vacated. The party returned to Kuching and endeavoured to telephone once again to O/C Troops, without success.

2. It was during this visit to Force Headquarters that the Secretary for Defence saw the blazing Naval Direction Finding Station, and noted the flashes as wires (presumably electric and telephone) came into contact.

3. Throughout the remaining hours of darkness, the Secretary for Defence remained in his office completing plans, decyphering and encyphering messages, and answering enquiries. Many times he tried to get into communication with O/C Troops, or his officers, unsuccessfully. Many members of the Sarawak Volunteers and several officers of the Sarawak Rangers came to the Secretary for Defence for instructions regarding military dispositions, as they, too, were out of touch with O/C Troops. They were advised to remain at their posts in accordance with pre-arranged plans; or, if not acquainted with these plans, to seek their military Commander without delay.

THE MANAGER, (MR. A. D. TRAIL) OF THE CHARTERED
BANK, KUCHING. (2ND. LIEUT.,
SARAWAK VOLUNTEERS)

4. The Manager of the Chartered Bank, Kuching, in common

with the Heads of Government Departments, was informed of the military situation as the Secretary for Defence knew it, at 11.30 p.m. on the 23rd. He asked twice for information regarding Japanese movements, and was told—"The Japanese are at Santubong. May be they will come up river. Nothing more is known." The Manager stated he had certain papers which must be taken to Singapore and he was told to entrust them to the Treasurer, who would be leaving shortly. Apparently he decided to leave for his safety, as he is known to have telephoned Mr. [A. R.] Dee of Dahan Estate, from Batu Kitang at 4.45 a.m. on the 24th, . . . and to have arrived at the Estate at 8 a.m.

5. It should be recorded here that on the morning of the 24th it was decided to pay Government salaries, but the Secretary for Defence was advised that this could not be done as the Manager of the Bank was missing, and he had taken his keys with him. At 11 a.m. the Manager telephoned the Secretary for Defence from Dahan and was told to return at once to Kuching, to pay out the salaries and destroy the remaining currency. A launch was sent to Siniawan for him but he did not come. Mr. Trail, though an officer of the Sarawak Volunteers, left Bau on the 24th, with the Treasurer, for Pontianak.

6. The inability of Mr. K. Gillett, Chartered Bank Assistant, to dispose of the Chartered Bank currency because of the departure of his senior officer with some of the keys, is referred to in "C" para 10, and "E" paras 16 and 17.

DR. C. P. ALLEN, MALAYAN MEDICAL SERVICE

7. Dr. Allen arrived in Kuching by plane from Singapore on the 21st December. . . . At about 11.30 p.m. on the 23rd he telephoned the Secretary for Defence, asking for a plane to return to Singapore, but was told that the Landing Ground was being demolished.

8. Considering the position in the light of later events, the Secretary for Defence is of the opinion that he might well have advised Dr. Allen to escape overland, but of course at the time he was not in a position to advise flight.

THE COMMISSIONER, SARAWAK CONSTABULARY AND
OFFICER COMMANDING SARAWAK RANGERS
(LT. COL. W. H. KELLEY)

9. Upon receiving information from the Secretary for Defence . . . the Commissioner proceeded to the Landing Ground and placed himself under the command of O/C Troops, in accordance with a previous agreement whereby O/C Troops took command of all Local Forces. . . . The number of men taken by him is not known, but it is certain that he left the Sikh Detachment of the Constabulary in Kuching to maintain law and order.

10. The Commissioner is said to have taken a large sum of money with him: this money was said to be the salaries of the Kuching Constabulary and Rangers, drawn from the Chartered Bank on the 23rd December. Such an action would be wise, as the safety of the money was his responsibility.

THE TREASURER (MR. B. A. TRECHMAN)
AND THE JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER
(MR. H. THACKWELL-LEWIS)

11. Both the above-mentioned officers were instructed to proceed to Bau. . . . They left by car at 4 a.m. on the 24th.

12. The Treasurer telephoned the Secretary for Defence twice during the 24th. once in the morning and once at 3 p.m. and was informed of the military situation, as the Secretary for Defence knew it. It was agreed by telephone that the two officers should leave Bau for Dutch Borneo when they were certain of the fall of Kuching.

TEMPORARY BREAKDOWN OF THE KUCHING
TELEPHONE SERVICE

13. At about 1 a.m. on the 24th December, the Kuching Telephone Service failed. The Postmaster-General visited the Telephone Exchange and found that the operators had fled, presumably upon hearing the demolition explosions from the Landing Ground.

The P.M.G. assisted by Mr. T. P. Jefferson [formerly of Sarawak Oilfields Ltd., re-appointed assistant, post and telegraph department], re-established local communication. Fresh operators were called and they continued the service under Messrs. W. J. Chater [Assistant, Government Printing Office, and Transport Officer] and T. P. Jefferson, until 7 a.m. when a second party of operators took over.

THE DISPOSITION OF EUROPEAN CIVILIANS IN
KUCHING DISTRICT, WITH DUTIES IN THE
SARAWAK MILITARY DEFENCE FORCES, AT ABOUT
6 A.M. ON THE 24TH DECEMBER

14. The following list is, it is hoped, complete in the number of personnel, but the time and place at which each person joined his unit, and the duties he performed, cannot be vouched for in all cases. Many persons did not reach their units until after 6 a.m. but are reported here for clarity and convenience.

<i>Name</i>	<i>Local Rank</i>	<i>Force</i>	<i>Situated at</i>
Bayram, G.	2nd. Lieut.	Sarawak Rangers	
Benson, J.A.G.	2nd. Lieut.	S'wak Volunteers	3rd Mile, Rock Road
Birt, C.F.	2nd. Lieut.	S'wak Volunteers	Landing Ground
Black, K.N.	2nd. Lieut.	S'wak Volunteers	Landing Ground
Clapman, Dr. L.J.	2nd. Lieut.	S'wak Volunteers	General Hospital
Crawford, J.M.	Assistant	S'wak Coastguards	Pending
Dant, A.D.	2nd. Lieut.	S'wak Volunteers	Landing Ground
Digby, K.H.	Private	S'wak Volunteers	Japanese Internment Camp
Donnelly, J.M.M.	Sergeant	S'wak Volunteers	Landing Ground
Edwards, R.E.	Major	S'wak Volunteers	Landing Ground
Elam, H.E.H.	2nd. Lieut.	S'wak Volunteers	Landing Ground
Gibson, Capt. A.W.G.	Superintendent of Shipping	O/C Sarawak Coastguards	Kuching
Gilbert, J.O.	2nd. Lieut.	2/15th Punjab Regiment	[Batu] Lintang
Gillett, K.C.	Sergeant	S'wak Volunteers	Landing Ground
Harnack, W.	2nd. Lieut.	S'wak Volunteers	Landing Ground

<i>Name</i>	<i>Local Rank</i>	<i>Force</i>	<i>Situated at</i>
Keir, A.	Captain	S'wak Volunteers	Japanese Internment Camp
Kelley, W.H.	Lieut. Colonel Commissioner	Sarawak Rangers Sarawak Constabulary	Landing Ground
Kent, C.B.	2nd Lieut.	Sarawak Rangers	Landing Ground
Large, R.W.	Captain	Sarawak Rangers	Landing Ground
McClelland, J.G.		Sarawak Volunteers	Landing Ground
MacDonald, I.A.	Sergeant	Sarawak Volunteers	Landing Ground
Newman, C.L.	Captain	Sarawak Volunteers	Landing Ground
Pim, J.W.	2nd Lieut.	Sarawak Volunteers	Landing Ground
Sagar, R.S.	Sergeant	Sarawak Volunteers	3rd Mile Rock
Sergel, C.S.	2nd Lieut.	Sarawak Volunteers	Landing Ground
Spurway, B.J.C.	2nd Lieut.	Sarawak Volunteers	3rd Mile Rock
Stewart, D.B.	2nd Lieut.	Sarawak Volunteers	Reservior Road
Strath-Whyte, A.	2nd Lieut.	Sarawak Rangers	Kuap
Talbot, R.G.	Assistant Com- missioner	Sarawak Constabulary	Landing Ground
Taylor, A.G.	Private	Sarawak Volunteers	Japanese Internment Camp
Trail, A.D.	2nd Lieut.	Sarawak Volunteers	Fled to Dahan
Wink, J.S.	Assistant Com- missioner	Sarawak Constabulary	Landing Ground
Woodliffe, S.F.	2nd Lieut.	Sarawak Rangers	

THE DISPOSITION OF EUROPEAN CIVILIANS IN THE
KUCHING DISTRICT (EXCEPTING THOSE
AFOREMENTIONED) AT APPROXIMATELY
6 A.M. ON 24TH DEC.

15. The following list includes European women and all European members of the Passive Defence Services.

<i>Name</i>	<i>Occupation or Appointment</i>	<i>Passive Defence Service</i>	<i>Place of Occupation or Duty</i>
Aichner, Father	R.C. Priest	A.R. Warden's	R.C. Mission, Kuching
Aikman, R.G.	Under Secretary Resident, First Division	—	Office of Under Secretary

<i>Name</i>	<i>Occupation or Appointment</i>	<i>Passive Defence Service</i>	<i>Place of Occupation or Duty</i>
Aisup, A.E.	2nd Engineer, s.s. "Shinai"	—	Pending
Archer, J.B.	Assistant Censor Information Officer Pensioner, S.C.S.	Special Police	Telephone Exchange
Adams, J.	P. & T. Dept.	—	—
Allen, Dr.C.P.	Malayan Medical Service	—	General Hospital
Banks, E.	Curator, Sarawak Museum	—	Kuching
Bates, G.T.	Food Supply Officer	—	Food Control Office
Bates, Miss E.	Defence Secretariat	Medical Auxiliary	Defence Secre- tariat
Bates, Miss M.	Treasury	Medical Auxiliary	Treasury
Bonheim, Dr. E.	Dental Officer	Medical Auxiliary	Astana First Aid Post
Broadhurst, Miss M.L.	Matron	Medical Auxiliary	General Hospital
Cargill, J.K.	Assistant, Borneo Company, Ltd.	—	—
Cargill, Mrs. and infant	—	—	Dahan, Bau
Chater, R.W.	Superintendent Govt. Printing Office	—	Printing Office
Chater, W.J.	Assistant, Govt. Printing Office Transport Officer	Transport	Report Centre
Clark, C.D.	Officer adminis- tering the Govt.	Chief Secretary	Maderaseh Melayu
Corbin, C.	Manager, Sarawak Electricity Supply Co., Ltd.	A.R. Warden's	Power Station
Cousens, E.W.	District Warden	A.R. Warden's	Report Centre
Dee, A.R.	Manager, Dahan Rubber Estate	—	Dahan, Bau
Delaney, Father T.F.	R.C. Priest	—	R.C. Mission, Kuching
Field, G.A.C.	Acting Commissioner Customs Department	—	Customs Office

<i>Name</i>	<i>Occupation or Appointment</i>	<i>Passive Defence Service</i>	<i>Place of Occupation or Duty</i>
Gibson, Dr. (Mrs.) F. Mc.P.	Deputy O/C	Medical Auxiliary	A.R.P. Office
Henderson, Miss	Nursing Sister	—	General Hospital
Hollis, F.S.	Bishop of Labuan and Sarawak	—	S.P.G. Kuching
Hopfgartner Mgr.	Prefect Apostolic R.C. Mission	—	R.C. Mission, Kuching
Horn, C.B.	Coastguards Look-out	—	Tanjong Po
Howes, Father P.H.H.,	Priest-in-Charge	—	S.P.G. Kuap
Hulsbosch, Father, F.	R.C. Priest	—	R.C. Mission, Serian
Hume, P.	Assistant, A.R.P. Dept.	—	
Jacques, E.W.H.	Pensioner, S.C.S.	Special Police	Japanese Intern- ment Camp
Jefferson, T.P.	Assistant, P& T Department	—	Telephone Exchange
Kelley, Mrs. W.H. (D).	Typist, Operations Headquarters 2/15th Punjab Regt.	—	Landing Ground
Lake, Pastor W.W.R.	Director of Sarawak and Brunei Mission	—	37th Mile of S.D.A. Sim- anggang Road
Large, Mrs.R. W. (D.)	Typist, Operations Headquarters 2/15th Punjab Regt.	—	Landing Ground
Leaman, T.C.	Assistant Food Control Department	—	Food Control Office
Le Sueur, Dr. (Mrs.) E.	Medical Officer	Medical Auxiliary	First Aid Post Outdoor Clinic
Lowry, W.	Assistant Censor Controller of Rubber	—	Rubber Regulation Office
MacDonald, D.	Manager, Sungei Tengah Rubber Estate	—	Sungei Tengah
Mackie, A.	Public Works Dept.	—	P.W.D. Office
Marjoribanks Dr. E.M.	Private Medical Practioner	Medical Auxiliary	Central Police Station

<i>Name</i>	<i>Occupation or Appointment</i>	<i>Passive Defence Service</i>	<i>Place of Occupation or Duty</i>
Mrs. Martine and one infant	Wife of Manager Borneo Co. Ltd. Kuching	—	Dahan, Bau
Mercer, Arch. B.A.M.	Archdeacon of North Borneo and Sarawak	—	S.P.G. Kuching
Muhren, Father D.	R. C. Priest	—	R. C. Mission Serian
Munro, T.J.C.	Assistant, Sungei Tengah Rubber Estate	—	Sungei Tengah
Myles, G.T.	Executive Engineer, P.W.D. Evacuation Officer	Waterworks and A.R.P.	P.W.D. Office
Noakes, J.L.	Secretary for Defence, Director of A.R.P. and Security Officer	A.R.P.	Maderasch Melayu
O'Connor, Dr.M.P.	Principal Medical Health Officer & O/C Medical Auxiliary Service	Medical Auxiliary	General Hospital
O'Connor, Mrs. M.P. (K.)	Assist. Defence Secretariat	—	Defence Secretariat
Parker, T.E.	Controller of Food and Essential Commodities	—	Food Control Office
Pemberton,	Asst. Food Control Department	—	Food Control Office
Phillips, W.F.	Asst. Sarawak Elect. Supply Co., Ltd.	Air Raid Wardens	Power Station
Ricketts, O.F.	Pensioner, S.C.S.	—	Rock Road
Ricketts, Master H.	—	—	—
Ricketts, Miss L.	—	Medical Auxiliary	Sarawak Club
Ricketts, Miss A.	Typist, A.R.P. Dept.	Medical Auxiliary	Sarawak Club
Sargent, G.	Assistant, Defence Secretariat	—	Defence Secretariat
Scott, J.	Trader, Kuching and Sibulaut	—	Mathies Road, Kuching
Selous, E.M.	Secretary for Chinese Affairs	—	Secretariat for Chinese Affairs
Shaw, R.E.	First Engineer, s.s. "Shinai"	—	Pending

<i>Name</i>	<i>Occupation or Appointment</i>	<i>Passive Defence Service</i>	<i>Place of Occupation or Duty</i>
Simpson, J.B.	Retired Planter	—	Dahan, Bau
Staal, Father J.	R.C. Priest	—	R. C. Mission Senggi [Singhi]
Tait, W.G.	Postmaster-General Chief Censor	—	Post Office
Tait, Mrs.W.G.(J.)	Wife of W.G.Tait	Medical Auxiliary	Sarawak Club
Tait, Master A.	Adopted son of W.G. Tait	—	—
Thackwell-Lewis H.	Judicial Commissioner	—	Bau
Trechman, B.A.	Treasurer of Sarawak	—	Bau
Van Erp, Father H.	R.C. Priest	—	R.C. Mission Kuching
Vos, Father J.	Procurator, R.C.	—	R.C. Mission Kuching
Walker, Captain G. C.	Master, s.s. "Shinai"	—	Pending
Were, C.S.	Assistant, P. & T. Department	—	Post Office
Were, Mrs.	Wife of C.S. Were	—	
Were, Miss D.	Daughter of Mr. and Mrs. C.S. Were	—	Aged 14
Were, Miss S.	Daughter of Mr. and Mrs. C.S. Were	—	Aged about 7
Woodgate, W.J.	Assistant, Food Control Department	—	Food Control Office
Wright, F.H.	District Officer, Bau	—	Bau

In addition to those recorded above, the following ladies (Roman Catholic Mission personnel) were in Kuching on December 24th:

- x Mother M. Bernadine (E. Driscoll)
- x/ Mother M. Clare (M. McGowan)
- x Sister M. Domitilla (A. Johnson)
- x Mother M. Francis (W. McGreeves)
- x Sister M. John Bosco (H. Walsh)
- x Sister M. Joseph Teresa (M. J. Connaughton)
- x Mother M. Lucilla (E. Bailey)
- x/ Sister M. Teresa (V. Salter)

x/ Mother M. Sebastian

x Sister M. Stephanie (F. Redmon)

x/ Denotes that the person remained in Kuching but was not interned as an enemy subject by the Japanese.

x Denotes that the person remained in Kuching and was interned as an enemy subject by the [J]apanese.

European Military Officers seconded to the Sarawak Government as at 6 a.m. on the 24th December.

16. All the following Officers were attached to a Local Military Defence Force and their salaries were paid by the Sarawak Government. By arrangement¹² . . . they came under the direct command of O/C Troops upon mobilisation of the Local Forces:

<i>Name</i>	<i>Rank</i>	<i>Regiment</i>	<i>Attached to Local Force</i>
Bayford	Regimental Sergeant-Major	Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders	S'wak Volunteers
Bruce, W.	Lieutenant	Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders	S'wak Rangers
Crafter, F.W.	Major	East Surreys	S'wak Volunteer
Moran	Company Sergeant-Major	Loyals	S'wak Volunteer
Stafford, M.A. (No. 12522)	Regimental Sergeant-Major	Manchesters	S'wak Rangers

E. Activities of European Civilians in Kuching from 6 a.m. on December 24th up to the time of their capture or escape, and other associated events

1. This record is not complete, as a number of European officials who escaped may have further information to impart. . . . Events are not entirely in chronological order: in fact, it is not possible to make them so: but it will be observed that they are grouped in subject and sequence as far as possible.

TANJONG PO LOOK-OUT

2. At 7 a.m. messages began to come in to the Secretary for Defence from the Look-Out (Mr. [C. B.] Horn) at Tanjong Po. . . . At dawn suspicious vessels were seen off Tanjong Po and Kuala Santubong (the Kuala itself could not be seen from the Lookout Post). At 9 a.m. a vessel on the horizon was seen to be on fire and at 11.15 a.m. a warship close in, was attacked by Dutch planes. Later still the movements of Japanese destroyers on patrol were reported. Information came in from Tanjong Po up to 4 p.m. and was sifted and passed on to Singkawan[g] II, R.A.F. Headquarters and Naval Intelligence as it became available.

PATROL LAUNCH "JEAN," MR J. J. M. CRAWFORD

3. At 7 a.m. Mr Crawford was ordered by the Shipping Master to proceed at once on M. L. "Jean" to Goebilt,¹³ to examine the estuary for suspicious craft. He saw nothing to report and he left to return at 10.30 a.m. At 11.45 a.m. when the launch was 200 yards from Pending Wharf, the Punjab Detachment on guard there opened fire. The "Juragan" of the launch was mortally wounded and another of the crew was injured. Mr. Crawford beached the launch out of sight of Pending and waited. At noon, Mr. J. O. Gilbert appeared in a Punjabi outboard river-boat and rescued the launch party.

4. This attack, made in clear daylight on a launch known to have gone down river a few hours before flying the Sarawak flag, and so obviously a Government launch, is inexplicable and suggests grave negligence.

PRINCIPAL MEDICAL OFFICER ADVISED

5. At 8 a.m. the Secretary for Defence met the Principal Medical Officer and requested him to collect European doctors and nurses and (together with Mrs. O'Connor) give them quarters in the General Hospital.

SALAK PATROL LAUNCH

6. At 8.30 a.m. the "Juragan" of the Salak Patrol Launch signalled by wireless the number of Japanese craft off Santubong and information that the Japanese were landing at Santubong. He stated that the launch was proceeding up-river, followed by two light Japanese vessels. It was not clear from the report if the launch was proceeding up the Salak or Santubong River. At any rate, no further news was received of the launch and it was presumed that it was sunk or captured.

7. The information received was passed on to O/C Troops Headquarters, through a Dispatch Rider, and Singkawan[g] II and Singapore were informed.

8. At 9 a.m. a small Japanese plane appeared, flying low, over Kuching. The "Warning" signal was sounded but the plane dropped a few leaflets and then made off to Bukit Siol, where it dropped a bomb near the Punjabi position without doing any damage.

9. About 45 minutes later the plane reappeared and the "Warning" signal sounded again. This time the plane circled over Kuching several times and again dropped leaflets in the streets.

10. These leaflets were of three types, in Malay. The first two types contained pictures of human bodies mutilated as a result of air attack, and the third was a warning to all who attempted to destroy installations, oil, etc., that death would be the penalty. Actually, the leaflets served the Japanese little purpose, as the town was virtually deserted. Most of the inhabitants had fled in the early hours of the morning when they first heard the explosions at the Landing Ground—explosions which they probably took to be gunfire. The few who remained kept indoors. If the Japanese had bombed the town on the 24th they would probably have destroyed it, as a nucleus only of members of the Passive Defence Services remained on duty. Many members had fled from fear; others were busy moving their families and safeguarding their own property; and the few staunch supporters who remained (about 20% of the total strength) could not have coped with heavy bombing.

11. The Secretary for Defence visited the Report Centre at 11.20 a.m. and asked all present to stand by their posts to the end.

12. A third Air Raid "Warning" was sounded at about 11.45 a.m. because of the presence overhead of unidentified planes. . . . These planes were most probably Dutch, on their way to attack Japanese shipping at Santubong.

13. A fourth and last "Warning" signal was sounded at about 1.45 p.m. but no attack was made, and the planes, though unidentified, were presumed to be Dutch. . . .

CHARTERED BANK SECURITIES, BONDS AND CURRENCY

16. The District Officer [D. C. White] had agreed to meet the Manager of the Chartered Bank [A. D. Trail] at 9 a.m. to act as witness to the destruction of securities and currencies held by the Chartered Bank. However, the Manager had fled from Kuching before daybreak, taking the keys. . . .

17. Eventually the District Officer found the Bank Assistant (Mr. K. C. Gillett) who held keys to one section of the strong-room. Together they cleared out this section and the District Officer burnt the Security and Municipal Bonds found, while Messrs. K. [C.] Gillett and E. M. Selous checked. Mr. Selous kept one copy of the list of Bonds destroyed, but this subsequently was rendered illegible through contact with acid and urine, and therefore was destroyed.

18. The other section of the strong-room could not be opened as the keys were at Dahan in the Manager's hands, and thus all currency held by the Bank eventually fell into Japanese hands. . . .

19. While the destruction described in Par. 17 was proceeding, Mr. K. N. Black, Manager of the Sarawak Steamship Company, Ltd. came in for money to pay his coolies and he was given all that could be found—about \$1200. Later in the day Mr. Gillett handed his keys to the Resident. . . .

FAILURE OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN O/C TROOPS AND THE SECRETARY FOR DEFENCE

20. Whatever arrangements O/C Troops may have made for the conveyance of messages from Kuching to his Headquarters when

the telephone failed . . . they failed in practice. A Dispatch Rider did appear at the Post Office at odd intervals, but by noon he had disappeared entirely. At 10.30 a.m. there was such an accumulation of 'Immediate' message at the Post Office that the Secretary for Defence himself conveyed them to the Landing Ground, without, however, being able to find O/C Troops as no one there knew of his whereabouts. Among the messages was a plain language one from "General Singapore" which read (to the best of the Secretary for Defence's memory) as follows: "Several Japanese vessels already sunk. Defend Landing Ground at all costs."

VISIT BY O/C TROOPS TO DEFENCE SECRETARIAT

21. At 11.30 a.m. O/C Troops himself appeared at the Defence Office and stated that he had not received the message reporting the Japanese landing at Santubong or the movement upriver of Japanese vessels. The Secretary for Defence begged O/C Troops to keep in constant touch with the Civil Authorities, and asked for Dispatch Riders to be kept constantly at the Post Office. While they were conversing, planes were seen flying in the direction of Santubong from the south-west and they were presumed to be Dutch.¹⁴

22. Though O/C Troops did not express unbelief to the Secretary for Defence regarding a Japanese landing at Santubong, deduced from information obtained from patrol launch . . . backed by messages from Tanjong Po . . . aerial activity and the scattering of pamphlets, he informed Mr. [R. G.] Aikman [under-secretary, Resident First Division] a few minutes later that he did not believe that the Japanese had landed at Santubong or that they were proceeding up-river.

DEFENCE OFFICE MOVED TO POST OFFICE

23. At about noon the Secretary for Defence moved to the Post Office, where he was joined by the Naval Reporting Officer. The reason for the move was that by this time the officers were almost wholly engaged in cyphering and decyphering and time could be saved by working together near the wireless operators. Also, it was advantageous to collect the few remaining officials.

CODES IN USE

24. The Naval Reporting Officer kept his copy of the Naval Shore and "B.G." Code, and brought these to the Post Office when he joined the Secretary for Defence there, Communication with Singkawan[g] II was carried on in plain Malay and English.

25. Because of the diff[i]culties of delivering messages . . . to O/C Troops, the Secretary for Defence informed Malaya Command at about 2 p.m. [24 December 1941] that delivery could not be guaranteed and suggested the use of Royal Air Force Cypher for messages sent through the civil authorities. No reply was given. It has been established that O/C Troops was using a receiver set at the Landing Ground at that time and his operator was intercepting messages sent from Singapore to the Kuching Post Office for him, so perhaps this is the reason why he failed to make any satisfactory arrangements to collect messages from the Post Office.

OIL SUPPLIES DESTROYED

26. At noon the Secretary for Defence met Captain [R. W.] Large, who stated that he was on his way to the Thompson Road oil supply dump to deny the oil. . . . The Secretary for Defence concurred and it is understood that Captain Large and a detachment of Sarawak Rangers carried out denial.

THE SHIPPING MASTER (CAPTAIN A. W. G. GIBSON)

27. At about 1 p.m. the Shipping Master informed the Secretary for Defence that he wished to proceed in "Maimuna" down-river towards Santubong to investigate Japanese activities. The Secretary for Defence advised against this action as it would mean the certain loss of lives, and the vessel. It should be recorded that the vessel carried no armament and the native coastguards who manned the vessel could not be excepted [*sic*, expected] to fight against experienced soldiers, even if a remote opportunity to fight at close quarters occurred.

28. Later, the Shipping Master went to Pending where, with O/C Troops, he investigated the attack on M.L. "Jean" by the

Pending Punjab Detachment (See "E" par 3). He telephoned particulars to the Secretary for Defence and O/C Troops also spoke, expressing his profound regret.

29. The Shipping Master was driving into the town from Pending when a Japanese soldier jumped on to his running board and ordered him to stop. Captain Gibson struck the soldier, knocking him on to the road, and then drove to meet his wife. They returned to their home and while there the house was twice visited by Japanese soldiers accompanied by a Chinese guide. They wanted her husband but Mrs. Gibson bravely and cleverly persuaded them that he was not in the house and when they had gone she persuaded him to leave (naturally against his will) for the Landing Ground.

30. The action of the Shipping Master in leaving Kuching was in order. He was not under orders to stay and he could have done no good by doing so.

2ND LIEUT. D. B. STEWART (SARAWAK VOLUNTEERS)

31. 2nd. Lieut. Stewart in charge of No. 6 (Motor Transport) Company, was stationed in Reservoir Road. He repeatedly telephoned the Secretary for Defence during the day, asking for information and orders. The Secretary for Defence could give little information and for orders could only suggest that Lt. Stewart should get in touch with his Commander. It was unfortunate that No. 6 Company was separated from the main body at the Landing Ground, but the fault appeared to be with O/C Volunteers and O/C Troops, who should at least have established communication.

32. Lt. Stewart managed to escape on the evening of the 24th, after the Japanese had occupied the town, by taking Sgt. Ong Khi Wi's car and driving through the enemy patrols. His Company, consisting of Chinese, meantime dispersed without enemy interference.

MESSRS. J. B. ARCHER AND T. P. JEFFERSON

33. At about 2 p.m. Mr. Jefferson was sent from the Post Office to the Landing Ground to deliver telegrams to O/C Troops, as Dispatch Riders were missing. . . . The documents were handed to

Lieut. (later Captain) [N. C.] MacArthur, and Mr. Jefferson then returned. At about 3 p.m. the Postmaster-General sent Messrs. Archer and Jefferson to the Telephone Exchange to ensure that the operators remained on duty. At about 4 p.m. they could get no reply by telephone from the Post Office and they were told that Mr. [E. W.] Cousens had been captured in Rock Road. . . . Then they saw Japanese soldiers in the street and they tried to get to the Post Office by car, but were intercepted, arrested and taken to Main Bazaar, where they joined the main European party of captives. . . .

THE DISTRICT WARDEN, MR. E. W. COUSENS

34. The District Warden left his house at about 3.30 p.m. after a short rest for lunch. He was followed by 2nd Lieut. Benson and Sergeant Sagar of the Sarawak Volunteers in a lorry as they wished to collect steel helmets from the District Warden at the A.R.P. Store in Rock Road. When the District Warden stopped his car at the Store he was met by two Japanese soldiers who arrested him and made him drive his car to Main Bazaar, where he was tied, questioned and held until the arrival of the main European party of captives. It appeared that the District Warden was the first European prisoner to be taken in Kuching by the Japanese.

MESSRS. A. MACKIE AND C. S. WERE

35. The Postmaster-General took Mr. Mackie to the Wireless Station at about 2.30 p.m. to carry out the following duties:

(a) To calm the wireless operators and police who were showing panic; and

(b) to wire an auxiliary motor for use in case of failure of electric power from the mains.

36. At about 4 p.m. a rifle shot and shouting were heard from the Rest House direction. The Police began to panic and Mr. Mackie calmed them. Ten minutes later another shot was heard and the Police and Operators fled. Mr. Mackie telephoned the Post Office but could get no reply so he went to Mr. Were's house nearby and there waited, with Mr. Were . . . until they were captured by Japanese soldiers and taken to the Rest House. . . .

THE RESIDENT AND UNDER-SECRETARY
(MR. R. G. AIKMAN) AND
THE DISTRICT OFFICER (MR. D. C. WHITE)

37. . . . Both these officers were under orders to remain in Kuching. . . .

38. At about 11 a.m. the Resident left Maderaseh Melayu . . . and went to the Chartered Bank, where he met the District Officer and Mr. Gillett. The latter officer explained that he must report back for duty at 3rd mile and handed some of the Bank keys to the Resident.

39. At about 11.45 a.m. an air raid warning was sounded and the Resident and District Officer went to the Report Centre in Pig Lane, where they remained until the "All Clear" was sounded at 12.15 p.m. They then went on a tour of the kampongs and bazaar, accompanied by the Datus Pa[h]lawan [Abang Haji Mustapha] and Amar [Abang Haji Suleiman]. The Datus left the party in the Kampongs and the Resident and District Officer went to the Post Office, arriving at about 1.15 p.m. From there they went to the Residency. Immediately upon arrival, at about 1.45 p.m. an air raid warning signal sounded and without leaving the car they went off to the Report Centre. After the "All Clear" they returned to the Residency, arriving at about 2.45 p.m. At about 3.50 p.m. the District Officer endeavoured to connect with the Post Office by telephone, but failed, so the two officers decided to investigate for themselves and left the Residency at about 4 p.m. Upon reaching the Satok-Rock Road junction a disturbance was observed along Rock Road, near the Rest House. A bystander volunteered the information that the Japanese had arrived in Kuching. Just then a Japanese soldier came running up the road and upon reaching the car, which had stopped, removed the ignition keys and ran on. A few minutes later another Japanese soldier appeared, accompanied by a Japanese civilian. Both officers were ordered out of the car, which was searched for arms and then the Japanese enquired the way to the Convent and passed on. The Resident and District Officer walked to Maderaseh Melayu and then, by way of Jawa Road Nos. 1 and 2, Satok Road, Palm Road and Badrudin Road, to the Residency. There they remained till after dark when a visit was

paid to Monseigneur Hopfgartner's house. Later, they returned to the Residency for the night. Spasmodic bursts of firing were heard between 6 p.m. and 9 p.m. from the Satok direction and between 7 p.m. and 8.30 p.m. from the Tabuan Road direction.

40. The next day (25th) the Resident and District Officer remained in the Residency until about noon, when four Japanese soldiers arrived and arrested them. Their hands were roped behind their backs and they were not allowed to take their suitcases. They were then led to the big tree at the foot of the Sarawak Club Hill where they met a Japanese officer and a Japanese civilian, Kurabayashi. The Resident and District Officer were asked their occupations and the officer ordered them to be taken away. Japanese troops, numbering perhaps 150, were by this time lining the road edge up to the Club.

41. Accompanied by a Japanese soldier and Kurabayashi, the Resident and District Officer were marched down Rock Road to the Rest House, where they arrived at 12.45 p.m. They were searched and then allowed to join the other Europeans collected there.

DOCUMENT 20

Capture and Surrender

J. L. Noakes, "Report upon Defence Measures Adopted in Sarawak from June 1941 to the Occupation in December 1941 by Imperial Japanese Forces; Also an Account of the Movement of British and Sarawak Military Forces during the Japanese Invasion of Sarawak," 15 February 1946. MSS Pac.s.62. RHL. Section XX, pp. 58-70.

THE ASTANA PARTY

42. At about 3.30 p.m. [25 December 1941] the Secretary for Defence was informed by Messrs. [E.] Banks and [W. G. R.] Ward that Japanese soldiers were reported to be coming into the town from

the direction of Pending. This information was passed on to Singkawan[g] II and Singapore.

43. The text of the message to Singkawan[g] II was as follows:

"Japanese about 2 miles away, approaching Kuching from Pending. Number unknown."

The Chief Secretary was given the same information when he telephoned at about the same time as the news was received. The door of the Post Office was locked and the Naval Reporting Officer and the Secretary for Defence proceeded to destroy all remaining codes and cyphers. . . . Rifle shots were then heard outside and Japanese soldiers were reported to be nearly in Rock Road. The telephone was dead, so the Secretary for Defence dictated a last message to the Postmaster-General (Mr. W. G. Tait) who had by this time taken over that transmitter in touch with Singkawang[g] II.

44. At about 4 p.m. the Secretary for Defence informed the others assembled that they, civilians, should now surrender in accordance with previous arrangements . . . and then walked into the streets into the arms of Japanese soldiers. He was seized and tied with rope round the wrists and neck. The others followed and the party, consisting of Messrs. Noakes, [G. A. C.] Field, Tait, Banks, Ward, [E. M.] Selous and two Chinese Wireless Operators, were marched to Main Bazaar. The Europeans were tied together by rope in a chain, wrist to wrist, and made to sit in the middle of the road, with a machine-gun trained on them. The two Chinese were told to leave. Later the Europeans were moved to the "kaki lima."¹⁵ They were questioned by a Japanese Officer who spoke a little English. The Japanese numbered perhaps one hundred in the Main Bazaar, but it was quite obvious that their soldiers had infiltrated to other parts of the town, as their men came in from time to time with bicycles and cars. The Commanding Officer sat on a stool in the centre of the road and his eyes turned from time to time in the direction of the Fort, apparently on the watch for reinforcements. The party was soon joined by Messrs. Cousens, Archer and Jefferson, and at about 6 p.m. it was marched to the Pengkalan Batu, there to be joined by Drs. Allen and Clapham. Thence the party was moved to Astana and was joined soon by Mr. W. Lowry. After

a short period of waiting they were all moved into a small, badly ventilated, room in the basement. Twelve men were packed into this room, which was about 12' x 12' [3.6m x 3.6m], and later Coastguards and Rangers were brought in also, while Punjabi soldiers were thrown into an adjoining room. Up to this time treatment had been reasonable, but now a period of brutal savagery commenced. The twelve Europeans were tied together in a chain, ankles to ankles and wrists to wrists behind their backs. The ropes were tied so tightly that even Japanese boots were used to secure the knots, and the ropes bit into the flesh and soon cut off blood circulation. Rifle butts, bayonet points, crowbars and bottles were used on the prisoners for no apparent reason. Some men were struck for lying down, others for trying to sit up. The movement of any one person of course cause[d] agony to the others adjoining. After a few hours many were delirious, off and on, and remained thus until they were released 48 hours after capture. Water was given grudgingly; a small bowl of rotten rice was given once and four only of the captives managed to obtain a few minutes freedom to defecate outside. They urinated where they lay, amongst broken bottles, filth, and acid from a telephone battery which had become upset.

45. During the course of the second day (26th) a few Japanese Officers visited the prisoners and one was kind enough to give them water. Dr. Nakagawa, the Japanese dentist in Kuching, also paid a visit. At 5.30 p.m. all ropes were cut and the European prisoners were allowed out on the lawn in front of [the] Astana, where they were joined by Sergeant-Major M. A. Stafford, of the Sarawak Rangers[;] Sergeant M. Stafford and Mr. J. O. Gilbert were engaged in preparing river blocks at Lintang with a detachment of Rangers on the 24th. They did not know that the Japanese were in the river and they were completely surprised, but Mr. Gilbert managed to escape. Sergeant-Major Stafford was taken on board an armoured motor Landing [B]arge and taken to Kuching, . . . and there tied and left in Astana until the other prisoners were taken on to the lawn. All prisoners—13 in all—were taken to the Central Police Station and lodged in the First Aid Post, where they found a few stretchers, pillows and blankets and were able to bathe and use a lavatory. They found a few ex-Sarawak Constabulary (Sikh and

Malay) on duty under Japanese officers and they were able to buy biscuits, coffee, and fruit and tinned milk in small quantities through these men. The First Aid Medical Chest was broached for supplies and the prisoners carried out first-aid on themselves.

46. Messrs. Ram Nath Chatli (of the Security Office) and Mr. James (Sarawak Steamship Company, Ltd.) were found locked in the cells of the Police Station. They had not been ill-treated and were released later.

47. On the 27th Messrs. D. MacDonald and T. J. C. Munro were brought into the Central Police Station from Sungei Tengah Estate ... and Drs. Allen and Clapham were taken out and sent to the General Hospital the same day. On the 28th Captain G. C. Walker, Mr. R. E. Shaw, Mr. A. E. Aisup and four Chinese officers and members of the crew of s.s. "Shinai" ... were brought into the Central Police Station. 2nd Lieut. J. H. Farwell of the 2/15th Punjab Regiment arrived from Siniawan ... on the 31st and Messrs. J. B. Simpson and A. R. Dee were brought in from Dahan Estate on the 1st January 1942. ... Mr. C. B. Horn gave himself up at the Central Police Station on the 4th January and on the 5th Lt. E. Bonheim was transferred from the General Hospital to the same Station. ...

48. On the morning of the 8th January 1942, the following prisoners were collected outside the Central Police Station (together with the 'Rest House' party ...) and marched to "Zaida" in Rock Road:

Mr. A. E. Aisup	Mr. C. B. Horn	Mr. J. B. Simpson
Mr. J. B. Archer	Mr. T. P. Jefferson	Sgt. Major M. A. Stafford
Mr. E. Banks	Mr. W. Lowry	
Dr. E. Bonheim	Mr. D. MacDonald	Mr. W. G. Tait
Mr. E. W. Cousens	Mr. T. J. C. Munro	Capt. G. C. Walker
Mr. A. R. Dee	Mr. J. L. Noakes	Mr. W. G. R.
2nd. Lt. J. H. Farwell	Mr. E. M. Selous	Ward
Mr. G. A. C. Field	Mr. R. E. Shaw	

49. During the first week of imprisonment in the Central Police Station, innumerable requests were made for the services of a doctor with medicines, as the wounds of some of the "Astana Party" were severe and required expert medical attention. A Japanese "horse-doctor" eventually appeared, with a bottle of mercurio-

chrome which he applied on all wounds shown to him. Actually, [t]he attention given by Dr. Bonheim with A.R.P. medicines found in the Police Station, effected cures in all but two cases before the prisoners were moved to "Zaida."

50. The prisoners were not ill-treated physically during their stay in the Police Station, but they were almost totally disregarded by their captors. They were forced to live in a confined space with a tiny courtyard for exercise and some of them were locked in pairs in cells at night. The original members of the "Astana Party" had no clothes other than the filthy things in which they passed 48 hours in Astana, but later the Japanese relaxed to the extent that they were each given a shirt and shorts, and some soap, a tooth-brush and tooth-paste. The Japanese did not supply any food but a few purchases and gifts were allowed to trickle through, and for a few days the Rest House cook was allowed to supply two meals a day at his own expense. They were interrogated a few times by Japanese officers, and demands were made from time to time for keys and information concerning salaries due to Government Asiatic officials.

THE REST HOUSE PARTY

51. The Chief Secretary, Mr. Le Gros Clark, spent most of the morning of the 24th. between his office and the Post Office. In the afternoon, at about 2 p.m. he went from the Post Office to his office and from there went to the Rest House (Japanese Internment Camp) to see Captain A. Keir. Later he returned and about 3.30 p.m. telephoned the Secretary for Defence, who stated that he had no reliable news of Japanese movements, but they were believed to be coming up from the direction of Pending. The Chief Secretary had one final look through his papers, and in the safe, to make [sure] that all secret papers had been destroyed. He then closed his office and walked over the hill towards the Rest House. As he walked he heard rifle shots from the direction of Rock Road, close to the Rest House and he could see the Japanese internees leaving their camp. He arrived on the crest of the hill to see Japanese soldiers coming up the other side of the Rest House from Rock Road. As soon as the Japanese internees saw the Chief Secretary they

called to him to stand in their midst for his personal safety. Two of them took him by the arm and asked him to stand close to them. On the arrival of the Japanese soldiers he was taken into the Internment Camp.

52. At 1.30 p.m., on the 24th, Captain A. Keir (Sarawak Volunteers) in charge of 38 Japanese male internees at the Rest House and Japanese females and children lodged in the Roman Catholic Convent, took a sick Japanese child to the General Hospital. Later he went to this house and at 4 p.m. received a message from the Rest House requesting him to go there at once. He arrived to find Japanese soldiers in possession and the Police guards on their knees. Apparently the Japanese internees were the first to see their soldiers on the road, and had called them. The soldiers came up and the three Europeans on duty (Mr. E. W. H. Jacques and Privates K. H. Digby and A. G. Taylor) surrendered. One shot was fired at a Police guard but he was not hit. Captain Keir was accused of carrying "dum-dum" bullets in his revolver, but the Japanese internees gathered around him and appeared to intercede with the Japanese officers on his behalf, as eventually he was allowed to go into the Rest House with the Japanese ex-internees, carrying his baggage. The "new" internees at this time numbered five:—Mr. Le Gros Clark, Captain Keir, Mr. Jacques and Privates Digby and Taylor. That evening Messrs. A. Mackie and C. S. Were joined them....

53. At 5 p.m. on the 24th the Japanese Commander arrived and called the Chief Secretary before him. After enquiry, through an interpreter, as to his identity and official position, the Japanese Commander ordered Mr. Le Gros Clark to tell him the name and rank of the British officers commanding the defending troops, but he refused and was then threatened with punishment. Again, he refused, was threatened again, but persisted in his attitude. The Commander then ordered him to write out an order calling upon all European civilians within the State to hand themselves over to the Japanese forces "for their own protection" and the Chief Secretary agreed and wrote out an order accordingly.

54. The following morning the seven prisoners were searched and their money taken. Enquiries were made regarding the destroyed Treasury Notes, and then they were marched to the Central

Government offices where the Japanese forces were bivouacked. There a Japanese ex-internee (Kurabayashi) made a provocative speech to about 400 soldiers, [having] stood the Chief Secretary out in front of them. As this man had previously that morning shown considerable excitement towards the Chief Secretary because of the destruction of the Treasury Notes and the removal of his brother and two other Kuching Japanese from the State,¹⁶ the Chief Secretary could only infer that he was attempting to arouse the Japanese soldiers to perform acts of aggression against him because of these "crimes." The Chief Secretary was struck several times by the soldiers, and Captain Keir was also struck.

55. The party was then taken to Astana and later returned to the Rest House. At about 12.45 p.m. Messrs. R. G. Aikman and D. C. White were brought in . . . and later Dr. and Mrs. M. P. O'Connor arrived, but the latter two returned to the General Hospital in the evening. On the 26th the Bishop of Labuan and Sarawak (F. S. Hollis), Archdeacon B. A. M. Mercer and Mr. Kueh Choo Seng were brought in to the Rest House at 5 p.m. . . . and then the whole party was moved to the upstairs rooms in the Central Police Station. Mr. James Scott and Mr. O. F. Ricketts came in on the morning of the 28th. . . . Mr. Were was taken away on the 1st January 1942 and Messrs. Ricketts and Kueh Choo Seng at about the same time. On the morning of the 8th January 1942, the following eleven men joined the "Astana Party" outside the Central Police Station and proceeded to "Zaida" in Rock Road. . . .

Mr. C. D. Le Gros Clark	Mr. E. W. H. Jacques
Mr. R. G. Aikman	Mr. D. C. White
Capt. A. Keir	Mr. A. Mackie
Mr. K. H. Digby	The Bishop of Labuan and Sarawak
Mr. A. G. Taylor	Archdeacon B. A. M. Mercer
	Mr. James Scott

56. The members of the "Rest House Party" were not ill-treated physically, but they were forced to live in a confined space with no facilities for exercise, and they were dependent upon the kindness of friends outside for food and drink. The Japanese supplied no food, and they did allow a few purchases and presents to filter through and for a few days the Rest House Cook was allowed to

supply them with two meals a day at his own expense. They were questioned several times by Japanese officers and usually the questions appeared utterly irrelevant.

57. In order to convey an intelligible sequence of events, the foregoing account has been carried forward to the 8th January 1942 in paras 42 and 56. A return must now be made to the 24th December 1941. . . . In the following paragraphs . . . an attempt will be made to describe the capture, or escape, of those European civilians of the Kuching District who have not already been referred to.

MR. C. B. HORN

58. Mr. Horn was given charge of the Tanjong Po Lookout Station on the 23rd December. . . . His wireless messages in cypher commenced to come in from about 7 a.m. on the 24th . . . and messages of military importance continued to come until 4 p.m. [w]hen Kuching ceased to operate. . . . At about 3 p.m. the Secretary for Defence had signalled "Good work. Keep it up." and that was the last message sent to Mr. Horn, though he continued to transmit during the next hour.

59. On the night of the 24th Mr. Horn went to Muara Tebas for information regarding Kuching, as he naturally suspected that the Japanese had occupied the town. The little information he obtained confirmed his suspicions. He then returned to Tanjong Po and the next morning, as early as possible, informed the Resident, Third Division [A. MacPherson], at Sibu, that Kuching was in Japanese hands.

60. On the 27th men were sent to Kuching to obtain news, and one of them—the Chief Light-House Keeper—returned after about eight days to relate that the Kuching District had been completely occupied by Japanese troops and the British forces had retired into Dutch Borneo. During this period of waiting, Dutch bombers visited Santubong and caused large fires. Mr. Horn states that he received numerous reports of extensive damage to enemy vessels and dumps. The coast at Santubong was strewn with enemy bodies and wreckage.

61. Mr. Horn weighed up his chances of escape, prudently de-

cided against such a course, and then destroyed parts of the wireless set, hid the rifles and ammunition and set out for Kuching. On the afternoon of the 4th January 1942 he walked unnoticed through the town, and surrendered at the Central Police Station.

MESSRS. D. MACDONALD AND T. J. C. MUNRO

62. Mr. Munro was assistant to Mr. MacDonald, Manager of Sungai Tengah Rubber Estate. At 8 p.m. on the 24th December 1941, 2nd Lt. [C. B.] Kent of the Sarawak Rangers, arrived and stated that the Japanese were reported to be in Kuching. Kent left at 11 p.m. for Tanjong Embang, but for some reason did not get there but went to 6th Mile, Matang Road. Next morning he was found on his way back to Mr. MacDonald's house.

63. Mr. MacDonald telephoned to Tanjong Embang and informed the Sikh Officer in charge of the Punjabi Detachment . . . that they should leave as the Japanese had taken Kuching and they were isolated. At about the same time (11 a.m.) runners arrived from O/C Troops with orders for withdrawal, so Mr. MacDonald passed on the instructions to the Sikhs. 2nd Lt. Kent gave the necessary orders to the Detachment of Sarawak Rangers also stationed at Tanjong Embang.

64. At 2.30 p.m. Lt. Kent and the Troops passed through the Estate towards Siniawan via Kampong Saga, to join the main retreating force. All equipment, ammunition and petrol left behind was destroyed by Messrs. MacDonald and Munro by 4 p.m. on that day—25th[.]

65. On the morning of the 26th Japanese patrols were reported to have been through the estate the previous night.

66. At 3 p.m. on the 27th a Japanese force arrived with one Lal Chand of Luxmi Stores, and Acting Captain (King's Commission) Mataulmulk of 2nd/15th Punjab Regiment. Messrs. MacDonald and Munro were tied up, struck and reviled. It appears from questions put to them that Captain Mataulmulk had given the Japanese information concerning the destroyed dumps. . . . At 5 p.m. both prisoners were taken to the Central Police Station in Kuching. . . .

67. Mr. Dee, Manager of Dahan Rubber Estate, Bau, received Mrs. [T. C.] Martine and child, Mrs. [J. K.] Cargill and child and Mr. [J. B.] Simpson from Kuching on 20th December 1941.

68. At 4.45 p.m. on the 4th Mr. Dee received the following message from Mr. (2nd. Lieut. Sarawak Volunteers) A. D. Trail, Manager of the Kuching Branch of the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China:—"Trail, Passive Defence, speaking. Come to Batu Kawa immediately." Mr. Dee went down by car, met Mr. Trail at 9th Mile and was back with him at Dahan by 8 a.m. Mr. Trail told Mr. Dee that he should have left Kuching the previous night with the Treasurer, but the Secretary for Defence forgot to tell him! (. . . note that Mr. Trail must have left Kuching at about 4 a.m. and the Treasurer left at about the same time. . .) Mr. Trail left Dahan at 1.30 p.m.

69. At 4 p.m. on the 25th Mr. Gillett (Mr. Trail's Assistant) telephoned from Siniawan asking for Mr. Trail. A little later Mr. Cargill asked for Mrs. Cargill. At 8 p.m. the District Officer (Mr. F. H. Wright) Bau, telephoned from Bau and instructed Mesdames Martine and Cargill to leave at once with their children for Bau. Messrs. Dee and Simpson refused to leave though asked to do so. The two women and two children were sent to Krokong by car at 8.45 p.m. . . .

70. At 9 p.m. on the 26th looters arrived at the Estate in an Army lorry, armed with service rifles and shotguns. With the help of the Estate Javanese they looted the Estate shop, while the two Europeans hid in the undergrowth near their house.

71. Messrs. Dee and Simpson sent two letters to the Japanese, explaining the situation in which they found themselves and signifying their willingness to place themselves in Japanese hands. On the 31st a local Japanese named C. Nishida (of 13th Mile, Simang-gang Road) arrived and took them to Siniawan. The next day, 1st January 1942, they were taken to the Central Police Station at Kuching. . . .

DR. E. BONHEIM

72. Dr. Bonheim, Government Dental Officer, Kuching, went to

his office at 6 a.m. on the 24th. At 9 a.m. when there was an Air Raid Warning, he tried to get to his First Aid Post at Astana but no boat was to be found. Then he went to the General Hospital, back to his house, to Astana, back home again, and finally to the General Hospital with some belongings. He states that no Japanese visited the Hospital on the 24th. On the 25th one appeared and on the 26th Japanese doctors appeared. On the 27th all persons on the General Hospital were questioned and the same day Drs. Allen and Clapham returned. On that date the Europeans in the General Hospital were:—

Dr. M. P. O'Connor	Sister M. Teresa (R. C.
Mrs. K. O'Connor	Mission, Nursing Sister)
Miss [M] L. Broadhurst (Matron)	Sister M. Stephanie (R. C.
Miss E. A. Henderson (Nursing Sister)	Mission, Nursing Sister)
Mrs. W. G. Tait (Nurse Medical	Dr. E. Bonheim
Auxiliary Service)	Dr. J. Clapham
Dr. (Mrs.) E. McP. Gibson	Dr. C. P. Allen
(Deputy O/C Medical Aux. Service)	

73. On the 5th January Drs. Bonheim and Gibson were taken to the Central Police Station. Dr. Bonheim was taken inside . . . but Dr. Gibson was sent to the R. C. Convent after she had been questioned by the Japanese.

CAPTAIN G. S. WALKER AND MESSRS. R. E. SHAW AND A. E. AISUP

74. Captain Walker was Captain of s.s. "Shinai". . . . Messrs. Shaw and Aisup were First and Second Engineer respectively. Captain Walker was an Australian, Mr. Shaw held a British Passport and Mr. Aisup a Latvian.

75. S.S. "Shinai" was anchored in the Kuop River above Pending, where she had been laid up since her arrival on the 16th, because the crew refused to work the ship further. A new crew could not be found in Kuching and it was impossible to get one from Singapore. By the 24th some of the old crew had disappeared.

76. The officers and remaining members of the crew left the ship on the 23rd to live ashore during the daylight hours in a nearby

rubber garden owned by one Kwong Pok. A few returned to the ship at night, but the majority stayed ashore, fearing aerial attack.

77. When the Japanese occupation of Kuching took place, the vessel was scuttled by the officers and then a letter was sent to the Japanese authorities in Kuching informing them that the officers and crew awaited their orders.

78. On the 28th December 1941, the three Europeans, the Chinese First and Third Officers, the Chinese Third Engineer and a Chinese seaman, were all arrested and interned in the Central Police Station. . . .

THE LORD BISHOP OF LABUAN AND SARAWAK
(F. S. HOLLIS) AND ARCHDEACON B. A. M. MERCER

81. The Bishop and Archdeacon stood on the S. P. G. Hill at about 5 p.m. on the 24th December and watched the Japanese soldiers file up Rock Road. They were not molested and it was not till 1 p.m. on the 26th that a Japanese Officer and men visited their homes and ordered them and Mr. Kuch Choo Seng to the Rest House. The Bishop was obliged to hand over the S.P.G. keys before leaving.

82. They arrived at the Rest House (without any baggage as they understood they were only to be questioned) at about 2 p.m. and at about 5 p.m. were moved with the "Rest House Party" to the Central Police Station, where they were imprisoned.

MRS. W. G. TAIT

83. Mrs. Tait, wife of the Postmaster-General, was in charge of the Women's Nursing Section of the Medical Auxiliary Service organised by Dr. Gibson. The Nursing Section was based on the Sarawak Club, which had been prepared for patients and was to be used as a convalescent branch of the General Hospital if that establishment should become overcrowded.

84. Mrs. Tait was at her house at about 4 p.m. on the 25th when a nurse arrived from the Club and told her that the Japanese soldiers had entered the building. She went to the Club immediately

and found the soldiers molesting a young nurse and Mrs. Tait successfully intervened. She and an R. C. sister were then tied together with ropes and with the Asiatic nurses, were marched to the Wireless Station.

85. A Japanese woman in the R.C. Convent opposite saw the procession enter the Station and she rushed across and spoke to the soldiers. Eventually, after some show of rifles and bayonets, they released the prisoners, all of whom went to the General Hospital, where they stayed till 9th January 1942, when they were allowed to go the R.C. Convent, or to their own houses, to live.

86. A junior Japanese doctor at the General Hospital made objectionable advances towards the Asiatic nurse[s] during their stay there, and Mrs. Tait complained to the senior doctor. It was shortly after this that they were allowed to leave.

87. Dr. Gibson was interned in the R. C. Convent on the 25th January 1942 (See para 73) and internment conditions were imposed on Mrs. Tait also on the 9th January.

MR. AND MRS. C. S. WERE, MISS D. WERE AND CHILD

88. Previous to the 24th December, Mr. Were approached the Secretary for Defence regarding the safety of his family. The Secretary for Defence advised him to send them to Dahan, but nothing was done. Mr. Were was the Postmaster-General's assistant and at dawn on the 24th the family moved to the P.M.G.'s house by arrangement with him. Mr. Were was captured at his house near the Wireless Station shortly after 4 p.m. on the 24th. . . . He was approached by the Japanese and offered work in the Wireless Station. After discussing the matter with Mr. Le Gros Clark, and with his agreement, Mr. Were accepted. He was released on 1st January 1942 and commenced work at once. . . .

89. On the evening of the 24th some Japanese soldiers entered Mr. Tait's house and found Mrs. Were, Miss D. Were (aged 14 years), Miss S. Were (aged about 7 years), and Master Arthur Tait (an adopted child of Chinese parentage). Five Japanese soldiers raped Miss D. Were in the presence of the others. They assaulted and humiliated Mrs. Were also, but the actions of the small girl

prevented rape. Mrs. Were's wedding ring was torn from her finger and Arthur Tait was beaten. All their belongings (4 large leather bags) were stolen by the Japanese. Miss D. Were was later admitted to hospital in a serious condition.

90. On the 25th Mrs. Were reported the criminal assault to the Japanese authorities, who are said to have conducted an enquiry.

91. Shortly afterwards a Japanese soldier was imprisoned in the Central Police Station with the Europeans. . . . His crime was said to be rape of a Chinese girl, but he may have been connected with the offence against Miss Were. He was badly thrashed at different times by the Japanese Police.

[Space reserved for evidence by Dr. (Mrs.) E. McP. Gibson, Dr. E. Le Sueur, and Dr. E. M. Marjoribanks.]¹⁷

MR. JAMES SCOTT (BORN 11. 11. 1873)

106. Mr. Scott was an engineer, trader and planter, with 45 years experience of Sarawak. He first learnt of the Japanese invasion at about 5 p.m. on the 24th December 1941, when he heard cheering in the town. At 5.30 p.m. two Japanese soldiers looked in at his house but they did not molest him. In the afternoon of the 25th a Japanese civilian interpreter and two soldiers called, drank coffee and listened to the wireless. They asked for his car but the engine would not run. On the 26th more Japanese arrived and posted a notice on his factory door to the effect that it was not to be opened. Again on the 27th he was paid a friendly visit and at 10 a.m. on the 28th the Japanese called and said he must leave but he would not require any personal belongings. He and his servant were taken to Mr. [C.] Corbin's [manager of the Sarawak Electricity Supply Co. Ltd.] house, an officer taking a pair of his trousers and others carrying a case of whisky. Mr. Scott was questioned and then tied to his "boy" and an old Chinese gardener of Mr. Corbin's who had been accused of stealing durians [spiky, highly aromatic local fruits] from his place of work. The trio were marched to the Central Police Station where Mr. Scott was imprisoned with the "Rest House Party". . . .

[Space reserved for evidence by Misses M. L. Broadhurst and

E. A. Henderson, Monseigneur Hopfgartner, Reverend Fathers J. Staal, Aichner, F. Hulsbosch and D. Muhren.]

REV. FATHER P. H. H. HOWES

121. Father Howes was Priest-in-Charge of the Kuap S.P.G. Mission Station. He was left undisturbed until the 29th of December 1941, when a local Japanese named Kimora [Kimura] appeared and informed him that he was quite safe so long as he remained at Kuap. On the 15th January 1942 Father Howes was called to 10th Mile Police Station, where he stayed the night and the next day he was taken to Kuching and interned at "Zaida". . . .

PASTOR W. W. R. LAKE

122. Pastor Lake, Director of the Sarawak and Brunei Mission of Seventh Day Adventists, was at 37th Mile, Simanggang Road, on the 24th December 1941. He was ill for six weeks and was not disturbed by the Japanese until about the end of January, when he was called to Kuching, questioned and allowed to return to 37th Mile carrying a letter authorising him to continue Mission activities in his area. He was not allowed to return to Kuching without permission.

123. On the 15th April 1942, Pastor Lake was called to Kuching. His letter was destroyed and he was interned at "Zaida". . . .

MR. T. E. PARKER

124. Mr. Parker was Controller of Food and Essential Commodities. . . . Mr. Parker and his assistants were required to remain in Kuching only so long as they could be useful. He was not obliged to surrender to the Japanese.

125. At approximately 11 a.m. on the 24th Mr. Parker and Mr. [G. T.] Bates and his family left Kuching for Serian by food convoy along the Simanggang Road. He did not inform the Chief Secretary or the Secretary for Defence of his intended departure. The party of Europeans escaped to Pontianak via Sanggau, arriving on 2nd. January 1942.¹⁸ . . .

MR. G. T. BATES, MRS. BATES AND
MISSES E. AND M. BATES

126. Mr. Bates, retired Manager of the Borneo Company, Limited, Kuching, was acting as Food Supply Officer, Kuching, on 24th December 1941. Miss E. Bates was a typist in the Defence Office and Miss M. Bates worked in the Treasury. The Secretary for Defence went to Mr. Bates' house at about 8.30 a.m. on the 24th to urge the family to leave and found them preparing to go by lorry to Serian.

127. They left at about 11 a.m. . . . and arrived in Pontianak on 2nd January 1942.¹⁹ . . .

MESSRS. P. HUME, G. SARGENT,
W. WOODGATE AND PEMBERTON

131. All these Sarawak Oilfields Limited officers joined the Sarawak Government on 18th December 1941. . . . All of them approached the Secretary for Defence for instruction in the early hours of the 24th. The first two officers, who were directly under his control, were told that they were free to leave Kuching and they should proceed to Bau and await further developments. The latter two were given similar instructions with the proviso that they obtain the consent of their senior officer (Mr. T. E. Parker) before acting. It is presumed that they obtained his consent. All four officers left Kuching early (probably before dawn) on the 24th. The first two arrived in Pontianak on about 3rd January 1942 and the second pair on about 31st December 1941. . . .

MR. J. K. CARGILL, MRS. CARGILL AND INFANT,
AND MRS. [T. C.] MARTINE AND INFANT

135. Mr. Cargill was an assistant in the Borneo Company, Limited, Kuching. He left Kuching on the morning of the 24th and telephoned his wife at Dahan Estate at about 4 p.m. that afternoon. . . . He joined his wife and Mrs. Martine and the two children near Bau (probably at Krokong) and the party arrived at Pontianak on the 31st December 1941.

136. Both Mrs. Kelley and Mrs. Large were employed as typists in the office of O/C Troops. They left Kuching for the Landing Ground at about midnight 23rd/24th December. They arrived in Pontianak on 31st December 1941.

137. Mr. Wright, District Officer, Bau, telephoned Mr. Dee at 8 p.m. on the 25th (See para 69) and intimated that he was leaving Bau with the retreating forces. He appears to have remained with the Military Forces as he accepted a commission as 2nd. Lieutenant in the 2nd/15th Punjab Regiment.²⁰ . . .

DOCUMENT 21

"The town of Kuching was occupied without any resistance."

J. L. Noakes, "Report upon Defence Measures Adopted in Sarawak from June 1941 to the Occupation in December 1941 by Imperial Japanese Forces; Also an Account of the Movement of British and Sarawak Military Forces during the Japanese Invasion of Sarawak," 15 February 1946. MSS Pac.s.62. RHL. Section XX, pp. 70-72.

1. Reliable information regarding Japanese movements from 10 p.m. on the 23rd to 4 p.m. on the 24th December 1941, has been difficult to obtain for obvious reasons, but no doubt amplification (and perhaps amendment) of this record will be possible when the writer is free to question eye-witnesses. Until this opportunity occurs no final summing-up can be done.

2. Probably shortly before 9 p.m. on the 23rd December 1941, the Military Authority (O/C Troops) in Kuching knew that a Japanese Naval Force was proceeding along the coast from Miri and was approaching the estuaries of the Sarawak River north of Kuching. . . . The Civil Authorities knew about 9 p.m. A reliable report received at 10 p.m. on the same day by the Secretary for Defence showed that strange vessels were off the Santubong Entrance and it could reasonably be inferred that these vessels were Japanese. . . . At

7 a.m. on the 24th the Tanjong Po Look[-]out confirmed the presence of suspicious vessels off Kuala Santubong and Tanjong Po, . . . and further reports from time to time left no room to doubt that some of the vessels were Japanese warships and were being attacked by Dutch planes. . . . At 8.30 a.m. on the 24th. the Salak Patrol Launch reported the Landing of Japanese Forces at Santubong. . . . At 9 a.m. and later, uneasily identified Japanese planes appeared over Kuching and dropped leaflets on the town and a bomb on Siol. . . . Later an intercepted telegram from Malaya Command indicated that the Japanese had suffered naval losses and an attack by land on the Landing Ground was expected. . . . At 3.30 p.m. the Japanese were reported to be approaching Kuching and by 4 p.m. they had occupied the town. . . .

3. All the information detailed in para 2 (excepting last sentence) was passed to Force Headquarters at the Landing Ground through the Secretary for Defence. If it was slow in getting there, then the fault must lie with O/C Troops for not providing an efficient carrier service when the telephone failed. . . . O/C Troops appears to have left his Headquarters for long periods without giving his officers details of his proposed movement; and although he must have collected some information of value regarding enemy movements during the 19 hours under review, he gave the Civil Authorities no information apart from that at the commencement of the period. . . . No advice was forthcoming and the Civil Administration was left in the air mid-way between the opposing forces. It may be that O/C Troops was convinced that the Japanese would not penetrate inland . . . but if this is so, then he made a grave error of judgement.

[4]. The following information regarding the Japanese movement into Kuching must be treated with reserve. The writer will not vouch for accuracy, but he is reasonably certain of the main facts.

[5]. The Japanese probably advanced into Kuching, on 24th December 1941, in two directions. One force entered the Salak River by boat from Santubong and proceeded to Samariang, north-west of Kuching, where it disembarked and proceeded on foot along the Samariang and Astana Roads to the Fort and so to the river bank to cross the river in rubber boats carried by the Japanese soldiers.

[6]. The second force entered the Santubong River in landing barges and proceeded to Lintang. At this point a little probing was done towards Pending and then the barges went up the Sarawak River to Tanjong Bintawak, where half the force disembarked and marched to the Fort via Bintawak Road, while the other half continued up-river in the barges to Kuching.

THE SAMARIANG FORCE

[7]. The Japanese troops passed unopposed along Samariang Road although they were probably within 200 yards from the summit of Bukit Siol, where a small detachment of Punjabis, under 2nd Lt. J. H. Farwell . . . was stationed. This is not surprising, as the Japanese were well camouflaged and moving under good cover. It is probable that the force divided at the Astana Road junction—some went along Astana Road westwards to Matang Road and thence across the bridge into the town, and the others (the main body) marched to the Fort and crossed the river in rubber boats. Probably they arrived at about 3.30 p.m. as patrols had infiltrated through the town by 4 p.m. . . .

13. Judging from the arrests of Europeans at many places in the town at about 4 p.m. the invading force was in considerable strength. The Japanese troops seen by the "Astana Party" in Main Bazaar . . . were estimated to number about 70, and these were obviously but a small portion of the force in the town. The nervousness of the Japanese Military Commander . . . was probably due to his anxiety for the large force.

THE SANTUBONG-SARAWAK RIVER FORCE


14. The evidence of S. M. [Sergeant-Major] Stafford of the Sarawak Rangers is important and reliable. He was captured at Lintang at about 3 p.m. on the 24th . . . having been struck senseless by a blow on the head. When he regained consciousness, he found himself in an armoured barge which was one of about eight, all proceeding up the Sarawak River after a short reconnaissance towards Pending. S. M. Stafford states that the barges were armour-plated

and lined with concrete. The Captain's cock-pit was steel, and each barge was equipped for landing and each barge carried 70 to 100 soldiers. He was questioned but he said he did not know of any guns at Pending or the name of O/C Troops.

15. As far as S. M. Stafford is aware, the barges were not fired upon at any time and he saw no signs that would indicate any previous action. Three or four barges were unloaded at Tanjong Bintawak and the soldiers from the vessels marched along Bintawak Road to the Fort, with S. M. Stafford in their midst. The other barges proceeded slowly up-river and he recognised them at Kuching when he arrived there at about 6 p.m. He thinks they may have got there by 5 p.m. 4 p.m. would have been much too early.

CONCLUSION

16. It is presumed that the Samariang Force of a few hundred Japanese arrived at Kuching at about 3.30 p.m. and immediately took possession of the town. Half of the Santubong-Sarawak River force arrived in barges, perhaps an hour later, and the other half arrived overland at about 6 p.m. There were rumours of resistance offered the Japanese at Tanjong Embang and Bintawak, but no positive evidence has been obtained. The town of Kuching was occupied without any resistance.



Layout of the Batu Lintang Camp, Kuching

KEY

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1 Japanese Administrative office | 10 The Dutch, British and Australian Officers' Compounds, each enclosed by their own fences |
| 2 Japanese Military Store; also house where punishments were conducted | 11 a. Indonesians' Compound |
| 3 Quartermaster's Stores (for storage of rice and other foodstuff) | b. Compound for male civilian P.O.W.s |
| 4 Roman Catholic Priest's Compound | c. Compound for British other ranks |
| 5 Artificial Hill (about 20 feet in diameter and 10-12 feet high) with the words 'One Happy Family' around the foot of the hill. There was a watchtower and sentry house on the top of the hill | d. Kitchen Blocks |
| 6 Parade Ground | 12 The Camp Hospital |
| 7 Lieutenant-Colonel Suga's Administrative Office | 13 Dr. Yamamoto's Office and his 'Laboratory' (up to 1943 it was Punjabi Soldiers' Camp) |
| 8 Japanese Guards' Quarters | 14 Women's and Children's Compound |
| 9 a. Parade Ground for flag-raising and anthem-singing ceremony | 15 The Guard House |
| b. Driveway for Japanese cars | 16 Ammunition Dump |
| | 17 Ridgeway which was cleared for cemetery 'Boot Hill' |

SOURCES: After Peter H. H. Howes, "The Lintang Camp: Reminiscences of An Internee during the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945," *JMHSSB*, no. 2 (March 1976), p. 34; and Ivor M. Purden, "Japanese P.O.W. Camps in Borneo," in *Borneo: The Japanese P.O.W. Camps—Mail of the Forces, P.O.W. and Internees*, Neville Watterson, 1989, p. 21.




Sketches of life in Batu Lintang

SOURCE: Papers of Lieutenant S. E. Bagnall, 90/8/1. IWM.



Sketches of life in Batu Lintang

SOURCE: Papers of Lieutenant S. E. Bagnall, 90/8/1. IWM.




Sketches of life in Batu Lintang

SOURCE: Papers of Lieutenant S. E. Bagnall, 90/8/1. IWM.




Sketches of life in Batu Lintang

SOURCE: Papers of Lieutenant S. E. Bagnall, 90/8/1. IWM.




Sketches of life in Batu Lintang

SOURCE: Papers of Lieutenant S. E. Bagnall, 90/8/1. IWM.




Sketches of life in Batu Lintang

SOURCE: Papers of Lieutenant S. E. Bagnall, 90/8/1. IWM.



Sketches of life in Batu Lintang

SOURCE: Papers of Lieutenant S. E. Bagnall, 90/8/1. IWM.




Officers cookhouse
Lt S. E. Bagnall, L.A.

Kuching P.O. camp '45

Sketches of life in Batu Lintang

SOURCE: Papers of Lieutenant S. E. Bagnall, 90/8/1. IWM.



Bukit Stabar 7th Mile Airstrip, September 1944

SOURCE: Papers of L. E. Morris, 91/18/1. IWM.



Kempetai "hospitality"

SOURCE: Papers of L. E. Morris, 91/18/1. IWM.

CHAPTER 4

WITHDRAWALS, ESCAPE, SURRENDER

THE SITUATION in the outstations was less chaotic except in the Lower Rejang, where mass panic engulfed the largely Chinese inhabitants. Miri was occupied by the Japanese on 18 December 1941. Prior to the Japanese landings evacuation by sea was effected for the oil industry personnel and Brooke civil servants, including their families. European inhabitants in the outstations generally proceeded inland to evade capture. Good sense, however, prevailed over the hopelessness of their plight, and eventually most of them did surrender to the Japanese. They were interned at Batu Lintang Internment Camp, Kuching.

Nevertheless, some individuals did manage to escape to Java and thence to Australia. They were the fortunate few to successfully make the dash to freedom; however, some among them left behind husbands and sons to face the Japanese invaders.

According to the defense plan, the 2nd/15th Punjab Regiment after disabling the Bukit Stabar landing grounds retreated across the border to Dutch Borneo. Their attempt to escape, however, was unsuccessful and they eventually surrendered to the Japanese.

Although these were exceptions to the rule, there were incidents of individuals who did not abide by the order to remain at their posts and to carry out their given responsibilities in the face of the Japanese advance into Kuching. In the military ranks, a small group defected to the enemy.

DOCUMENTS 22 to 30 depict the conditions in the outstations and the activities and movements of the European community in trying to escape from the Japanese. Chinese and indigenous inhabitants who were in no danger of capture or ill-treatment witnessed the hurried exodus of the White "Tuans" and "Mems."

Unsuccessful attempts at escape are noted in DOCUMENTS 23, 24, 25, 28, and 29. DOCUMENTS 23, 24, 28, and 29, which trace the movements of Europeans throughout Sarawak following the Japanese landings, are taken from Noakes's Report. This sketch of "Orang Putih Lari" (White Man Running) and their subsequent capture, and, in some cases, voluntary surrender, has generally been corroborated by contemporary accounts. In cases where information was lacking or difficult to ascertain, Noakes left blank spaces for later inclusion when the said individual could be contacted or when news of him or her arrived. Apparently, these individuals did not appear at the internment camp in Kuching as the blank spaces remained in Noakes's Report. Their fate, therefore, is uncertain.

DOCUMENT 25 tells of the "escape" of the Borneo Company's personnel from Sibu and the Rejang Timber Concession (R.T.C.) together with several Brooke officers and their families. This narrative is part of W. McKerracher's report entitled "Report on proceedings before, landing up to and covering the evacuation of the Borneo Co.'s Staff from Sibu and the Rejang Timber Concession," dated 2 May 1942. This report was handed to H. D. Aplin, Sarawak government agent, who in turn passed it on to Alan Griffin's stepmother, Mrs. J. F. Griffin. This report is now with the Papers of Alan Griffin, Rhodes House Library.

DOCUMENT 26, which describes the Japanese occupation of

Miri, and DOCUMENT 27, relating to the subsequent evacuation of Europeans from Miri to Kuching by ships, are from Noakes's Report.

W. G. Morison, assistant district officer, Sarikei, tells of his successful flight to freedom in Australia (DOCUMENT 22). This narrative is abstracted from his papers entitled "Personal Experiences during Japanese Occupation of Sarawak," dated 20 January 1946. It is among the Papers of W. G. Morison deposited at Rhodes House Library. The precarious journey from Sarawak to Java and Australia of a fortunate few who managed to escape is detailed in DOCUMENTS 31 to 33. Wink of the Sarawak Constabulary eventually made his way across southwest Borneo to Java and thence to Australia (DOCUMENT 31). Likewise, W. McKerracher of the Borneo Company and a few others made their journey to Fremantle (DOCUMENT 32). H. E. H. Elam, Sarawak deputy secretary for defense and liaison officer, Kuching, also effected his escape, first to Java, and then onward to Melbourne. His wife, Elizabeth, and baby daughter, Susan, together with several others from Sarawak, managed the arduous overland trip across southwest Borneo to Pontianak. They were evacuated to Java and onwards to Australia (DOCUMENT 33).

The collection of papers, letters, bulletins, and cables, which tells of the Elams's escape to Australia is part of the collection of the Papers of E. H. Elam, Rhodes House Library.

The evacuation of Sarawak European Civilians from Pontianak (DOCUMENT 30) is from Noakes's Report.

Details of the operations of the 2nd/15th Punjab Regiment, its retreat across the border, and subsequent surrender to Japanese forces are from Noakes's Report. DOCUMENTS 34 and 35, the version by Noakes, a civilian of Sarawak, should be read in conjunction with two other accounts, namely "A Report on Operations in Sarawak and Dutch Borneo" by Lieutenant Colonel C. M. Lane, Officer Commanding 2nd/15th Punjab regiment; and K. D. Shargava and K. N. V. Sastri, *Official History of the Indian Armed*

Forces in the Second World War, 1939-45: Campaigns in South-East Asia, 1941-42 (Combined Inter-Services Historical Section India & Pakistan, City Orient Longmans, 1960), pp. 362-82.

When reading DOCUMENT 36, taken from Noakes's Report, a request is made to reserve judgement of the behavior of these individuals: "It will be seen that the conduct is questioned of certain persons who are said to have fled from their duties, but no final judg[e]ment should be pronounced until the persons mentioned have been given an opportunity to justify their actions" (Section XX, E, para 1, p. 53).

As far as can be ascertained, there was only one incidence of defection among Indian soldiers of the 2nd/15th Punjab Regiment. Noakes recorded this switch of loyalty in DOCUMENT 37.

DOCUMENT 22

"Escape" from Sarikei

W. G. Morison, "Personal Experiences during Japanese Occupation of Sarawak," 20 January 1946. Papers of W. G. Morison, Mss.Ind.Ocn.s.155. RHL.

On Christmas Day [25 December 1941], we at Sarikei, heard of the fall of Kuching. A day or two later, hearing that the Japanese had occupied Sibu and Binatang and were proceeding down river to Sarikei, we¹ left by launch and went down river to Selalang, where Mr. Bland of the Island Trading Company, was picked up. The party then proceeded across country to Roban, arriving there at about 11 a.m. the next day. From Roban, the party went on to Saratok, arriving there in the afternoon, and staying that night with the District Officer [F. B. K. Drake].

The next morning, the party, now including the District Officer of Saratok, left for Debak. That same night Debak was reached. On the following morning, hearing rumours that the Japanese were at Betong, we went inland, cutting across into the Skrang

river. In the Skrang we were taken by Chinese launch up to Engkilili, and from there on the following day, proceeded to Lubok Antu, where Europeans of the Second Division had already gathered.²

The next day, the majority went over into Dutch territory, taking with them a message to be wirelessly to His Highness the Rajah, who was believed to have been in Java at that time. The message, I believe, contained amongst other things, a request for instructions concerning the money question.

The same day, Richards and myself went downstream to Simanggang. We remained there a day or so and then went back to Engkilili. There we waited for a day or two for the arrival of the District Officer of Simanggang and the Rev. [A. W.] Stonton. A Motor Tonkang came up and took all of us back once again to Simanggang.

The next day, Richards and myself left for Betong, arriving that afternoon. I stayed at Betong for about ten days, hoping there would be some reply to the message sent to his Highness. No reply came. So I decided to go back to Sarikei, and after Richards had procured for me the services of two Malays, and two Dyaks to act as guides, I went up the Layer. The water rose and in consequence progress upstream became slower and more difficult.

As we paddled further upstream, the rumours that Dyaks were out on the war path became stronger and stronger, and we passed several Chinese boat hawkers, who were making their way hurriedly down stream. All of them were apparently avoiding the ever increasing Dyak Balas [war parties]. The two Malays, hearing these alarming stories became very scared and developed all sorts of complaints and sicknesses. After telling them what I thought of them, I sent them packing, and carried on with the two Dyaks. I frankly considered, at the time that the stories were very much exaggerated, and this I found to be the case when, a day or two later, I contacted the Penghulu of that district. He himself had been around trying to keep everything quiet, and I understood him to say that there were no big war Balas out in his district, although he

had come across one or two disgruntled individuals. He went on to say, however, that he thought there was trouble in the Entebbai [Entebai] and Julau. Later I learnt that Julau Dyaks had made a nuisance of themselves in Sarikei.

Later I crossed the divide into the Third Division with my two Dyak guides and made my way, via the Ulu Julau, the Wak and Ulu Sarikei to Sarikei itself, arriving there in the afternoon, just about a month after having left it in December.

Here I should like to say a word about these two Dyaks. They were throughout my short trip, excellent, and I trusted them implicitly. They had a shotgun apiece. I carried no firearms. They acted both as guides and carriers. They also told me the lay of the land—what houses would be best to avoid, and so on. They always carried loaded guns and even went so far as to guard me while I bathed, although I think there was little need of it. One night they said they had sat up with loaded guns at their sides, as they expected unpleasantness. Whether this is true or not matters little, but I do want to point out that these two men had little to gain, and perhaps everything to lose, by acting as guides of a European at that time. Rumours were everywhere. Rumours concerning the whereabouts of fugitive Europeans, rumours of Japanese victory, and rumours of the price offered by the Japanese for any European head. I think that little blame could have been attached to these men if they had taken my head, a thing which they could so easily have done. There is a sequel to this story. When in 1945 I was in Labuan an Australian introduced himself to me with a note from J. C. B. Fisher then at Sibul. It appears that on my arrival at Sibul in 1942 I had written to Richards at Betong and told one of these Dyaks to give the letter to Richards personally, or else hand it over to the first European he met. This same man, having been unable to give the letter to Richards in 1942, as he, Richards, had been taken at about the same time as myself, kept that letter for over three years, finally handing it over to the first European he met—this same Australian guerrilla, who came to see me at Labuan. It is clear from the above that I am personally indebted to these two

Dyaks, but I think there is more to it than that. What they did for me expresses a loyalty, which could hardly be personal, as I had never seen them before they were engaged as my guides, but it does express, to my mind, a most remarkable loyalty through myself to His Highness the Rajah and the Sarawak Government. I would suggest, therefore, that this loyalty should be recognized in some way, publicly if possible, in the not too distant future. When in Labuan last year [1945], I communicated with Fisher at Sibü, expressing the same views.

At Sarikei, I got a very good reception from the Chinese, especially the Government Clerks, dressers, etc. I should particularly like to mention Ah Koon, and his wife, who did all they could to make me comfortable the one night I stayed there. The next day I was taken up to Sibü, where I saw a much harassed Datu Tuanku Mohamed. I stayed in his house for a few hours, afterwards moving over to the Roman Catholic Mission, where I was very kindly put up until the Japanese came and collected me a couple of days later. While in Sibü Abngg [*sic*; Abang] Adeng promised to pay the two guides. He never kept that promise. Father [J.] Buis [R. C. Mission, Sibü] helped me out. They were paid, I think, twenty five dollars apiece.

The Japanese went further up river and came back to Sibü a day or two later with [J. C. H.] Barcroft [district officer, Mukah]. We travelled down to Kuching on the S. S. Rejang together. I should like to add here that we were both well treated. It is possible, and even probable that this treatment was due to the presence of Tuanku Bujang,¹ who came up with the Japanese party to collect us. We arrived in Kuching on or about the 3rd or 4th of February 1942. . . .

DOCUMENT 23

Europeans in the Second Division on the Run

J. L. Noakes, "Report upon Defence Measures Adopted in Sarawak from June 1941 to the Occupation in December 1941 by

Imperial Japanese Forces; Also an Account of the Movement of British and Sarawak Military Forces during the Japanese Invasion of Sarawak," 15 February 1946. MSS Pac.s.62. RHL. Section XXIII, pp. 86-88.

1. On the 24th December 1941, Europeans in the Second Division were as follows:-

- Andrews, Miss E.
- Arundel[?], G. R. H. Resident, Second Division,
- Attenborough, T. (Eurasian), Dresser-in-Charge, Simanggang.
- Bonheim, Mrs. E.
- Bonheim, Master P.
- Corbin, Mrs. C.
- Edwards, A. E. A., Lands and Survey Dept., Simanggang District
- Elam, Mrs. H. E. H. and infant
- Drake, F. B. K. Acting District Officer, Saratok
- Houghton, Miss K.
- Jongklass, W. O. Rubber Regulation Officer, Second Division, Simanggang.
- Mercer, Mrs. B. A. M.
- Munro, Mrs. T. J. C. and two infants
- Olver, Miss A. A.
- Paisley, Revd. Father J.
- Paisley, Mrs. J. and two infants
- Reeves, B. A. Superintendent, Lands and Survey Department, Second Division, Simanggang
- Richards, A. J. N. District Officer, Betong
- Snelus, A. R. District Officer, Simanggang
- Stonton, Revd. Father A. W. Priest-in-Charge, Batang Lupar SPG Mission, Simanggang
- Trail, Mrs. A. D.

2. Wireless communication between Kuching and Simanggang (centre of the Second Division) ceased in 24th December 1941. On the following day the Resident, Sibul, [A. MacPherson] informed the Resident, Simanggang[,] by wireless that Kuching was in

enemy hands, that civilians were prisoners but were not being ill-treated (*sic*), that fighting was believed to be continuing in the interior, and that the two stations should keep in touch for further information from Sibul. This was the last message received from the Resident in Sibul.

3. The party of European women and children (denoted by asterisk in para 1) led by Father Paisley, moved off for Pontianak on the 26th and arrived there on 4th January 1942. . . .

4. On the 28th December the Simanggang Wireless Station intercepted messages sent from the Datu [Tuanku Mohamed] in Sibul to Native Officers in the Third Division, indicating that the Third Division Europeans had fled and the Datu had taken control.

5. During the evening of the 29th December, the first group of Dayak Rangers arrived overland from the [F]irst Division, still armed with rifles. They stated that Capt. R. W. Large had instructed them to discard their arms and run for home. Other parties arrived later and confirmed the statement made by the first. All arms were taken from the men as they came in. On the 31st December a meeting of European and Native Headmen was held, after which Messrs. Arundel[1], Snelus, Reeves, Jongklass and A. E. A. Edwards left for Engkilili. At this station Messrs. Arundel and Snelus waited for Mr. Richards who had received previous instructions to join them. Miss Andrews preceded Mr. Richards and went in to Lubok Antu with Messrs. Reeves, Jongklass and Edwards. All rejoined at Lubok Antu on 1st January 1942.

6. The party met the [Dutch] Controleur of Semitau (Mr. H. Verkuil) on 3rd January and after discussion the Resident ruled that any person other than himself or the District Officer, Mr. Snelus, was at liberty to leave for Pontianak. On the 4th January, Mr. [F. B. K.] Drake [district officer, Saratok] and a party from the Third Division . . . arrived.⁴ Mr. Jongklass, having decided not to flee, returned to Simanggang the same day.

7. That same day, the 4th. Mr. Verkuil and Miss Andrews left Lubok Antu. The Dutch Officer returned to his post (he was captured and interned later) and Miss Andrews arrived safely in Pontianak on the 8th January. . . .

8. On the 6th January, a general dispersal took place from Lubok

Antu. One party of seven Europeans . . . left for Pontianak. Mr. Snelus returned alone to Simanggang the same day. Messrs. Richards and [W. G.] Morison also left the same day and arrived in Simanggang on the 7th. The Resident remained in the station.

9. During the period under review, Revd. Father [A. W.] Stonton had been away from Simanggang. On the 26th December, while in Pantu, he heard that his launch had been damaged and that Kuching refugees were arriving in Simanggang. He walked back to Simanggang to find that the Europeans had gone to Lubok Antu.

10. Mr. Snelus no sooner arrived in Simanggang than he was recalled by the Resident, so he left again on 7th January, accompanied by Father Stonton. The Acting Resident, Pontianak (Mr. C. Bakker), and the Assistant Resident, Sentang (Mr. S. Kortleven) had arrived at Lubok Antu for discussions with Mr. Arundel[1]. The Dutch officials were anxious to know, among other things, if Mr. Arundel[1] intended to remain in his Division. They were assured th[at] he and Mr. Snelus had no intention of leaving.

11. Mr. Arundel[1], Mr. Snelus and Father Stonton left Lubok Antu on the 11th, but the first officer fell ill with malaria and was forced to stay at Engkilili. The other two went on to Simanggang the same day. Thus the disposition of Europeans on this date was as follows:—

The Resident, Mr. Arundel[1], at Engkilili.

The District Officer of Simanggang, Mr. Snelus, at Simanggang.

The District Officer of Betong, Mr. Richards, at Simanggang.

The Reverend Father Stonton, at Simanggang.

The Dresser-in-Charge, Mr. Attenborough, at Simanggang.

The Rubber Regulation Officer, Mr. Jongklass, at Rawang, Simanggang.

The Assitant District Officer of Sarikei, Mr. Morison, at Simanggang.

All these gentlemen were fully aware of Japanese progress into Sarawak and they knew that they must be taken prisoners. It is greatly to their credit that they resolved to remain at their posts. It

would appear that, particularly,(?) the two youngest officials—Messrs. Richards and Morison—should be commended for their devotion to duty. Mr. Richards had the permission of the Resident to leave, and Mr. Morison, who had come to the Division from Sarikei with his senior officer, now decided to return alone to a district from which all Europeans had fled.

12. On the 12th January, one Elia Bey [Eliab Bay], Sea Dayak of Lundu, and Native Officer in Kuching, appeared in the District Office in Simanggang and presented a letter addressed to Datu Abang Zin [Galau] [Native Officer].

The Datu had previously perused the letter. It was from the Japanese in Kuching, appointing Elia Bey Japanese Liaison Officer for the Second Division.⁵ Mr. Snelus told Elia Bey that he had no standing whatsoever and he should return to his masters in Kuching. Elia Bey left.

13. On the 13th, Messrs. Richards and Morison left for Betong, the first Officials's station. Mr. Morison remained with his friend until 23rd when he went on to Sarikei, arriving on 28th. His presence was made known to Sibu directly upon his arrival and a telegram was despatched for his arrest. Thus, on 29th. he was taken to Sibu under an armed native guard supplied by the Native Officer, Sarikei. At Sibu he was allowed to stay in the R. C. Mission until 1st February, when he was sent to Kuching with Mr. J. C. H. Barcroft in "R[e]jang" and interned at "Zaida" on the 2nd.

14. On the 14th January Mr. Snelus went to Engkilili to meet Mr. Arundel[l]. The next day he went on to Lubok Antu, but the day following a message arrived from D[a]tu Abang Zin asking for a meeting. This took place at Engkilili on the 17th. when the Datu begged both officers to return to Simanggang. They did so, Mr. Snelus going first and Mr. Arundel[l], still a sick man, two days later. About the 23rd both officers left again as Mr. Arundel[l] wished to meet Dutch officials and arrange for salt to be brought over the border as there was a serious shortage in the Division. Mr. Snelus stayed at Engkilili and Mr. Arundel[l] went on to Sentang. On the 28th he informed Mr. Snelus by telephone from Lubok Antu that he would be down the following day. He had seen 2nd. Lieut. [W.] Harnack [director, Lands and Survey, Kuching] at Sentang.

15. On the 29th Mr. Arundel[1] telephoned that he was too ill to travel so Mr. Snelus returned alone to Simanggang that day. He arrived at 4.15 p.m. and at 5.30 p.m. was arrested by S[e]rgeant-Major Wright and men of the Sarawak Constabulary.

16. Messrs. Jongklass and Attenborough were arrested at about the same time. The three prisoners were taken before Inspector Juing Insol,⁶ who explained that their arrest had been ordered by the Japanese, some of whom were nearby. During the night Mr. Attenborough was brutally assaulted and insulted by Insol.

17. On the 30th Elia Bey . . . arrived at Betong with a squad of police and arrested Mr. Richards, who was taken to Simanggang and lodged with the other three prisoners. . . .

18. Father Stonton was present at the arrest of Messrs. Attenborough and Jongklass. . . . Juing Insol told him to "clear off" so he did, but later asked the Japanese by letter for elucidation of his position. He was told in reply to prepare to go to Kuching on the 3rd February.

19. On the 3rd the four prisoners and Father Stonton were placed on board a P.W.D. Tongkang and taken to Kuching. They were all interned in "Zaida" on the 4th February 1942.

20. Thus the only European at large in the Second Division on the 1st February was the Resident, Mr. Arundel[1]. There have been persistent rumours of his death at the hands of Dayaks after the Japanese had placed a high price on his head, but the evidence is not sufficiently reliable to be recorded herein.⁷ Mr. Jongklass died from natural causes on 23rd February 1945, and was buried in the Batu Lintang Camp Cemetery. Mr. K. H. Digby [Sarawak legal adviser] holds his will.

DOCUMENT 24

Europeans in the Third Division on the Run

J. L. Noakes, "Report upon Defence Measures Adopted in Sarawak from June 1941 to the Occupation in December 1941 by Imperial Japanese Forces; Also an Account of the Movement of

British and Sarawak Military Forces during the Japanese Invasion of Sarawak," 15 February 1946. MSS Pac.s.62. RHL. Section XXIV, pp. 89-100.

A. A Summary of . . . events relating to the Third Division

1. . . . Searchlights from vessels (probably Japanese) turned on Oya Lighthouse in early hours of 19th December.
2. . . . Japanese plane bombed Oya and Mukah at 3.30 p.m. on 23rd December.
3. . . . Telegram from Resident, Sibu, to Chief Secretary, Kuching, on 23rd December, suggesting dispersal of food and leaving Datu to carry on.
4. . . . On morning of 25th December Tanjong Po Look[-]out informed Resident, Sibu, of fall of Kuching. . . .
8. . . . Wireless communication on 25th December between Resident, Sibu, and Resident, Simanggang.
9. . . . Party [Arundel[l], Snelus, Reeves, Jongklass, Miss Andrews, Richards] . . . meet Second Division and Dutch officials at Lubok Antu.
10. . . . Mr. Morison returns to Sarikei and is arrested and interned.

B. Europeans in the Third Division on 23rd December 1941

1. SELALANG

Bland, R. D. Assistant, Island Trading Co., Ltd.

2. SARIKEI

Buck, W.S.B. District Officer.

Moscrop, L.P. Rubber Regulation Department.

Morison, W.G. Assistant District Officer.

Murray, C. B. Lands and Survey Department.

Quaddeker, Reverend Father C. R. C. Mission.

3. BINATANG

Wagenaar, Revd. Father W. R. C. Mission.
Peeters, Revd. Father P. R. C. Mission.

4. SIBU

Alphonsus, Mother M. (McIvor, S.J.) R. C. Mission.
Anderson, A.W. Assistant, Sarawak Electricity Supply Co. Ltd.
Augustine, Sister M. (Pinder, G.) R. C. Mission.
Bache, Public Works Department.
Baron, R. N. Lands and Survey Department.
Buis, Revd. Fr. J. R. C. Mission.
Cobbold, P. C. V. Manager, Borneo Co. Ltd.
Cox, S. H. K. Food Control Department.
Dekker, Father J. R. C. Mission.
De Padua, Sister M. (Murphy, M.) R. C. Mission.
Hansom, S.G. District Officer, Sibu.
Lee, Sarawak Steamship Co. Ltd.
Lee, Mrs. Wife of Lee.
Macpherson, A. Resident, Third Division.
Macpherson, Mrs. A. Wife of A. Macpherson.
Mansel, F. L. Divisional Treasurer.
McKerracher, W. Borneo Co. Ltd.
Miles, C. L. Borneo Co. Ltd.
Murphy, D.V. Sarawak Constabulary.
Reid, T. A. Public Works Dept. and District Warden.
Schotling, J. Rubber Regulation Department.
Sinclair, R.F. Trade and Customs Department.
Spencer, H. J. Agricultural Department.
Walter, T. E. Forestry Department.

5. KANOWIT

Barry, Revd. Father L. J. R.C. Mission.
Bernard, Sister M. (McParland, M.) R.C. Mission.

Bomphrey, Mrs. E. wife of E. Bomphrey of Island Trading Co.,
Ltd. Selalang.

Bomphrey, Two infants.

Bruggeman, Revd. Father S. R.C. Mission.

Jacks, H. P. K. District Officer.

Kidd, G. D. Manager, Rejang Estates Ltd.

Kidd, Mrs. [G.] D. Wife of G. D. Kidd.

Perpetua, Mother M. (O'Hara, J.) R.C. Mission.

Werenfried, Sister M. (Verhoeven, M.) R.C. Mission.

6. DURIN

Van de Bergh, Revd. Father L. R.C. Mission.

7. KAPIT

Griffin, A. F. R. District Officer.

8. DALAT

Clotilde, Sister M. (Blackburn, R.) R.C. Mission.

Lidwinia, Mother M. (Mulder, J.) R.C. Mission.

Mak, Rev. Father A. R.C. Mission.

Murray-Whelan, Rev. Father J. H. R.C. Mission.

Nativity, Sister M. (Brennan, J.) R.C. Mission.

9. MUKAH

Barcroft, J. C. H. District Officer.

De [C]ounsel, Mother M. (McGee, M.) R.C. Mission.

Hol[m], Revd. Fr. J. R.C. Mission.

Jerome, Sister M. (Scannell, B.) R.C. Mission.

Joan, Sister M. (Charnley, A.) R.C. Mission.

Leonard, Sister M. (Jordan, E.) R.C. Mission.

Lloyd-Thomas, G. L. Cadet.

Mulder, Revd. Father A. R.C. Mission.

C. Events in Sibu, 25th to 27th December 1941

1. All Senior Officers of the Sarawak Civil Service in charge of stations were expected to remain at their posts unless the inhabitants of the district moved en masse[,] in which case the Officer would move with them. . . . Residents have authority to release any Senior Officers, engaged on any work, in the event of invasion. It was expected that Residents and District Officers of the Third Division would stand by the people and hand over the Government to the occupying authorities in due course, but this did not occur and so far no explanation had been advanced.

2. The Resident heard of the capture of Kuching in the morning of 25th December 1941. . . . Four Japanese planes bombed Sibu that afternoon. Eleven bombs were dropped and four people killed, but otherwise there was negligible damage. Sibu, of course, was an undefended town.

3. On the 26th the District Officer commenced the dispersal of food supplies to dumps outside the town, but the local people claimed a share in the supplies and that evening they commenced to help themselves. Unrestrained looting was in full swing by midnight and continued on 27th without interference by the authorities. It would appear that from 25th onwards all European control disappeared. Although the writer has received much information regarding the state of affairs at Sibu during these days it is possible that much of it is prejudiced and therefore should not be recorded in the absence of the Sibu Officials. . . .

4. The M.V. "REJANG" left Sibu at midnight, 26th-27th, for Kapit with the following Europeans on board:—

Mr. Bache, Mr. and Mrs. Lee, Mrs. Macpherson and Messrs. Miles, Schotling, and Walter. Mrs. Bompfrey and her two children embarked at Kanowit. The vessel arrived at Kapit on 27th. Shortly after Mr. McKerracher arrived in his "outboard" from Sib[ul], the District Officer, Kapit, (Mr. Griffin) was informed that the evacuees intended to go on to Belaga.

5. The Sarawak Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. launch "ANN" left Sibu for Kapit at 10 a.m. on the 27th, with Messrs. Reid, Anderson and Jacks on board. (Mr. Jacks embarked at Kanowit). The launch arrived in the evening of the same day.

6. The Government launch "BETTY" left Sibü for Kapit at noon on the 27th, with Messrs. Macpherson, Cobbold, Baron, Cox, Hansom, Murphy, Mansel, Sinclair and Spencer on board. The vessel arrived at dawn on 28th.⁸ . . .

7. No members of the R.C. Mission in Sibü, Kanowit and Durin accompanied the evacuees to Kapit. Their subsequent internment is described in "G."

8. Mr. Kidd of Kanowit had stated that "Rejang" stopped off his estate at 6.30 a.m. on 27th and Mr. Miles came ashore to ask Mr. and Mrs. Kidd to leave with the party, but they refused. Mr. McKerracher met with the same refusal when he landed at 10.30 a.m. Again at 3.30 p.m. "ANN" and "BETTY" arrived and Mr. Cobbold tried to persuade the Kidds to leave, but he too was refused. Mr. Kidd saw the three vessels pass his estate on the 28th on their way down river to Sibü. On the 29th he informed the Native Officer, Kanowit, that he and his wife were not leaving. He had heard reports of looting at Sibü from 26th onwards. The Chinese at Sibü and Kanowit had organised their own police force in self defence and had refused all armed Dayaks entrance to the bazaars. The internment of Mr. and Mrs. Kidd is described in "G," para 19.

9. Revd. Fr. Barry, Rector of the Kanowit R.C. Mission, has stated that four European and two Chinese R.C. Sisters and fifty school-children arrived from Sibü on the 23rd. The bombing of Sibü was reported to them on the 25th so all R.C. Sisters and school-children were sent up the Kanowit River for safety the following day. At 4 p.m. on the 27th "ANN" stopped off the Kanowit R.C. Mission and the occupants said they were leaving Sibü and were going up the Katibas "to have another smack at the Japs." It is believed that Mr. Jacks was in favour of using the Katibas route into Dutch Borneo, but Mr. Macpherson preferred Belaga. . . .

D. The Flight of Europeans from Sarikei on 26th December 1941

1. The District Officer, Mr. Buck, held instructions to remain at his post until the arrival of the occupying authorities. . . . At the

same time it was within the power of the Resident, Third Division (in view of the extraordinary situatio[n] existing after the fall of the centre of Government at Kuching) to give Mr. Buck permission to leave. It is thought that such permission was given.

2. Mr. Morison remembered that Mr. Buck received a wireless message on about 25th suggesting dispersal of food stocks, after which Mr. Buck might "fall back" on Sibu. . . . Foodstuffs were not dispersed by Mr. Buck before leavin[g.]

3. A rumour of Japanese approach to Binatang from the Sibu direction began to circulate in Sarikei early in the morning of the 26th. The Europeans packed hurriedly and left for Selalang, thence to Lubok Antu and Pontianak. . . . Mr. Morison alone returned from Lubok Antu. . . .

4. Mr. Morison found most of the stock of food stored in the Chinese Chamber of Commerce when he returned on the 28th January 1942. There was a strong feeling of resentment against all Europeans in Sarikei at that time.

E. Movements of Mukah and Dalat Europeans from 24th December 1941

1. The bombing of Oya and Mukah [has already been] described.⁹ . . . Both villages were undefended.

2. On 24th December, the District Officer, Mukah, Mr. J. C. H. Barcroft, received a wireless message from the Resident in Sibu advising all communities to disperse and organise under their ow[n] chiefs, as Government might cease to function at any moment. He also advised dispersal of all food stocks by distribution direct to communities, and upon completion of these veiled instructions the District Officer might "fall back" on Sibu, but he should do everything in his power for his people before leaving.

3. Early in the morning of the 25th the Resident wirelessly [Barcroft] as follows:—"Appoint you my deputy with full powers under Defence Regulations."

4. At 3 p.m. on the 25th five Japanese planes were seen flying in the direction Sibu-Miri, and the same evening a wireless message

from Sibu stated that the town had been bombed. At [6 p.m.] wireless communication with Sibu failed.

5. At 4 p.m. on the 26th the Sibu wireless station recommenced broadcasting, but would not communicate with Mukah, so Mr. Barcroft concluded that Sibu was in enemy hands. That same evening Mr. Barcroft held a meeting of Native Officers and told them that Sibu was probably occupied by the Japanese. A party was sent to Sibu, via Dalat, to investigate, but it never returned.

6. At 5 p.m. on the 27th Mr. Barcroft intercepted a wireless message from the Datu [Tuanku Mohamed] in Sibu to the Native Officer, Mukah. (The Native Officer showed the same message to Mr. Barcroft the next day). It was as follows:

"I have taken over Sibu. Abang Adeng in charge of police.
You (Abang Mustapha) are to take over Mukah District."

The Native Officer was genuinely distressed. He replied:

"Carrying on as usual."

7. On the 28th the wireless operator of Mukah was informed privately from Sibu that the Resident and others had gone up the Rejang River. Mr. Barcroft was informed and he and the other Mukah Europeans decided that his best course was to get into contact with his Resident. He and Mr. Lloyd-Thomas left for the Ulu Mukah at 10 a.m. on the 29th.

8. During this period the R. C. Sisters had been sent to Dalat, and Revd. Fr. A. Mulder, Rector of the R.C. Mission at Mukah, followed them on the 28th.

9. Messrs. Barcroft and Lloyd-Thomas arrived at Nanga Pelagus above Kapit on about 9th January 1942, and there heard the story of the European evacuation from Sibu. Mr. Barcroft wrote the Native Officer of Kapit asking for information, and at 10 p.m. the same day the Native Officer (Abang Mat) arrived. He described the movements of the Resident's party and stated that so far no Japanese had entered the Rejang River. The Siby [*sic*; Sibu] party was on its way to Dutch Borneo and rumours had been heard of Europeans at Belaga but probably they were not from Sibu. Mr. Barcroft gave the Native Officer two messages—one for the Native Officer, Mukah, and one for the Datu in Sibu. In the last one he

suggested that he return to Sibu, but first he would go to Belaga to investigate the report of Europeans there. The two Europeans, accompanied by the Native Officer, Belaga, who had arrived from Kapit on the 10th, left Pelagus on the 11th and arrived at Belaga on the 12th. They met Messrs. Outram, Avery and Coldman and Mrs. Coldman, all of Bintulu, who had arrived that same day. . . . The Bintulu party wished to go on to Dutch Borneo but was dissuaded by Mr. Barcroft who pointed out the very real danger of attempting the trip in the wet season then prevailing. Mr. Miles arrived from the interior on the 13th. . . and agreed that it would be most unwise to attempt to follow the Sibu party at that time. See "G" for the later movement of this new party.

10. Mr. Barcroft's action in leaving his station, despite orders from the Chief Secretary to remain . . . is quite understandable and, it is thought, cannot reflect upon that office in the light of his later movements. In fact, it is difficult to see how he could have acted otherwise. He had already received indefinite orders from his Senior Officer to "fall back" on Sibu, only to find that the Resident had fled and all European authority appeared to be at an end in the light of the Datu's message to the Native Officer. His district was quiet and orderly and he could leave it safely to search for the Resident, to whom he looked for authority and guidance. Furthermore, Mr.] Barcroft was high in the Third Division in seniority to the Resident and in the absence of the Resident and Mr. Buck, he would be the Senior Administrative official. He rightly considered that he could not sit idly at Mukah while there might be urgent duties requir[ing] his attention in the main centres of the Division.

11. Father Mulder . . . returned to Mukah on the 6th January 1942. The Revd. Fr. J. H. Murray-Whelan, R[e]ctor of the R.C. Mission at Dalat, relates that the Chinese at Dalat organised their own police force, set up a guard and prepared to defend themselves against Dayaks and Chinese who were said to be looting in the Igan River. Father Whelan was in Mukah between 17th and 21st January. Shortly after, a report circulated in Dalat to the effect that a Chinese trader named Lao Siong Ngong had been murdered in the Ulu Tamin by Dayaks.

12. Fr. Whelan went to Sibu on the 20th February and to Sarikei on the 23rd. He returned to Sibu on the 25th and was back in Dalat

again on the 11th March. On the 23rd Fr. Mulder visited him to discuss their situation, and returned to Mukah on 25th. Fr. Whelan followed him to [M]ukah on 9th April. On 13th April Fathers Mulder, Whelan and Hol[m], and the R.C. Sisters were called by newly arrived Japanese officials to the Government bungalow and informed that their activities would in future be restricted to Mission work.

13. On the 14th April, following upon his interview with the Japanese, Father Whelan went to Dalat and proceeded to close the Mission. Father Mak left for Mukah on the 17th and Father Whelan and the Sisters followed on the 18th. The Japanese authorities ordered the confinement of all Dalat and Mukah European R.C. personnel to the Mukah Mission Grounds.

14. On 14th May the Native Officer was instructed by the Japanese to send all the European R.C. personnel . . . to Sibü. Four men and seven women left on the 15th.

*[F.] The Flight of Sibü and other Europeans into Dutch
Borneo—continued from "C" para 6*

1. Twenty-three Europeans (eighteen men, three women and two children) assembled at Kapit and left in seven boats equipped with outboard motors at 8.30 a.m. on the 28th December 1941. Four spare motors were carried.

2. On the 30th, Messrs. Reid, Baron, Schotl[i]ng and Jacks arrived at Belaga. The others arrived the following day. Then the forward party left and the main party followed on the 1st January 1942.

3. At Long Bahau above Belaga, Mr. Miles decided to return down river and he parted from the others on the 9th January, arriving in Belaga on the 13th, to meet Messrs. Barcroft, Lloyd-Thomas, Avery, Coldman and Outram and Mrs. Coldman. . . . For the later movements of this party, see "G."

4. The Sibü party, reduced by one (Mr. Miles) pushed on from Long Bahau. Messrs. Reid and Jacks went on ahead and arrived at Long Nawang on about the 15th. They sent back assistance and the relief party of Kenyas [an ethnic group of shifting cultivators and

longhouse dwellers] met the main Sibu party on the 18th and brought it into Long Nawang on the 22nd January 1942.

5. Long Nawang was a Dutch Outpost near the Dutch-Sarawak Border under the Civil control of a Dutch Native Officer. Barracks existed for military personnel but at this time they were engaged down river. The native population consisted of a large kampong of Kenyas. The station was equipped with a wireless [receiving] and transmitting set. Foodstuffs were plentiful. There was one herd of about 40 head of Government-owned cattle. Pigs were plentiful. Rice, Vegetables, fruit, etc. were available in suitable quantities. There appeared to be no reason why the refugees should not exist comfortably for an indefinite period provided they were not molested. They were fairly well supplied with firearms and ammunition.

6. A telegram awaiting the refugees instructed them to proceed to Long Iram. Many of them were sick and unfit for further travel so, on the 29th. Messrs. Jacks, Schotling, Walter, McKerracher and Anderson went on. It was reported that a wireless message received later in Long Nawang indicated that these five men had been successfully evacuated from Long Nawang to Java by air.¹⁰

7. Messrs. Cobbold, Griffin, and Baron made one unsuccessful attempt to return to Sarawak, but they were obliged to return to Long Nawang, where the majority of the refugees by this time had settled down to farming.

8. About the 6th February, Lt. Greneveldt, Flying Officer, Brassechers, Sgt. Pilot Holm, Warrant Officer Reen and Messrs. Parry and Hudden, and Father Feldbrugge, all from the Fourth Division arrived at Long Nawang, and Lieut. Greneveldt, as senior officer, took over Command of the station. Later, about fifty Dutch Militia and members of other services arrived from down-river.

9. Mr. Hudden left for Sarawak on 13th February, intending to return to the Kelabit country and search for the Resident, Fifth Division.¹¹ . . .

10. On the 24th March Messrs. Baron and Griffin decided to return to Sarawak. They joined a party of Kanowit Dayaks and arrived at Belaga on the 7th April. It is believed that the Native Officer, Belaga, informed the Japanese in Sibu of Messrs Baron's

and Griffin's arrival. On the 12th April Mr. Miles came up from Kapit and the three went down to Sebutin (above Kapit) to join Messrs. Outram and Lloyd-Thomas on the 12th. . . .

G. Continuation of Movements in Third Division of certain Europeans who were later interned

MESSRS. BARCROFT, LLOYD-THOMAS, MILES, OUTRAM,
AVERY, COLDMAN, BARON, AND GRIFFIN,
AND MRS. COLDMAN

1. . . . [A]ll but Messrs. Baron and Griffin were assembled in one party at Belaga on 13th January 1942.

2. On the 16th January Messrs. Barcroft and Miles left this party and arrived at Sebutin (above Kapit) the following day. They met the Native Officer of Kapit on the 18th and were told that the Datu at Sibu had not replied to Mr. Barcroft's letter of 11th. . . . The Native Officer, Mukah, had replied to the other letter and stated that a Japanese patrol had visited Oya for an hour or so. There was a rumour abroad that the Japanese had landed at Sarikei and soon would be in Sibu. Mr. Barcroft sent one wireless message to the Datu asking for a reply, and another to the Native Officer, Mukah. The Datu still refused to reply so on the 19th Mr. Barcroft informed them that he would visit Sibu. This message bore fruit, as the Datu wirelessly the following message to the Native Officer, Kapit, on 20th:

"Do not let Barcroft proceed Sibu as enemy very close. Good idea he stay with Kidds (Kanowit)."

The Native Officer replied that Mr. Barcroft would be leaving on the following day (21st) for the Kidd's home; that he was determined to see the Datu, and that unless he received news of Kanowit he would go on to Sibu.

3. Messrs. Barcroft and Miles arrived at Kanowit on the 21st. and the launch used was sent on to Sibu with a message for the Datu, informing him that Mr. Barcroft wished to discuss his own

positio[n] without delay. He also sent the Datu a petition, signed by the Native Officers of Dalat and Kanowit, the Chief Clerk of Kapit, and Penghulus Sibat [and] Juga[h], Temonggong[s] Koh and Serai, requesting Mr. Barcroft to remain in the [Rejang] River as trouble was expected and they relied upon a European to keep the peace. The launch did not return though arrangements had been made for it to do so, and Mr. Barcroft sent another wireless message on the [23rd] asking why no reply had been given. On the 25th the Datu replied that he was calling a meeting of all officers on the 29th and he would be able to satisfy Mr. Barcroft [after] that date.

4. The two Europeans returned to Kapit on 26th. On the way they met the Native Officer, Kapit, going to Sibü, so Mr. Barcroft gave him a letter for the Datu and copies [for] all officers attending the meeting.

5. On the 27th a wireless message was sent to Mr. Lloyd-Thomas at Belaga, suggesting that he come to Sebutin; but on the 28th news was received through the Native Officer, Kapit, that the Japanese would arrive in Sibü on the 30th and they might visit Kapit, so a second telegram was sent to Mr. Lloyd-Thomas cancelling the first and instructing him to hide as Mr. Barcroft's arrest appeared imminent. At the same time the Datu was asked again for instructions.

6. On the 29th the Datu informed the Chief Clerk at Kapit that th[e] Japanese would visit the station on the 30th and he should ask Mr. Barcroft to hand over any weapons and prepare to meet the Japanese. Mr. Barcroft and Mr. Miles [a]ttended at the Kapit Fort. The Japanese arrived with Tuanku Bujang on "Rejang" at 5 p.m. on the 30th.

7. Messrs. Barcroft and Miles were questioned the same day. The first officer was told to be on board the vessel at 6 a.m. the following day, but Mr. Miles was informed that if he wished he could stay on in Kapit provided that he produced timber for the Japanese. On the 31st Mr. Barcroft left in "Rejang" and Mr. Miles returned to Sebutin.

8. M.V. "Rejang" called at Sibü and Mr. Morison . . . was embarked. The vessel sailed at noon on 1st February 1942 and both were interned at "Zaida" Internment Camp at Kuching on the following day, after an interview with the Japanese at [the] Central Police Station.

9. On the 31st January, Messrs. Outram, Avery and Lloyd-Thomas left Belaga. At Nanga Pelagus Mr. Avery branched off for Bintulu via the Anap and Tatau Rivers and arrived on [15]th February. . . . Messrs. Outram and Lloyd-Thomas, [although] they had received both [of] Mr. Barcroft's message[s] . . . proceeded to Sebutin, where they met Mr. Miles and learnt of the capture of Mr. Barcroft. They sent a letter to Mr. and Mrs. Coldman, left behind in Belaga, advising them to return to Bintulu via Kapit and Sibul.

10. Mr. Miles found that no facilities were offered him in Kapit for the production of timber, so on 9th February he went to Sibul and interviewed the Datu. The Datu appointed him Manager of the Borneo Co. Ltd., gave him an advance of \$1000 and free petrol and told him he would suffer no interference. He returned to Sebutin on the 13th. The following day the Coldmans arrived from Belaga.

11. There were now five at Sebutin. Mrs. Coldman and Messrs. Coldman, Outram, Lloyd-Thomas, and Miles.

12. On the 4th March Mr. and Mrs. Coldman and Mr. Lloyd-Thomas left for Sibul. The two first named took the M.L. "SWEE" for Bintulu on the 11th and arrived on the 13th. . . . Mr. Lloyd-Thomas saw a dentist, for which purpose he went to Sibul. He met a Japanese named Hatebe, was given permission to return to Kapit and arrived back at Sebutin on the 11th March.

13. Mr. Miles went to Sibul on the 14th and was back again in Sebutin on the 19th. On the 25th the three Europeans went to Pasir Nai above Sebutin, to commence padi farming, but Mr. Miles went off again on the 24th to Salim, near Sibul, and there met Mr. Nizam, formerly Chief Clerk in the Borneo Co. Ltd., Sibul, who informed him that Nissa Shokai, Ltd. of Kuching had taken over the affairs of the Company. Mr. Miles resolved to refuse to work any longer.

14. On about the 28th March, Hatebe . . . met Mr. Miles at Salim and agreed to release him from his timber production duties[.] He would be allowed to plant padi, and so he returned to his friends at Pasir Nai on the 28th.

15. On the 4th April, Mr. Miles went to Belaga. On the 28th Messrs Lloyd-Thomas and Outram were called to the Kapit Fort to meet Japanese officials and a message was sent for the recall of Mr. Miles. The Japanese did not, in fact, arrive until the 21st.

16. Mr. Miles arrived at Belaga on the 10th April and met Messrs. Griffin and Baron, who had come across from Long Nawang (See "F." para 10). The three men went to Sebutin on the 12th, [upon receiving] Mr. Miles' order to return. . . .

17. Japanese officials arrived at Kapit on the 21st and examined the five Europeans on the following day. That night (of 22nd) the four Government officials (Messrs. Griffin, Lloyd-Thomas, Baron and Outram) were lodged in clerk's [quarters] at Kapit. On the 23rd the same four were taken to Sibu in M.L. "ANN" and on the 25th were conveyed to Kuching on M.V. "Sydney R. Maw." They were questioned at the Kuching Police Sta[t]ion on the 26th April 1942 and immediately afterwards interned [in] "Zaida" Internment Camp.

18. Mr. Miles was not interned with the others. After they left he made a trip upriver and lost all his belongings in the Pelagus Rapids. He states that previously the Japanese had allowed the Baleh Protected Forest to be opened and he protested vigorously, but unsuccessfully. On the 12th May he and Hatebe went to Belaga to collect Borneo Co. Ltd. debts and stop timber thieving. [O]n the 16th he was instructed to go to Kapit and take stock on B.C.L. property up to 28th February 1942. This he did and a Balance Sheet was prepared. On about the 20th May he was sent to Sibu under Police escort and on about [25th] departed for Kuching on "Sydney R. Maw." He was interned in Padungan Internment Camp on 26th May 1942.

MR. AND MRS. KIDD

19. . . . Mr. Kidd (Manager, Kanowit Plantations, Ltd.) had indicated to the Native Officer of Kanowit and the Datu of Sibu that he and Mrs. Kidd would remain on the estate until removed by the Japanese.

20. During the first few weeks after the fall of Kuching, Dayaks (sometimes assisted by Chinese) looted the estate of all timber and latex cups, but did not molest the two Europeans, Messrs. Miles and Barcroft stayed with the Kidds from 21st to 26th January 1942. . . .

21. On the 28th January they were informed by the Native Officer, Kanowit, that he had received orders from Sibu to detain them in their house. On the 30th Japanese arrived from Sibu and interrogated Mr. Kidd on M.V. "Rejang." He was told that he and Mrs. Kidd would be confined to their compound. The same day the ship left for Kapit and passed Kanowit on its return voyage on the 31st with Mr. Barcroft on board . . .

22. Mr. Lloyd-Thomas called to see them on the 11th March on his way from Kapit to Sibu . . . On the 26th some Japanese arrived and made an examination of the estate and plant. On the 20th April more Japanese arrived, interrogated Mr. and Mrs. Kidd and took away their wireless set. Mr. Kidd was ordered to plant foodstuffs though he protested that he had no money.

23. On the 15th May news arrived that they were to be interned and two days later the Native Officer of Kanowit took all books and office material to the Fort for "safe-keeping."

24. Mr. and Mrs. Kidd were taken to Sibu on the 18th May, with the European personnel of the Kanowit R.C. Mission. . . . They left for Kuching on the 19th on "Sydney R. Maw." On 20th May 1942 Mr. Kidd was interned at the Padungan Internment Camp and Mrs. Kidd was interned at the R.C. Convent on the same day.

25. Mr. Kidd has stated that the general view of the inhabitants of his district was that the flight of the Europeans in December 1941 was a deplorable action. In his opinion there exists in the Third Division a feeling of antagonism towards Europeans which will be difficult to eradicate in future years.

REV. FATHER BARRY AND OTHER R. C. PERSONNEL IN THIRD DIVISION

26. Father Barry was Rector of the Kanowit R. C. Mission. . . .

27. Those R.C. Sisters and children who had been sent up the Kanowit River for safety . . . were brought back to Kanowit on 5th January 1942 and Father Barry took the Sibu members home.

28. He found a bad state of affairs in Sibu. The Chinese Government officers openly opposed the Malay, and the only person who appeared reasonable was Jalil, formerly of the Survey Department

but latterly an Agricultural Assistant. At one of the Malay meetings it was proposed to arrest the R.C. Priests, but the motion was not carried. The people of Sibu deeply resented the flight of the European Government Staff, and the Datu himself had been heard to say that he would like to shoot a certain European. Father Barry returned soon to Kanowit and resumed his duties as far as possible.

29. On the 30th January 1942, some Japanese arrived at Kanowit accompanied by Wan Bujang and Nizawi. Fathers Barry and Bruggeman and Mr. and Mrs. Kidd were asked a few questions and then the Asiatic party went on to Kapit.

30. Later, the R.C. Priests were interrogated by one Hamada, Sibu's Japanese Administrator, as he passed through to Kapit. He returned a few days afterwards with Messrs. Baron, Outram, etc. . . . so he probably visited Kanowit on about 21st April. When Hamada arrived in Sibu he issued an edict closing all English-speaking schools.

31. Hamada took Father Barry's wireless set, but two days later Lieut. Yamada of the Japanese Telegraphs, arrived on an inspection of wireless stations and returned the set. He told Father Barry that the remaining Europeans would not be interned.

32. On the 12th May orders came from Sibu for all Europeans to be sent there for internment. The clerk at Kanowit Fort made an inventory of all belongings and some of the packages were locked, sealed and left in the station.

33. On the 18th May all R.C. personnel (European) and Mr. and Mrs. Kidd arrived in Sibu. They were allowed to lodge in the R.C. Mission, where they met other Europeans of the Mission, collected for internment.

34. The whole party numbered twenty-six (twelve men and fourteen women) as follows:

Of Binatang

Wagenaar, Father W.

Peters, Father P.

Of Sibu

Alphonsus, Mother M

Augustine, Sister M

Buis, Father J.

Of Kanowit

Barry, Father L. J.

Bruggeman, Father S.

Kidd, G. D.

Kidd, Mrs. G. D.

Perpetua, Mother M.

Werenfried, Sister M.

Of Sibu

Dekker, Father J.

De Padua, Sister M.

Of Durin

Ven De Bergh, Father J.

Of Durin

Clotilde, Mother [sic; Sister] M.

Lidwinia, Mother M.

Mak, Father A.

Navitty, Sister M.

Murray-Whelan, Father J. H.

Of Mukah

De Counsel, Mother M.

Holm, Father, J.

Jerome, Sister M.

Joan, Sister M.

Leonard, Sister M.

Mulder, Father A.

35. The party was conveyed to Kuching on "Sydney R. Maw" on the 19th and on the 20th May 1942 the men were interned at Padungan Internment Camp and the women at the R. C. Convent.

SUMMARY

1. According to information obtained the Japanese first visited Kapit on the 30th January 1942 . . . and Sibu probabl[y] one or two days earlier. . . . Thus they did not arrive in Sibu until about five weeks after the Europeans (excepting R.C. personnel) had fled the town. Kanowit was first visited by Japanese on 30th January. . . . Althoug[h] Mr. Barcroft heard a rumour . . . on the 18th January to the effect that the Japanese had already landed in Sarikei. Mr. Morison learnt nothing of this when he returned to Sarikei on the 28th, but it is possible that isolated patrols did visit Sarikei before Sibu was taken over. A patrol landed at Oy[a] for an hour or so a few days before the 18th . . . an[d] Mukah was not visited by the enemy until 13th April 1942. . . .

2. After internment of the last party . . . on t[he] 20th May 1942, no Europeans remained in the Division, although Mr. Hudden may still have been travelling through . . . and there is always the possibility that some members of the Long Nawang party returned for a visit.

DOCUMENT 25

The Evacuation of the Borneo Company's (BCL) Staff from Sibu and the Rejang Timber Concession (R.T.C.)

W. McKerracher, "Report on proceedings before, landing up to and covering the evacuation of the Borneo Co.'s Staff from Sibu and the Rejang Timber Concession," 2 May 1942. Papers of Alan Griffin, Mss.Pac.8.109. RHL.

The arrangements had been to spend a fortnight in Singapore; but as conditions were, the writer [W. McKerracher, manager, BCL Sawmill at Salim] considered it a waste of time, and decided to return to Sarawak by the same boat on the Saturday (6th). Mr. [T. C.] Martine [BCL manager, Sarawak] arrived on Friday, 5th December [1941], and the evening was spent together in discussion, and he agreed that an immediate return would be advisable, so embarked at 7 a.m. on Saturday, 7th December. During the following Sunday night news of the Japanese entry into the war was received by Radio while at Sea; this proved to be the last sailing out[t] of Singapore for Sarawak.

On my return I found that Mr. [C. B.] Horn [BCL staff at Salim] was most anxious to get to Singapore, to enlist, and so made arrangement to release him—to return on the boat on which I had travelled. He however, decided to first go to Kuching, to attend to some personal matters, and also in case Mr. Martine might get across, and so travelled on the interport boat. He arrived in the Kuching river just in time to be in the first Jap air raid there, and found himself unable to get away. *Inter alia*: The final news the writer received of him, required [*sic*; acquired] later in Batavia, was that he was given a launch with 3 month's supply of food, and sent down to Point Perin, to act as "look-out" against invasion, and nothing further has been heard of him.

Events moved fast in the following days. After the fall of Miri, the raid on Kuching, followed by its fall, and with the receipt of your [H. D. Aplin, Sarawak government agent] cable to close

down Forest-working, the writer went up to *Kapit* on Sunday 21st to take over the Forest as [C. L.] Miles [BCL staff] was intensely eager to get out to enlist, and proposed to get out by a means we had previously planned, i.e., up the river and over the border through Dutch territories to Java, and so to Singapore. [P. C. V.] Cobbold [manager BCL, Sibul] and the writer had at that time . . . decided to remain.

However, the Japs bombed and machine-gunned from the [a]ir Sibul on Christmas Day (the writer being down there on Oil Dispersal business), and damage was pretty severe; no deaths or casualties of Europeans, all being confined to Asiatics. They paid us another call on Boxing Day, and with the reports of their boats entering the river *the native* population panicked, and took charge, breaking into and raiding all [government and BCL] Stores. The Police were under orders "not to shoot," and eventually themselves joined the raid on the Rice Stores etc. The Resident proposed to evacuate all Europeans in an endeavour to follow out our scheme—up the river and through Dutch Borneo etc., and as our own Government had ceased to exist, radioed Sir Shenton Thomas [British agent for Borneo and governor of the Straits Settlements] in Singapore, who replied "Do whatever you think best," and who must have (as events proved) contacted the Dutch Government asking them to expect and assist us. This they most splendidly did, and we have reason to be very very grateful to them for their help at a later date.

We had been using the M.V. Rejang to transport the bulk drums of fuel oil up to the [j]ungle at the back of the Mill and elsewhere, at various dispersal points, and during the Christmas Day raids she was at Sibul, uninjured, except for machine-gunning. Later she was brought up to a point about half a mile below the Mill, and for the evacuation it was arranged that she be brought down to pick up and transport the party, to leave at midnight as a[t] zero hour on December 26th, so as to enable all District Officers etc. down river who could get up in time to make it.

With the Japs coming up the river (reports had it that Sarikei

had already been occupied), it was not considered safe to wait longer. Those whose duties still delayed them were left to get up the best way they could, and the Government Launch "Betty," with the Sarawak Electricity Supply Launch "Anne" ["Ann"] were left for that purpose, together with our Launch "Karang Mas" at Salim for stragglers. All these eventually arrived at Kapit in time for the party to get away in "long-boats" at 8 a.m. on Sunday 28th.

Miles, hearing of the Christmas Day raid by radio, had dashed down river on Boxing Day, and to him was left the arranging of the boat-party. This entailed the purchase or acquisition of 5 more outboard engines, 40¼ gallon drums of Benzine (extra to the stocks we held, of which the Mill had 23 and the Forest [Department] 37), together with 40 bags of [r]ice, and 5 bags of [s]alt. The main party were to bring all the food stores they had, on the [M. V.] Rejang.

The rice was to pay wages to drivers, boatmen, and later to paddlers and bearers, who were all R.T.C. employees. The long-boats and engines (8 to start with) with the exception of one Government boat from Kapit were also all R.T.C., together with the [r]ice and [f]uel, so that it may be said that the whole party was carried as far as the Dutch [b]order in R.T.C. boats, fuel, labour and goodwill (this by the way because it would have been lost to us anyway).

The writer left the Mill at 7 a.m. on Saturday 27th (the Rejang having previously passed at 1 a.m. "black-out"), after having appointed a Committee consisting of the Mill Foreman, Dresser, Yard Foreman, Saw Doctor and Engine Driver, to control the issue of Rice and Food Stocks etc., enough being in stock to last them three months, and also arranging for the Armed Police Guard (which had been sent up to protect the Oil Fuel) also to guard the Food against raiding, pointing out that if they remained on their "ration amounts" they were safe for that time, and that they were much better staying in their "Quarters", and so generally making what provision for their welfare was possible. All essential papers were packed and brought away, only later to be

unfortunately lost in a capsizing in the Pelagus Rapids, when your correspondent lost everything he possessed.

The problem of demolition and sabotage of the Mill was a question very hard to decide. The only effective method was to fire it, and the danger in that was that it might spread over the whole station and put 200 odd people homeless, with a greater danger of attracting the Jap planes up river on the track of the retreating party, and so bringing about what was at that time our greatest risk, i.e., getting machine-gunned out of the water. This risk was with us continually for the first ten days, until we had got well above the Balaga [Belaga] Rapids, so it was eventually decided to leave the Mill intact.

One was tempted at times to remain, but no good could have come of it, for one could not have run the Mill (except for the Japs). Then too there was no means of getting wages for the employees, in fact they were not paid as it was, for the current month, cash being unobtainable in Sibul. That is, however, not a cause for worry, because they had in almost every case had advances up to and in a few cases beyond that was due to them.

The Cashier had only \$73 in hand, which was left, and I.O.U.'s were given to the coolies for the amounts due to them less the advances, and this had some small reassuring effect. There was \$600 in the safe, which the writer brought away with him, but which was lost with all his other stuff in Pelagus Rapids on the following Sunday. . . .

DOCUMENT 26

The Fall of Miri, 16 December 1941

J. L. Noakes, "Report upon Defence Measures Adopted in Sarawak from June 1941 to the Occupation in December 1941 by Imperial Japanese Forces; Also an Account of the Movement of British and Sarawak Military Forces during the Japanese Invasion

of Sarawak," 15 February 1946. MSS Pac.s.62. RHL. Section XVII, pp. 31-32.

1. In the early hours of the morning of the 16th December 1941 a strong Japanese Naval force arrived off the coast. At the time the Miri coast was experiencing one of the worst gales ever recorded in that locality, but strong Japanese military forces were landed in flat-bottomed barges at various points along the coast from Seria to Baram. The seas were rough and heavy rain reduced visibility to a minimum and reports indicate that Japanese losses from drowning were considerable. The landings were a complete surprise and successful occupation was carried out immediately after dawn. No resistance was offered except at Tanjong Lobang, where the light-house keeper killed two Japanese before suffering the same fate himself, and possibly at Lutong, where it is rumoured that a Sikh policeman was shot.

2. At 5.35 a.m. the General Manager, Sarawak Oilfields Ltd. telephoned from his office to Mr. R. L. Daubeney, the Resident, to say that the District Officer, Belait (Mr. R. N. Turner) had just informed him by telephone that Japanese were said to be in Belait and he, the District Officer, would telephone again, if possible. The Resident prepared to leave the house at 5.55 a.m. and telephoned the information received to the Assistant [*sic*; Deputy] Secretary for Defence [E. H. Elam], who decided to go at once to the office to destroy the contents of his safe. However, a few minutes later it was seen that the European homes were surrounded by Japanese soldiers.

3. At 6 a.m. Messrs. R. L. Daubeney, D. R. Lascelles, N. A. Lucas, R. J. Bettison and J. F. Drake-Brockman were arrested in their homes at Tanjong Lobang. Mr. Bettison was forced by the Japanese to drive a Sarawak Oilfields Ltd. tool truck to Lutong and then back to the Government offices and the Borneo Company Limited Store to investigate looting by Japanese soldiers. The others were taken to the Government offices, where they were joined by Mr. W. Phillips and Rev. Father Jansen, and at 10 o'clock by Mr. Bettison. Late afternoon they were taken to the jail and the next morning were cross examined and finally interned in Father Jansen's house. . . .

4. Mr. [B. B.] Parry [honorary appointment as 2nd lieutenant,

Sarawak Volunteers, Miri Corps] escaped. His car was seen by the Tanjong Lobang party at 6.30 a.m. abandoned on the main road outside his house.¹² . . .

5. Kuching received a wireless message at 7.30 a.m. on the 16th from the Miri wireless operator, as follows: "Wait! something happening here." . . . The same day, and at several times later, the operator at the look-out post at Kuala Baram wirelessly information to Kuching . . . Messages from the Resident, Brunei, also on the 16th, confirmed the Japanese occupation of the Oilfields.

6. The Japanese are said to have landed 10,000 troops on the oilfields within a few hours. They met no opposition but the storm raging at the time must have taken heavy toll of their early landing parties. Their occupation was successful, but they took over oilfields so completely wrecked that an enormous amount of work and material would be required before the fields could become of any oil-producing value again. However, there were certain comparatively minor omissions from denial, as follows:

(a) Practically the whole Sarawak Oilfields Ltd. fleet of eight launches, four lighters, four motor tonkangs, one full loading vessel named the "Tiong" of about 200 tons, and cargo boats "Angus" and "Burong," each of about 200 tons, fell into Japanese hands. It had been intended to send these vessels to Kuching but unavoidable delay resulted in their capture, as the surprise occupation of Miri allowed no time to destroy the vessels.

(b) A large number of Sarawak Oilfields Ltd. motor vehicles fell into Japanese hands. It is true that many of these had been immobilised but as the Sarawak Oilfields Ltd. garages held spare parts it was only a matter of minutes for the Japanese to induce the Asiatic garage hands to fit new parts.

(c) The Japanese found the Lutong ferry in good running order.

7. The surprise arrest of the European Government officials was so complete that all confidential documents, including codes and cyphers and currency amounting to \$80,000 were found undisturbed by the Japanese. Fortunately the codes and cyphers were of little use to them, particularly as the safe containing them was not opened by the Japanese until [?] and the Secretary for Defence had taken precautionary action by that time. . . .

DOCUMENT 27

The Voyage of the Shinai, Maimuna, and Lipis from Miri to Kuching

J. L. Noakes, "Report upon Defence Measures Adopted in Sarawak from June 1941 to the Occupation in December 1941 by Imperial Japanese Forces; Also an Account of the Movement of British and Sarawak Military Forces during the Japanese Invasion of Sarawak," 15 February 1946. MSS Pac.s.62. RHL. Section XVIII, pp. 33-34.

1. Evacuees were distributed amongst the three ships, as follows:

- | | |
|-----------|--|
| "SHINAI" | Acting Captain J. H. C. Brown, Sergeant-Major Blayford and twelve European Sarawak Oilfields Ltd. employees who were Volunteers, and armed. |
| "MAIMUNA" | Mr. Cunningham-Perdriau and 24 men of the Straits Settlements Police, a Punjabi signalling party and approximately 100 Sarawak Rangers and Police with their families of approximately 150 persons. |
| "LIPIS" | Lt. [W. St. P. M.] Hancock and six Royal Engineers, Lt. [G. G.] Withers and 20 Loyals, Captain [J. R.] Asher and 61 Royal Artillery, 44 Sarawak Oilfields Ltd. employees, Major W. Slatter, 2nd Lt. [D. A.] Hodges and a number of Punjabis, Sergeant-Major J. Axon of the Brunei Volunteers and one Japanese internee named Sasuki. |

2. "SHINAI" left Miri at 9 p.m. on the 13th and stood well out to sea. "Maimuna" followed at midnight and "Lipis" left at 2 a.m. on the 14th. "Shinai" stood well out to sea and made her way independently of the other two vessels. "Maimuna" kept well inshore, with the "Lipis" further out but always in sight.

3. On the 14th at 11.45 a.m. a low-flying light, twin-engined Japanese bomber approached "Lipis" and passed without attacking. The plane then turned and attacked from astern, dropping three

bombs, all of which missed the ship as the Captain changed direction. The bombs must have been light because they did no damage though the first exploded fifteen yards astern, the second five yards to starboard amidships and the third twenty yards ahead. The plane then turned again and, flying very low, raked the ship with machine gun fire. By this time two Lewis Guns and six Bren Guns had been manned and they returned the fire. Two more attacks were made by the plane and then she made off, flying towards "Maimuna," but she was not seen to attack that vessel. The two Lewis guns were operated by Major Slatter and 2nd Lt. Hodges respectively. Both officers, with their men, were in very exposed positions, the first on the monkey-island above the bridge and the second on the stern poop deck. Major Slatter and Lt. Hodges' Assistant, L. Naik Muhd. [and] Akbar Khan were killed instantly. Another sepoy [Indian soldier] died of wounds that evening and all three were buried at sea. The Master of the "Lipis," Captain Jones, was wounded and his place was most ably taken by Chief Officer Parry Thomas. The company suffered 28 other casualties, some very serious, making 2 killed, one died of wounds and 29 wounded in all. Fortunately there were two Sarawak Oilfields Ltd. doctors on board to attend to the wounded.

4. From the nature of some of the wounds and marks on the ships there is reason to suppose that the plane used small cannon as well as machine guns. The wireless aerial was shot away but this was soon repaired by Mr. [T. F.] Jefferson, of the Sarawak Oilfields, Ltd. Otherwise the ship suffered no material damage and was able to proceed to Kuching. . . .

5. "Maimuna" was not actually attacked but the plane came near enough for military personnel to fire on her, unfortunately without any visible success.

6. Meantime, "Shinai" was having trouble also. At about 11.45 a.m. (Sarawak Time), a low-flying, twin-engined Japanese bomber circled the ship and then vanished. A few minutes later she returned and dropped a small stick of bombs, flying from port to starboard. These dropped harmlessly about 30 yards away on the port side. The plane returned to the attack three times, each time dropping a single bomb, but always missing. After the last attack she turned quickly and poured one short burst of machine gun fire

into the ship. No damage was done to the ship and one policeman received a small flesh wound. Machine guns and rifles on "Shinai" fired on the plane at each attack but no visible damage was done to her. The attack created considerable confusion on board "Shinai" among the very nervous crew. After the first bombs had been dropped the European engineers are said to have shut off steam and rushed on deck. The Second Engineer attempted to release the port lifeboat by cutting the ropes with an axe, but the Volunteers, on the orders of Lt. [Acting Captain] Brown, cleared engineers and crew from the decks and drove most of them below. Though steam was cut off the ship had sufficient way on to proceed while being attacked and the Captain himself took the wheel.

7. "Shinai" is said by Captain Walker to have arrived off Tanjong Po at 3.30 a.m. on the 15th and she remained there until 10 a.m. on the 16th when a pilot came on board and conducted the ship up to Pending. As "Shinai" entered at Muara Tebas, a Japanese plane flew across the ship three times at a height of about 5,000 feet, dropping one bomb each time, but again no damage was done though the nearest bomb fell about twenty yards from the ship. As the bomber was taking up position for the fourth attack, two Dutch fighters appeared at low level and thereupon the bomber disappeared. On this occasion the engineers and crew are said to have conducted themselves satisfactorily.

8. Captain Walker is indignant because of the delay in sending a pilot to bring his vessel in. . . .

DOCUMENT 28

Europeans in the Fourth Division on the Run

J. L. Noakes, "Report upon Defence Measures Adopted in Sarawak from June 1941 to the Occupation in December 1941 by Imperial Japanese Forces; Also an Account of the Movement of British and Sarawak Military Forces during the Japanese Invasion of Sarawak," 15 February 1946. MSS Pac.s.62. RHL. Section XXV, pp. 101-7.

A. Summary of Information Relating to the Fourth Division

1. . . . Internment of Japanese nationals at Mir[i] on 8th December 1941.
2. . . . Permanent Denial of Miri and Seria Oilfields commenced on 8th December 1941.
3. . . . Evacuation of Civilians from Miri.
4. . . . Account of the Permanent Denial of Miri Oilfields, Lutong Refinery and the Miri Landing Ground.
5. . . . The Japanese Occupation of Miri on 16th December 1941.
- . . . Internment of Messrs. Daubeney, Lasel [Lascelles], Lucas, Bettiso[n], Drake-Brockman and Phillips, and Father Jansen.

MR. PARRY'S ESCAPE.

6. . . . paras 1-3. Evacuation of Sarawak Oilfields Lt[d] personnel and Military Forces from Miri on 13th December 1941.
7. . . . Wireless reports from Miri and Kuala Baram of Japanese invasion on, and after, 16th December 1941.
8. . . . Bombing by Dutch of Miri between 17th and 28th. Forced landing of a Dutch bomber at Marudi on 17th[.] Death of two of the occupants and escape of three others wit[h] Father Feldbrugge.
9. . . . Dutch bomber shot down over Miri on [19th] escape of the pilot, his meeting with Mr. Parry (and probabl[y] Mr. Hudden later) and their escape to the interior.
10. . . . Effort made by District Officer, Bintul[u] (Mr. Outram) to obtain information regarding the fate of Miri Europeans.
11. . . . Arrival of Lieut. Greeneveldt, Flying Officer Brassechers, Sgt. Pilot Holm, Wireless Operator Reen, Messrs. Parry and Hudden and Father Feldbrugge at Long Nawang on about 16th February 1942.
12. . . . Arrival of Mrs. Coldman and Messrs. Coldman, Avery and Outram in Belaga on 13th January 1942.
13. . . . Departure of Mr. Hudden from Long Nawang for Sarawak on 13th February 1942.
14. . . . Movements of Mr. Outram in the Third Division from 12th January 1942 his internment in "Zaida" on 24th April 1942.

15. . . . Return of Mr. Avery to Bintulu on 16th February 1942.
16. . . . Reference to Mr. and Mrs. Coldman up to their return to Bintulu on 13th March 1942.

B. Bintulu Events and Movements of Bintulu Europeans until interned in Kuching

1. The following Europeans were living in Bintulu on the 16th December 1941:

Outram, J. R.	District Officer.
Avery, W. H.	Assistant, Chicle Development C[o]
Coldman, E. J.	Manager, Chicle Development Co.
Coldman, Mrs. E. J.	

2. Mr. Outram learnt of the certain capture of the Miri Europeans on 24th December 1941, in a message from the Native Officer, Niah. . . . During the period 1[8]-24th December there was much aerial activity over Bintulu, n[o] doubt due to the fact that the village lay along the route used by Allied planes stationed at Singkawang II Aerodrome to attac[k] the Japanese at Miri.

3. At 3.30 p.m. on the 25th December, seven Japanese planes dropped nine bombs on Bintulu. Little damage was done and the[re] were no casualties. Bintulu, of course, was an open town. Thi[s] unprovoked bombing caused panic in the bazaar and kampongs and all the people fled. Some junior staff of the Government fled also. One Francis Lim, suspected of pro-Japanese tendencies [was] warned by the District Officer for encouraging panic.

4. On the 27th the District Officer of Mukah, Mr. Barcroft . . . enquired regarding Mr. Outram's intentions and was informed that Mr. Outram would remain in charge of Bintulu.

5. Between 26th and 28th the Native Officers of Bintulu asked Mr. Outram to leave, for their own safety as well as his, as t[hey] feared Japanese attacks so long as Europeans remained with them[.] On the 28th reports were received of ill treatment by the Japanese of Europeans at Miri and thereupon the Asiatic population begged the Europeans to leave the District. At a meeting held

on that day it was decided that the Europeans would leave for the interior on the 29th.

6. Mr. Outram, in common with other Government Officers in charge of Districts, was under orders to remain at his post . . . It would appear that he had every intention to do so, but a direct request from the people for [him] to leave was an eventuality that the Chief Secretary, who gave the order, could not have foreseen. The writer knows that the Chief Secretary was perfectly satisfied with Mr. Outram's explanation when they met later in internment.

7. The party (three men and one woman) left at 4 [p].m. on the 28th for Belaga. In the Ulu Tubau Mr. Outram received a message from Messrs. Reid and Jacks . . . to the effect that the Third Division Europeans were leaving and the Bintulu Europeans should follow rapidly. The party arrived at Belaga on the 12th January 1942. Mr. Outram was finally interned at Kuching on 26th April 1942 . . . Mr. Avery returned to Bintulu on the 16th February 1942 and Mr. and Mrs. Coldman followed on the 13th March 1942.

8. When Mr. Avery arrived he was detained by the Native Officer (Awang Abil) and sent to Miri where he was lodged in Mr. Cargill's house on the peninsula, from the 21st February to the 4th March. On the last date he was sent to Bintulu by Japanese with orders to ship to Miri all jelutong [wild rubber] stocks held by his Company. The cargo was carried in Japanese fishing boats. On the 22nd May 1942, his work completed, he and Mr. Coldman were taken to Miri and interned with the other European[s] . . . on the 23rd. . . .

9. Mr. and Mrs. Coldman were promptly confined to their house, under guard, upon their return on the 13th March 1942. Both were taken to Miri on about the 20th and lodged in a house for about a week. They were interrogated and returned to Bintulu, where they were kept under supervision in their house until Mr. Coldman was taken off for the last time in 22nd May. . . .

10. Mrs. Coldman was left alone in her house in Bintulu, under supervision, but with no servants and no guarantee of safety. Whe[n] Mr. Coldman was taken to Kuching he frequently requested the Camp Commandant to have the lady brought in and after much delay she arrived, on the 22nd July 1942, and was interned at once in Batu Lintang Internment Camp.

THE MIRI INTERNEES

1. Europeans living at Miri on the 16th December 1941 were as follows:

Bettison, R. J.	Trade and Customs Department.
Daubeny, R. L.	Resident, Fourth Division.
Drake-Brookman, J. F.	Cadet
Jansen, Revd. Father H.	R. C. Mission.
Lascell[es], D. R.	Assistant Secretary for Defence. District Officer, Naval Reporting Officer, etc.
Lucas, N. A.	Borneo Company Limited.
Parry, B. B.	Manager, Sarawak Oilfields, Limited.
Phillips, W.	Sarawak Constabulary.

2. Mr. Parry was not interned. He escaped to Long Nawang.¹¹

4. On the 24th December all the Internees were moved to clerks' quarters near Father Jansen's house and that same day seven more prisoners arrived from Brunei. They were:

Bomphrey, E.	Manager, Island Trading C. Ltd.,
Coghill, J. K. B.	Planter, Brunei.
Cook, J.	Malayan Agricultural Service,
Graham, Dr. G. M.	Malayan Medical Service,
Martin, W.	Malayan Police Service,
Paterson, A. B.	Malayan Public Works,
Pengilley, E. E.	Resident, Brunei, Malayan Civil Service.

5. On the 17th, 18th and 19th, 20th and 28th the Internees witnessed attacks by Dutch bombers on Japanese shipping. One Dutch bomber was seen shot down on the 19th and it was thought that the occupants escaped by parachute. They did, in fact, escape.

6. On the 28th December all Internees were moved to the Midfield Club and on the 30th Messrs. Bomphrey and Coghill and Dr. Graham were taken back to Brunei and released.

7. On the 7th January 1942 the following three Europeans were brought in from Kuala Belait in Brunei:

Bryant, K. H.	Malayan Forest Service,
Crowther, Father A. A.	R.C. Mission, Kuala Belait,
Turner, R. N.	Assistant Resident, Brunei and District Officer, Kuala Belait.

These men were arrested on the 16th January 1941, at Kuala Belait when the Japanese landed.

8. From the 16th December 1941 to the 9th January 1942, the Japanese did not supply their prisoners with food, but they were able to purchase a little with the limited funds in their possession. On the 9th January flour was supplied and on the 19th they were given rice, flour and an allowance of ten dollars per person per month. An Asiatic cook, his salary paid by the Japanese was allowed to cook for them from the 19th January to 23rd May. On the 28th March the Japanese arranged that each Internee should be paid the equivalent of twenty-five cents per day in food, but on the 25th May all Internees were subjected to forced labour, cutting grass and working on the roads, and all previous monetary arrangements were cancelled. Instead, the Internees were paid at the rate of twenty-five cents for a four hour working day. They never saw the money as they were paid by the Japanese equivalent in food. High food prices and scarcity of food prevailed (or so the Japanese said) and the prisoners suffered severely from lack of food and unbalanced diet. Despite protests, the Japanese took no steps to improve conditions.

9. On the 27th April 1942 the fourteen Internees were transferred[d] from the Midfield Club to a Sarawak Oilfields Limited house (occupied formerly by Mr. F. Clark) on the Miri Peninsula. Messrs Avery and Coldman joined them on the 23rd May from Bintulu. . . .

10. All Internees were placed on board a Japanese ship (No. 82) on the 4th June 1942 and taken to Kuching. They arrived at Padungan Internment Camp on the night of the [7]th June. The members of the party were as follows:

Avery, W. H.	Jansen, Father H.
Bettison, R. J.	Lascelles, D. R.
Bryant, K. H.	Lucas, N. A.
Coldman, E. J.	Martin, W.

Cook, J.
Crowther, Father A. A.
Daubeny, R. L.
Drake-Brockman, J. F.

Paterson, A. B.
Pengilley, E. E.
Phillips, W.
Turner, R. N.

THE MARUDI (BARAM) EUROPEANS

1. The Europeans living at Marudi (on the Baram River) on the 16th December 1941, were as follows:

Feldbrugge, Revd. Father,	Marudi R. C. Mission,
Hudden, D. C.	District Officer, Marudi,
O'Brien, Revd. Father, H. C.	Marudi R.C. Mission.

2. . . . Father Feldbrugge led the remaining three airmen¹⁴ to Long Linai at 9 p.m. on the 17th December 1941 and 1 p.m. on the 18th Father O'Brien left Marudi and joined them at Long Linai. On the 20th Father O'Brien went to Buoya Ajang's house in the Apoh River, where he procured rice and other supplies and brought them down to Long Apoh to rejoin his friends who had moved to this place meantime.

REVD. FATHER H. C. O'BRIEN

3. Father O'Brien left his four companions and went back to Long Linai to await news. On the 25th December a message arrived from Mr. Hudden stating that he had gone up the river Tinjar, probably on about 21st, though no date was given. On the 26th December Father O'Brien learnt that the Japanese had landed at Marudi, so he left the next day and arrived at Tama Tingang Malang at 9 a.m. on the 27th. He pushed on to the Apoh River the same day an[d] at 7 p.m. on the 28th, rejoined Father Feldbrugge's party. The following two days the party of five travelled on foot and by boat to Sungai Pata, arriving on the 30th. On the 1st January 1942 Father O'Brien's four companions went downriver and he spent the next five days looking for a path to the Kelabit country to the east. When he went downriver he found that the party of four had gone on and he never saw any of them again. These men—Father Feldbrugge, Flying Officer Brassechers, Sgt. Pilot Holm and

Wireless Operator Reen are known to have reached Long Nawang in Dutch Borneo with Mr. Hudden's party . . . on about 6th February 1942. . . .

4. At Long Ikan (or Long Akah) Father O'Brien heard that Mr. Hudden and two Europeans had walked from Ulu Tinja[r] to Ulu Julau and then proceeded upriver and called a meeting of native headmen to decide where Mr. Hudden should hide when he returned to Sarawak after taking his friends to Dutch Borneo. Later, on about 12th January 1942, Father O'Brien heard that Mr. Hudden's friends were Mr. Parry and a Dutch Parachutist. . . .

5. Father O'Brien reached Sungai Moh on about 16th January 1942, and learnt that Father Feldbrugge's and Mr. Hudden's parties had joined (making seven men in all), that they were about two days travelling upriver and that they were making for Long Nawang in Dutch Borneo.

6. Father O'Brien had left instructions downriver that any Europeans coming up should be told to join him in the Kelabit Country, so he felt he should go to that area. Accordingly he went upriver to Sungai Selangau, proceeded up this river and reached first Kelabit house. After resting, he went on to Penghulu Rajah King's house, where he learnt that soon there might be news from Marudi. At the end of two weeks of waiting, a message was received to the effect that the Japanese knew his whereabouts. Father O'Brien disbelieved the message, but as he felt he was not wanted he left on about the 12th February 1942 and arrived at Fa Bawang, in Dutch Borneo, on about 17th. There he met one Curu Harris and Tuan Agong (Singal), the Dutch Native Officer in Charge of Fa Bawang.

7. Father O'Brien next moved on to Long Berang. On this last lap he was carried by natives for six days as a very bad ulcer had developed in one leg. At Long Berang there were over one hundred mixed Dutch troops, commanded by Captain Avers. They were refugees from T[a]rakan. He also met Flying Officer Bowers, District Officer Sprout, an American Missionary named Willfinger . . . and a Dutch nurse. The soldiers were in a deplorable state, having suffered greatly during the Terakan operations and in the subsequent retreat to Long Berang. When Java capitulated to the Japanese on about 9th March 1942, th[e] Dutch flew a white flag, so Father O'Brien left for Sarawak.

8. On 17th March he fell in with Mr. Willis, a planter of Brunei . . . at Long Simpayang in Dutch Borneo. Together they crossed into the Bah Country of the Ulu Trusan and thence to the Limbang River and the Ulu Madahit, arriving on 14th April and staying the night in Pon Tamid's house. Here they heard a rumour that Mr. Hudden had been killed[,] but rumours of his death will be dealt with later, in para 14.

9. On the 15th April the two refugees went to Aror Linoh, where they found Mr. and Mrs. Bewsher. Mr. Mrs. and Miss De L. Clifford, and Mr. Montgomery . . . Father O'Brien stayed here till 20th June when he tried to reach another camp, but was forced back by bad weather on the 23rd. He left again on 1st July and slept that night at Pon Tamid's house . . . He heard again that a European had been killed in the Ulu Baram. Taking a guide, he pushed on to Mr. Southwell's house, arriving on the 7th July to find Mr. and Mrs. Southwell, Mr. Anderson and Mr. Willfinger from Long Berang . . . in occupation. Father O'Brien's guide told Mr. Willfinger in confidence that the European victim in the Ulu Baram was Mr. Hudden.

10. On the 8th July Father O'Brien and Mrs. Anderson went on to Mr. Davidson's house at Fa Berayong in the Ulu Trusan. They arrived on the 12th July and found six Europeans settled there. . . .

11. Mr. Davidson questioned Father O'Brien's carrier and formed the opinion that there was no doubt but that Mr. Hudden had returned to the Kelabit Country, had stayed in a "sulap" between the houses of Penghulu Miri and Penghulu Rajah King, and had been killed by four natives, probably Dayaks.

12. Mrs. Anderson remained with the Davidsons and Father O'Brien left on the 14th July and arrived back at Aror Linoh on the 20th. He was arrested on 26th July . . .

DOCUMENT 29

Europeans in the Fifth Division on the Run

J. L. Noakes, "Report upon Defence Measures Adopted in Sarawak from June 1941 to the Occupation in December 1941 by Impe-

rial Japanese Forces; Also an Account of the Movement of British and Sarawak Military Forces during the Japanese Invasion of Sarawak," 15 February 1946. MSS Pac.s.62. RHL. Section XXVI, pp. 108-12.

A. Summary of previously recorded events relating to the Fifth Division

1. . . . Limbang asked by Kuching on 16th December 1941, to assist in wireless link to Marudi.

2. . . . On 19th December 1941, the Secretary for Defence informed by Resident (Mr. J. [G.] Anderson) Fifth Division, that the Japanese were expected at Limbang that night. (They did not arrive until 31st).

3. . . . Movements of Father O'Brien, Mr. Willis and Mr. Anderson in Fifth Division.

B. Europeans in the Fifth Division on 16th December 1941

AT LIMBANG

Anderson, J. G.	Resident, Fifth Division
Anderson, Mrs. J. G.	
Montgomery, J. S.	Managing Director, Limbang Estates, Ltd.

AT LIMPASONG, LIMBANG

Bewsher, R. A.	Missionary, Borneo Evangelical Mission
Bewsher, Mrs. R. A.	
Southwell, C. H.	Missionary, Borneo Evangelical Mission
Southwell, Mrs. C. H.	
White, J. T.	

AT LAWAS

Colina, A. G.	Sawmill Owner, Va[m]co Timber Co.
Colina, Mrs. A. G.	
Colina, Miss F. S.	
McLaren, J. S.	Manager, Lawas Estates, Ltd.

AT TRUSAN

Davidson, F. T.	Missionary, Borneo Evangelical Mission
Morcambe, B. M.	Missionary, Borneo Evangelical Mission

C. The Japanese Occupation of Limbang and Internment of Mr. J. G. Anderson.

1. On the 16th December 1941, the Limbang Wireless Station intercepted a Kuala Baram message to Kuching to the effect that there were Japanese naval vessels off Miri, Lutong and Kuala Belait. Subsequent intercepted messages assured Mr. Anderson that the Japanese had landed along the coast. On the 18th [h]e heard that the Japanese were massing troops at Tutong in Brunei, and on the 19th he was informed that they were at Temburong and would be at Limbang that night. (This last message was proved later to be false). Mr. Anderson destroyed all confidential papers and exchanged final telegrams with the Secretary for Defence. From that time he did not have any further communication with Kuching.

2. On the 18th December, Mr. Bewsher, Mr. and Mrs. Southwell and Mr. White were at Limbang. That same day Mr. White went to Trusan, en route for North Borneo, where he had a Mission station.

3. On the 19th December, Mr. Bewsher, Mr[.] and Mrs. Southwell and Mrs. Anderson, went to Limpasong, above Limbang. Mr. Southwell and Mrs. Anderson again visited Limbang on the 20th and returned the next day. On the 22nd Mr. Bewsher went to Limbang and stayed the night with Mr. Anderson, assisting him with certain duties.

4. On the 23rd December, Mr[.] Mrs. and Miss De L. Clifford of Brunei, arrived and went to Limpasong with Messrs. Bewsher and Montgomery.

5. One hour before the party . . . left a message arrived from Japanese in Brunei, ordering the two Brunei launches "Muara" and "Subok" to return to Brunei. Both launches returned.

6. On the 24th December, Mr. Anderson (the only European left in Limbang) heard reports of Japanese planes having machine-gunned European houses, the hospital and convent at Labuan.

7. On the 31st December, about 125 Japanese soldiers entered Limbang. They were accompanied by one Sato, a Japanese resident of Kuala Belait, who acted as interpreter. Mr. Anderson and the Native Officer (Abang Mustapha) were imprisoned, but the Native Officer was released the next day, when Mr. Anderson was taken a prisoner to Brunei.

8. Mr. Anderson was imprisoned in the Brunei Customs Godown. Dr. Graham, and Messrs. Coghill and Bomphrey, joined him on 3rd January 1942, from Miri . . . and Messrs. A.H.P. Humphrey (Resident, Labuan) and J. A. Henderson (P.W.D. Labuan) were brought in on the 4th.

9. On the 6th January 1942, all prisoners were taken to cells in the Police Station and Mr. J. G. Lawrie (Manager of the Labuan Cable and Wireless Station) and Mr. F. B. Giffening (a Brunei planter) joined them therein. Mr. Coghill, a subject of Eire, was released the same day. Dr. Graham was released on the 18th, while Mr. Bomphrey was allowed to live with Mr. Coghill from the 17th. On the 19th the remaining prisoners were taken to the Subok Company's house, but were returned to the Police Station on the 25th.

10. On the 8th February, Mr. Giffening was released and on the 14th Messrs. Lawrie and Henderson were returned to Labuan, leaving only Messrs. Anderson and Humphrey in the Jail.

11. Early in Mar[c]h the two Residents were asked if they would work for the Japanese. Both refused.

12. On the 20th May they were taken to quarters in the Doctor's house and on the 22nd June were transferred to Jessleton, via Labuan, arriving on the 23rd. Both were interned in the Batu Tiga Police Barracks, with 85 other Europeans.

13. On the 5th September, the Jessleton Internees were taken by ship to Kuching, picking up Mr. Bewsher's party . . . at Labuan. They arrived at the Batu Lintang Internment Camp on 9th September 1942.

D. The Bewsher, Southwell and Davidson Camps on the Interior of the Fifth Division.

THE BEWSHER CAMP AT AROR LINOH, ULU LIMBANG

1. . . . [N]ine Europeans were established at the Borneo Evangelical Mission at Limpasong, Limbang, on 22nd December 1941 as follows:

Anderson, Mrs. J. G.	Montgomery, J. S.
Bewsher, R. A.	Southwell, C. H.
Bewsher, Mrs. R. A.	Southwell, Mrs. C. H.
de L. Clifford, G.	
de L. Clifford, Mrs. G.	
de L. Clifford, Miss M. M. J.	

2. On the 26th December, the whole party departed from Limpasong. Mr. and Mrs. Bewsher arrived at Aror Linoh in Sungai Medihit (a tributary of the Limbang River) on 1st January 1942. The others reached Kuala Medihit on 4th January and moved later to Aror Linoh.

THE SOUTHWELL CAMP IN ULU TRUSAN

3. Mr. and Mrs. Southwell had always desired to return to Ulu Trusan and so, with the main party settled at Aror Linoh, they felt free to do so. Accordingly messages were sent to Ulu Trusan and 32 Muruts came across to take them over. On the 9th March Mr. and Mrs. Southwell and Mrs. Anderson left for Aror Linoh. They arrived in the true Ulu Trusan on the 19th March and here the Muruts supplied them with food, built them a house and begged them to stay indefinitely. The Southwells made this place their headquarters for six months.

THE DAVIDSON CAMP AT FA BERAYONG, ULU TRUSAN

4. On the 16th December 1941, Messrs. F. T. Davidson and B. M. Morcombe were together at the Borneo Evangelical Mission at Trusan. The Resident (Mr. Anderson) had asked Mr. Davidson to take care of Mrs. and Miss Colina of Lawas, so on that day he went by launch to Kuala Trusan, bringing the two ladies back with him to Trusan on the 18th.

5. On the 27th December, Messrs. Colina and McLaren joined the party at Trusan.

6. On the 28th December, the party learnt that the Japanese had gone to Temburong, so all six people left the same day for Ulu Trusan. That evening they were joined by Mr. G. P. Willis, a planter from Brunei. They arrived at Long Tengaoh on the 31st December and stayed five days in the jungle. On the 5th January 1942 they moved on to Sungai Suboi (a tributary of Sungai Tengaoh) and remained there until 10th February. Disturbing rumours were heard of Japanese coming up the river so they pushed on to Fa Berayong in Ulu Trusan, arriving on the 12th February. A camp was established some distance from the native village and the party moved in on the 28th February.

SUMMARY

7. By 10th March 1942 the following six persons were living at Aror Linoh:

Mr and Mrs. Bewsher, Mr. and Mrs. de L. Clifford, Miss de L. Clifford and Mr. Montgomery.

8. By the end of March 1942, Mr. and Mrs. Southwell and Mrs. Anderson were established in their camp in the true Ulu Trusan.

9. On the 28th February 1942, the following persons were living at Fa Berayong:

Mr. and Mrs. Colina, Miss Colina, and Messrs. Davidson, McLaren, Morcombe and Willis.

[E.] Movements of the Bewsher Party from 10th March 1942 to Internment in Kuching on 9th September 1942.

1. The party settled down to cultivate foodstuffs. Mr. Bewsher continued his missionary duties as far as it was possible to do so. Food, medical stores and clothing were plentiful, and there was no reason to fear a prolonged absence from civilisation.

2. Father O'Brien and Mr. Willis arrived on 15th April 1942. . . . The first named left for Mr. Southwell's camp on 1st July and returned on 20th.

3. A [D]ayak named Belulok visited the camp twice. He professed friendliness but was suspected to be in Japanese pay. A friendly Dayak named Kesa visited the camp early in June and informed Mr. Bewsher that the Japanese intended to be at Aror Linoh on the 16th, so preparations were made for internment, but the enemy did not arrive.

4. On 26th July 1942 the camp was surprised by 99 Dayaks under Belulok and 15 Japanese. The following day all the Europeans were taken under arrest to Brunei, arriving on the 29th. Here Mr. and Mrs. Bewsher, Mr. and Mrs. de L. Clifford, Miss de L. Clifford, Father O'Brien and Messrs. Montgomery and Willis were kept until 7th September, when they were taken to Labuan and embarked upon a Japanese vessel carrying 87 other internees from Jessleton. . . . They were interned at Batu Lintang Internment Camp at Kuching on 9th September 1942.

5. Previous to the Japanese Occupation, Mr. and Mrs. Bewsher cared for two native foster children (twins) named Dandi and Danis anak Tiong, who were orphans. These two boys accompanied Mrs. Bewsher into internment.

[F.] Movements of the Southwell Party from the 19th March 1942

1. Mr. and Mrs. Southwell and Mrs. Anderson were established in Ulu Trusan. They too were well supplied with food, medicines and clothing. They opened a school for 40 men and women, planted padi and vegetables, and continued missionary work among the nearby Muruts.

2. On the 30th May, Mr. J. F. Willfonger, a United States Missionary from Dutch Borneo, joined the party and remained until surrender was decided upon, when he returned to Dutch Borneo. . . . Mrs. Anderson left the Southwells with Father O'Brien on 8th July, but she returned on 11th August.

3. When news was received of the capture of the Bewsher party, the Muruts insisted that the Southwell party should remain hidden and huts were built in the jungle to which the party could retire when warned of danger by local scouts. As a part of the plan, the four Europeans moved a day's journey to Pa Matang in Dutch Borneo, where they stayed until mid-September.

4. On the 19th September 1942, a letter arrived from the Japanese authorities through Bigar, the Lawas Native Officer.

The letter contained a demand from the Japanese Military Authorities at Brunei for the surrender of the party. It also contained a Proclamation dated 30th July 1942, calling upon all Europeans in the Brunei hinterland to surrender and threatening severe punishment for all who assisted the Europeans in any way. The refugees considered that the threat to the native population was too serious to be ignored.

5. On 1st October 1942, Mr. and Mrs. Southwell and Mrs. Anderson left Ulu Trusan and joined the Davidson party of six . . . at Trusan. On the 11th October, all of them surrendered to the Japanese at Sundar. The following day they were taken to Brunei and imprisoned in the P.W.D. Bungalow. On 14th December 1942, they were conveyed overland to Miri, embarked on a vessel taken to Kuching and interned at Batu Lintang Internment Camp on 16th December 1942.

G. Movements of the Davidson Party from 28th February 1942 to Internment in Kuching on 16th December 1942.

1. The Davidson party of seven members was established at Fa Berayong in Ulu Trusan by 28th February 1942. Here again, they [*sic*; there] were plentiful supplies of food, medicines and clothing. The two Missionaries, Messrs. Davidson and Morcombe, continued to work among the natives and at one time they were away

travelling for about five weeks. All the Europeans helped to cultivate padi and vegetables to conserve food stocks.

2. Mr. Willis left on the 7th March and travelled to the Dutch Border where he met Father O'Brien on the 17th March. They returned together to Mr. Bewsher's camp . . . and Mr. Willis was captured in the Bewsher party. . . .

3. During the period under review there were no disturbances in the surrounding district, though there were numerous rumours of Dayak atrocities elsewhere. Messrs. Davidson and Morcombe desired at one time during their travels . . . to cross to Ulu Baram, but the natives feared to go and refused to take them.

4. Father O'Brien and Mrs. Anderson arrived from Aror Linoh on the 12th July. . . . Father O'Brien returned on the 20th July and Mrs. Anderson went back to rejoin the Southwells on 11th August.

. . .

5. Bigar, the Dayak Native Officer at Lawas . . . visited the camp twice—once on 15th July on his way upriver and once on 31st July on his return. He brought gifts for Mrs. Anderson[.]

6. On the 29th July the party moved to a new camp at Long Berayong[.] News was received on the 2nd August of the capture of the Bewsher Party. On 10th August the party moved at night to a "sulap" about two hours travelling from the camp.

7. On the 14th September 1942 an ultimatum similar to that received by the Southwell Party . . . arrived for this party. A letter also came from Mr. Bewsher, urging surrender.

8. It appeared that the wisest course lay in surrender so they returned to their camp on the 16th September and on [15th] October left for Sundar escorted by native police who had come up from Lawas to collect them.

9. Mr. and Mrs. Colina, Miss Colina and Messrs. Davidson, Morcombe and McLaren thus joined the Southwell party at Trusan. . . .

DOCUMENT 30

Evacuation of Sarawak European Civilians from Pontianak

J. L. Noakes, "Report upon Defence Measures Adopted in Sarawak from June 1941 to the Occupation in December 1941 by Impe-

rial Japanese Forces; Also an Account of the Movement of British and Sarawak Military Forces during the Japanese Invasion of Sarawak," 15 February 1946. MSS Pac.s.62. RHL. Section XXI, pp. 78-82.

A. Europeans from the Second and Third Divisions

1. It is necessary to pass to the Second and Third Divisions in order to summarise the evacuation of Sarawak civilians from Pontianak.

2. A party of women and 6 children, in [the] charge of Revd. Father J. Paisley of the S.P.G. Mission, left Kuching on the 21st December 1941 and arrived at Simanggang on the same day. . . . It left Simanggang on the 27th and proceeded overland, via Lubok Antu, Se[m]litau and Sentang to Pontianak, arriving on 4th January 1942.

3. Miss E. Andrews of the S.P.G. Mission at Betong was induced to leave on the 30th December 1941. This lady followed the route of the aforementioned party and arrived at Pontianak on the 8th January.

4. On the 26th December 1941, a party consisting of Messrs. W. S. B. Buck, W. G. Morison, C. B. Murray and L. P. Moscrop and Father C. Quaddeker (of the Sarikei R. C. Mission) left Sarikei for Selalang, where they were joined by Mr. R. D. Bland of the Island Trading Company, Ltd. The party arrived at Roban on the 29th. Mr. F. B. K. Drake, District Officer of Saratok, was telephoned and joined later in the day at the station. The Resident gave Mr. Drake permission to leave and the party went on to Debak, arriving on the 30th. Continuing, it arrived at Engkilili on 3rd January 1942, and at Lubok Antu on the 5th, where it was met by a party of Sarawak Government officers consisting of Messrs. Arundell, A. J. N. Richards, A. E. A. Edwards, B. A. Reeves, W. O. Jongklass and A. R. Snelus, some of them had been there for several days in consultation with Dutch officials. . . .

5. On the 6th January 1942, the following members of the party assembled at Lubok Antu and proceeded to Pontianak via Se[m]litau and Sentang:—Messrs. Buck, Bland, Drake, Edwards, Moscrop and Reeves and Father Quaddeker. They arrived on the 8th.

B. Europeans from Sarawak assembled at Pontianak

1. The last evacuees arrived in Pontianak on the 8th January 1942. The following is a list of all European Civilians from Sarawak:

EUROPEAN CIVILIANS FROM SARAWAK: —

Adams, J.	Leaman, T. C.
Andrews, Miss E.	Myles, G. T.
Bates, G. T.	Martine, Mrs. and infant
Bates, Miss E.	Mercer, Mrs. B. A. M.
Bates, Miss M.	Moscrop, L. P.
Bland, R. D.	Munro, Mrs. T. J. C. and two infants
Bonheim, Mrs. E.	Murray, C. B.
Bonheim, Master P.	Olver, Miss A. A.
Buck, W. S. B.	Paisley, Father J.
Cargill, Mrs. J. K. and infant	Paisley, Mrs. J. and two infants
Cargill, J. K.	Parker, T. E.
Chater, R. W.	Phillips, W. F.
Chater, W. J.	Pemberton
Corbin, C.	Quaddeker, Father C.
Corbin, Mrs. C.	Reeves, B. A.
Drake, F. B. K.	Sargent, G.
Edwards, A. E. A.	Thackwell-Lewis, H.
Elam, Mrs. H.E.H. and infant	Trail, Mrs.
Houghton, Miss K.	Trechman, B. A.
Hume, P.	Woodgate, W. J.
Kelley, Mrs. W. H.	Wright, F. H.
Large, Mrs. R. W.	

There were, in addition, Messrs. Henley-Joy and Searle, and two others, all from the Naval Direction Finding Station in Kuching. . . .

2. Messrs. Adams Pemberton

x Bayram	Sargent
Hume	x Strath-Wyhte

x Kent x Woodliffe
 Leaman Woodgate

left Pontianak on s.s. KHOON KHOEA on the 27th January 1942 and arrived in Batavia on the 31st. They were evacuated from Java by BATAVIA PETROLEUM MAAT-SCHIPI [*sic*; MAAT-SCHAPPI] about mid-February, to an unknown destination.

(x indicates Commissions in the Sarawak Rangers)

3. Miss Andrews, Mrs. Kelley, Mrs. Large and Mrs. Martine and infant left Pontianak by 'plane for Batavia on about the 14th January 1942. Miss Andrews was not evacuated to Australia with the others about mid-February; this lady took a post as governess and subsequently was interned in Java.

4. Mr. Bates and his two daughters left Pontianak on s.s. KHOON KHOEA on 27th January 1941 and arrived in Batavia on the 31st. Mr. Bates (and probably his daughters) was interned at Bandoeng, Java.

5. Messrs. Bland and Phillips left for Batavia on s.s. KHOON KHOEA as above. Both obtained commissions as Engineer Officers in the Royal Navy and were posted to a depot ship. They left Java in mid-February for an unknown destination.

6. Mrs. Bonheim and Master Bonheim, Mesdames Corbin, Elam and infant, Mercer, Munro and two infants, Trail and Paisley and two infants, and Miss Houghton and Olver, left for Batavia on s.s. KHOON KHOEA on 27th Dec. as above. All but the Bonheims were evacuated to Australia in mid-February. It is believed that Mrs. Bonheim and her son were refused passages and subsequently were interned in Batavia.

7. Mrs. Cargill and infant left by 'plane for Batavia on the 14th January 1942. Mr. Cargill followed on s.s. KHOON KHOEA on the 27th and about mid-February the family left Java for South Africa.

8. Messrs. Buck, Chater, R. W., Chater W. J., Corbin, Myles, Murray, Pim*, Trail*, Wink*, I. A. MacDonald*, and McClelland left Pontianak by 'plane on about the 16th January 1942, for Batavia, where they were employed temporarily until evacuated in mid-February to Australia.

(* indicates Commissions in the Sarawak State Forces)

9. Messrs. Drake, Moscrop, Reeves, Benson ^ Donnelly ^ Elam ^ Sagar ^ and Father Paisley left for Batavia on s.s. KHOON KHOEA on 2nd January 1942. Most of them were employed temporarily in Java and all were evacuated to Australia in mid-February.

(^ indicates a member of the Sarawak State Forces)

10. Messrs. A. E. A. Edwards and [F. H.] Wright accepted emergency commissions in the 2nd/15th Punjab Regiment on the Dutch Sarawak Border. . . .

11. Mr. T. E. Parker left Pontianak by 'plane for Batavia on 10th January 1942. He acted as Sarawak Representative in Java till 27th February, when he took 'plane to Sydney.

12. Father Quaddeker remained with R. C. missionaries in and near Singkawang (to which place he went on 14th January) until he was interned on 10th July 1942. He arrived at Batu Lintang Internment Camp on 13th July 1942 and died later from natural causes.

13. Messrs. Trechman and Thackwell-Lewis took plane for Batavia from Pontianak on 16th January 1942, and a few days later travelled by plane to Sydney.

14. Messrs. Henley-Joy, Searle and two other companions (names unknown) left Pontianak for Palembang by s.s. MEMPAWAH on 10th January 1942.

15. European Members of Sarawak State Forces in Pontianak.

The following persons, assembled in Pontianak, held appointments in the Local Forces:—

Bayford, C. S. M.	Kent, 2nd. Lieut. C. B.
Bayram, 2nd. Lieut. G.	Large, Captain R. W.
Benson, 2nd. Lieut. J. A. G.	McClelland, Sergeant J.G.
Birt, 2nd. Lieut. C. F.	MacDonald, Sgt. Major I. A.
Black, 2nd. Lieut. K. N.	m Moran, C. S. M.
m Bruce, 2nd. Lieut. W.	Newman, Captain, C. L.
m Crafter, Major F. W.	Pim, 2nd. Lieut. J. W.
Dant, 2nd. Lieut. A. D.	Sagar, Sgt. R. S.
Donnelly, Sgt., J. M. M.	Sergel, 2nd. Lieut. C. S.
Edwards, Major R. E.	Spurway, 2nd. Lieut. B. J. C.
Elam, 2nd. Lieut. H. E. H.	Stewart, 2nd. Lieut. D. B.
s Gibson, Captain A. W. G.	Strath-Whyte, 2nd. Lieut. A.

Gilbert, 2nd. Lieut. J. O.	3	Talbot, R. G.
Gillett, Sgt. K.		Trail, 2nd. Lieut. A. D.
Harnack, 2nd. Lieut. W.	3	Wink, J. S.
3 Kelley, Lt. Col. W. H.		Woodliffe, 2nd. Lieut. S. F.
m denotes King's Commission		
s denotes Master Mariner		
3 denotes Officer, Sarawak Constabulary		

16. Company Sergeant-Majors Bayford and Moran accompanied Major Crafter to Bengkayang on about 1st January 1942. They returned to Pontianak on about 7th, where they remained until about 26th, when they took plane to Batavia. C.S.M. Bayford presumably was posted to the British Forces in Java, as he was taken prisoner in Bandoeng on 9th March 1942 and imprisoned at Tanjong Priok. C.S.M. Moran was appointed Regimental Sergeant Major of General Wavell's Headquarters and was evacuated to India with the Staff on 23rd February 1942. Major Crafter was promoted to Lieut. Colonel and appointed Embarkation Commandant, Batavia. He was taken prisoner at Bandoeng on 9th March and imprisoned at Tanjong Priok. . . .

19. 2nd. Lieut. Birt left Pontianak by plane for Batavia on the 16th January 1942. He was commissioned an Engineering Officer attached to General Wavell's Headquarters in Bandoeng [Bandung], and on about 23rd February was flown to India.

20. 2nd. Lieut. Black left Pontianak by plane for Batavia on about 26th January 1942. He joined his wife and children and together they went to Australia about mid-February.

21. 2nd. Lieut. Bruce also left Pontianak by plane for Batavia on about 26th January 1942. He was posted a Staff Officer and promoted to the rank of Captain. On the 9th March he was taken prisoner at Bandoeng and imprisoned at Tanjong Priok.

22. 2nd. Lieut. Dant proceeded to Batavia from Pontianak by s.s. KHOON KHOEA on 27th January 1942. He was commissioned Lieutenant (Embarkation Officer) on General Wavell's Staff and was taken prisoner at Bandoeng on the 9th of March and imprisoned at Tanjong Priok. On 22nd September he was taken to Singapore and on 13th October arrived at Batu Lintang Prisoner-of-War Camp, Kuching.

23. Major R. E. Edwards, Captain Large, Captain Newman and 2nd. Lieut. Spurway, were commissioned 2nd. Lieutenants (Emergency C[om]missions, Indian Army) from 22nd January 1942, and posted to the 2nd/15th Punjab Regiment, on the Dutch Sarawak Border. The authority for these commissions was Malayan Command cable No. 28776 of 22nd January 1942. 2nd. Lieuts. Harnack, Sergel and Stewart and Messrs. A. E. A. Edwards and W. F. [sic; F. H.]. Wright . . . were attached for duty as 2nd Lieutenants with the same Battalion under authority of the Chief of General Staff, S.W. Pacific Command letter No. S. W.P/1029 of 23rd January 1942.¹⁵ . . .

24. Captain Gibson, while in Pontianak, several times offered to return to Sarawak but was refused permission by the Dutch Resident. He left by plane for Batavia on the 16th January 1942 and was commissioned in the Royal Navy and posted to a depot ship which left Java in the last week of February for a destination unknown.

25. 2nd. Lieut. Gilbert left Pontianak on 16th January 1942 by plane for Batavia. He was evacuated to India, probably about mid-February.

26. Sgt. Gillett was severely ill in Pontianak from malaria, jaundice and hiccups. He was taken by plane to Batavia on the 26th January 1942, and recuperated. He was evacuated to Australia in mid-February.

27. Dutch Government officials have stated that Lieutenant-Colonel Kelley refused to return to the border although ordered to do so by Col. Gortmans. He refused on the ground that his Forces (Rangers and Constabulary) had been disbanded and he wished to join the British Army. He left Pontianak by air for Batavia on the 15th January 1942 and joined General Wavell's Staff at Bandoeng. He was commissioned Lieutenant-Colonel in the British Army and was evacuated to India on the 23rd February.

28. Mr. Talbot, Assistant Commissioner, Sarawak Constabulary, left on 27th January 1942 by s.s. KHOON KHOEA and arrived in Batavia on the 31st. He assisted Mr. Parker . . . until evacuated to Australia in mid-February.

29. Mystery surrounds the visit of Mr. G. T. MacBryan (Private Secretary to H.H. the Rajah)¹⁶ to Pontianak later in January 1942. H.H. was at the time in Java. It is stated that MacBryan wished to return to Kuching but he was arrested by Dutch officials upon in-

structions from high authorities and taken to Batavia and thence to Singapore.

30. By the 27th January 1942 all European refugees from Sarawak had been evacuated to Java, with the exception of those who joined the 2nd/15th Punjab Regiment. . . . In Pontianak the refugees were cared for by the Dutch Residents.

DOCUMENT 31

Escape to Java and Onward to Australia

Sarawak Constabulary 1938-1942. Papers of J. S. Wink, MSS
Pac. r. 111. RHL.

I [J. S. Wink, probationary assistant commissioner, Sarawak Constabulary] left Krokong at dawn after the last of the Punjabis had gone through. There was no sign of any enemy. At 5 p.m. I arrived at Serabak where we stayed for the night.

Arrived at Jogoi Babang at noon after very heavy going. The O.C. troops dispatched Mr. [E. H.] Elam [deputy secretary for defense and liaison officer, Sarawak] and myself forward to Siloeas to arrange for quarters. Here Mr. [B. J. C.] Spurway [officer commanding No. 3 Company, Sarawak Volunteers, Kuching Corps] ferried over 500 persons across the river by prahu [native boat] himself.

Ordered by O.C. Troops to take the women through to Sanggau. Mrs. [T. C.] Martine and child and Mr. & Mrs. [J. K.] Cargill and child. In spite of very heavy going we covered 19 1/2 miles that day, arriving at Sanggau at 8.30 p.m. The trail was clear but very muddy. Stayed overnight here.

Left Sanggau by Dutch army transport, after having been fed by the Dutch military authorities. 7 p.m. arrived at Baengkajang where we were accommodated in the barracks. Major [later Lieutenant-Colonel F. W.] Crafter was down with malaria, and most people were suffering from bad feet, and some with stomach trouble.

10 a.m. arrived Singkawang during an alert, and at 4 p.m. arrived at Pontianak. Pontianak bombed the same day as Kuching [19 December 1941], as reported to have suffered 264 casualties, the bazaar and Kampong and a school having been bombed.

[1942]

The women, Judicial Commissioner [H. Thackwell-Lewis] and Mr. Elam left by plane.

Left Pontianak by KNILM plane chartered by the Hon. Mr. Pitt Hardacre [Sarawak government agent; a member of the Allied Intelligence Bureau in Java] at Batavia. Port engine of plane failed and pilot put back to Pontianak, but because we were losing altitude he could only make the mouth of the S[ungei] Kakap.

Plane repaired. Flew to Batavia refuelling at [?] but the pilot and crew were not aboard.

Tjilatjap. Java.

February 25th, [1942]

My darling Mother, I feel like the travelling Jew, with something extremely hot in his ill fitting trousers, hopping from place to place all around the tropics. We tangled with the Jap in Kuching on Christmas Eve and had some fighting after which we advanced backwards into the jungle where for four or five days we ambled in the direction of Dutch Borneo. This was however, out of the frying pan into the fire and after an uncomfortable three weeks there, we were lucky enough to fly over to Batavia, Java, where our Government Agent [C. P. Hardacre, Sydney] had Chartered the plane. I did various jobs in Batavia from loading trains with the RASC [Royal Australian Service Corps] to assisting the British Consul to issue passports to the many who had lost them and to assist in granting visas to irate non-British subjects who were going away temporarily.

Batavia is hellishly hot and wet and I developed foul blisters and prickly heat. On Saturday I was ordered to report to the Supreme Command for a special job but that fell through and I stayed in Bandoeng only for a couple days. The climate there is absolutely

wizard and I could have done with a lot more of it. However, my luck was out and I was sent to this foul hole on a largish escort job, of which, details later!

Guess who I met? An ex-Mistley boy, son of the Colchester Chopping's Mills[.] We had horrible and beery reminiscences [concerning] the comparative foulness of Ma J and a fat toad and he supported my theory that J was an awful old sadist. I dont think the diminutive mind of the censor will pass the above ambig[u]ous phrase unless we give him the clue that the paragraph refers to prep school headmaster and wife. I hope you got my wire (a propos of censor's lack of immigration [*sic*; imagination]) sent in January from Batavia and returned by the censor in London because I said: "Wink, Shrewsbury. Well safe Wink" He obviously thought I referred to oil supplies and not to my state of health, and sent it back for clarification. I wrote him a scathing letter ordering him to read the words adjectively and not substantively, while deprecating his lack of intelligence.

There are all sorts of things I am dying to tell you but cannot. I must tell you about Java though. I feel quite an authority on it having seen quite a bit of through the window of the fast air conditioned express train in whi[ch] I have travelled right across it. The whole country is under cultivation. Including mountain tops I do not suppose there are more than a few square miles which are not in use. They plant swamp padi and the slopes of the hills [and] the si[d]es of the mountains are covered with the terraces and irrigation ditches. The population here is higher than in England so there is plenty of labour.

Ushers Hotel

Sydney April 5th 1942.

[My] darling Mother,

I arrived here yesterday from Melbourne and at last I have [an] opportunity of writing to you an account of our many adventures during the [last] three and a half months. I wrote you a short note from Pontianak, Dutch [Borneo], and wired you from Batavia and

again on my arrival in Geraldton, [Western] Australia from Tjilat-jap (Chilichap) Java.

I was transferred from Miri to Kuching in October, and that [was] really the beginning of the manifestations of Providence as far as I was [concerned], because it is believed that all our Government Officers at Miri [were] captured and a naval officer even stated that they had been shot. The [way in] which [they] evacuated my dear old Dyak and Malay police from Miri to Kuching [leaving] only the pre-war strength of police there, was bombed and machine [gunned] and there were three deaths and 21 wounded. Two or three days after [they] had arrived, we were bombed in Kuching. We had no Ack-Ack [anti-aircraft guns] and no planes [and] as the raiders were about 8,000 feet up, we were unable to do anything [except] sit tight in our shelters. I saw that there had been a direct hit on [the] petrol supplies and rode over on the motor bike to try and do something [then] a Navy-O [Zero] fighter started to machine gun the roads. Then we got working on the [dead] and wounded who were mostly [C]hinese women and children who had not reached [their] shelters. Had a busy afternoon with them. It was not till the 23rd Dec [that] we were ordered to battle stations and I took my three platoons out to [the] landing ground fortress where we dug in, sans equipment, supplies, communications [ders?] and only drill purpose rifles and about 50 rounds of ammunition each. [The] enemy tried landing from Chinese fishing boats and suffered many casualties [?] the Punjabis strafed him with the 18 lb-ers. However, they outnumbered us [at] 8 to one and had air and sea support, many automatic arms and lots of [fifth] colum[n]ists. They even captured and used the cold storage lorry and the Post [Office] van to try to enter the lines in. They wore police uniforms taken from [the] constabulary at Miri which they had attacked first and which had been [evacuated] after the oil fields had been completely demolished. The result was [that] on Christmas Day after continual firework display, shelling, mortar fire and [machine] gun fire, we were ordered to withdraw to the jungle after the airfield had [been] blown up. I re-

turned my men four miles and established posts on each [branch] of the Sarawak River and again further up where, it later transpired, as I [had] suspected, that we would be attacked on the flank. There was a battle at [the] junction of the two branches of the river and many Japs were lost but we [were] able to get medical supplies, wounded, and all remaining troops with their arms [equipment] and ammunition across, using only the one little ferry poled across [the] river by Malays. I then retired further repairing roads, cutting saplings [and] building corduroy [ropes] across mudholes so that our lorries could cross. Not [one] got stuck and we all got up to the border station on the 27th. The lorries [could] go no further and were scrapped and about 500 of us took to the jungle. [We] lived on any rice or cocoanuts we could get, and that meant very little indeed. [We slept] in the jungle villages wherever we could and after four days in the jungle O.C. Punjabis sent me on ahead all the time to try and find quarters for the [party] and on the last day he made me take on the women and children who had [arrived?] before us and whom we had caught up to. I was glad I knew the country; in some places the trail was extremely difficult to follow and the river sings dangerous. That last day, we covered 31 kilometers, 19 1/2 miles, and [reached] the Dutch outpost of Sanggau where we were able to get hot soup, biscuits [and] tea. From there we went by bus to Benkajang and then to Pontianak where [we] stayed in the hotel, others in the lunatic asylum and the women and the [children] in the Convent. Pontianak had been bombed with 264 deaths in one raid[. Time] was getting short and there were very few ships coming in to take off the [women] and children. The Punjabis stayed up on the border where there were many [Indonesian] troops, Javanese, Amboinese, Medadonese [Madurese?] and etc. Three weeks later our [government] agent flew from Sydney to Batavia and chartered a plane which made [?] trips, taking first the women and then 16 of us. We were half an hour out to [sea] when our port engine died and we only just managed to make the coast. However [the] damage was fixed the next day and we went to Batavia by way of Bangka Island [where] we

refuelled. On arrival in Batavia we were shown to rooms booked for us at [the] Hotel der Nederlander and were immediately appointed for duty with the [Head]quarters of the South West Pacific Command at Bandoeng. As they could not use me [?] while at Bandoeng, I got a job with the R.A.S.C., unloading ships in the [harb]our at Tanjong Priok and making up trains and lorry convoys for the BSD[?]. [?] lasted till we had got most of the stuff out and then I was offered a job [as] Liaison officer between Movement Control and [the] Dutch Military [Harbour?] Bureau. That fell through & I was then taken on [to] do duty in the Consulate in Batavia. I was then [order]ed to report to Wavell's H.Q. at Lembang where [?] Brig. Gen Field, the idea being for six of [us] to be flown back to Borneo to organize guer[illa] commandos. However, the Dutch would not [spare] a plane so that also fell through. I was [then] instructed to collect \$2,000,000 of our [?] money & [e]scort it to Australia. After [?] few bombings in Bandoeng I got out with [other] fellow and the money [and] left [Tji]latjap in S. Java by a small boat. We [were] 11 days at sea eating ships biscuits & [candies?] & very low on water & finally [?] at Geraldton, 300 miles north of [Fre]mantle on the night of March 12th. We [were] almost the last to leave that port [?] fire, ships were sank there the ... have now arrived here after over 800 [miles] by train & a sea trip from [Fre]mantle to Melbourne where the Rajah fare [?] lunch. I have applied for service [?] & may be joining the 1st Cavalry [Div] [though] Enlistments are slow. I was [made] an honorary member of the N.S.W. [Ma]sonic Club in Sydney & visited lodges [in the] evening. The people are extraordinarily [hos]pitable though prices are terrific. [I] shall know about my job in the army [in] 3 days time & in the meantime I [am] fattening the body at a good pub. [Sy]dney is a wizard place—fraud beaches, [?], harbour & nice shops & offices. [?] Gen McArthur a couple of days [?].—The Americans are doing a [?] job here. The spirit & morale is [good] here but there is still too much [?] of our service were caught in Sarawak [at] least five are known to have been [killed]. The majority, however, are safe in [?] or Australasia. We have, of course, [?]

everything, cars, furniture, wireless, bank [accounts], clothes, but we are still being [?] by our Govt as they intend us [to] go back in there after the war. Given fair equality in arms & planes, [we] could lick the Japs even if [out]numbered 3-1 but 8-1 was too [many], & lack of support from the air [made] it hopeless. However, we have [been] blooded & we now know then [to] [se]ttle & none of us were afraid—[?] feel now that, with arms & planes, [we] can beat them but *where* are [the] arms & planes ? Amongst other [?] lost are the cigarette case [?] ring & daddy's masonic regalia, [?] yours & his photos & the prayer book [?] gave me in 1919 & the bayonet [?] your letters to me, since [19]29 & Helen's & the girls! Also my [sw]ord, uniforms[,] photos[,] native curios[.]

DOCUMENT 32

*"... Fremantle on February 28th [1942]—
[64] days after leaving Salim ..."*

W. McKerracher, "Report on proceedings before, landing up to and covering the evacuation of the Borneo Co.'s Staff from Sibul and the Rejang Timber Concession," 2 May 1942. Papers of Alan Griffin, Mss.Pac.8.109. RHL.

The Post [Long Nawang] had been evacuated, all the troops having gone down river to the coast on Military duties, and so the Barracks and Officers' Bungalows were put at our disposal. They had unfortunately "gone off the air" the day before our arrival. It was also found the Japs had taken the Port at the mouth of the River, so we were therefore "shut-in" on that particular river. It appeared the only other means of getting out was across the Spurs of the mountains, to the headwaters of another River, the Sungei Bau [Boh]—a tributary of the Mahakam River, whose outlet port is Samarendu [Samarinda]. This entailed a trek of 14 days through the jungle, described by the Long Noyan [Long Nawang; misspelled throughout] native people as "very difficult", and never

before done by a white man. At a council hel[d] approximately half of the party decided to stay at Long Noyan [Nawang] for the duration, or until the Japs arrived—probably not before 12 months had elapsed; three of the party, Cobbold, Reid and Murphy, spoke of going back to Sibu and being interned there. The M[a]cPhersons, Lees, Mrs. Bomphrey and others wanted to get out, but some were still sick, and the trek to them sounded impossible, so it was decided to send an advance party to try it out. This consisted of Jacks, Anderson, Schotling, Walter and self; arrangements were set in motion to get bearers, paddlers, etc., and after a few days' rest to set out on January 30th. On the 28th we received news over the Barrack's radio that Samarenda, the port at the mouth of the River we were to make for, had fallen. On the same day also we received an S.O.S. per native, from a party of Dutch Airmen, five of them, accompanied by two Britishers, who were stranded just over the border with neither food nor clothes. The Airmen were parts of crews who had had to make forced landings, after raiding the Japs occupying Miri and Brunei. They sent their names (but not those of the Britishers), said they had been 36 days in the jungle, and asked that their names be sent to Dutch Headquarters. We have hopes that Lucas and Bomphrey were the two Britishers, but information to this effect did not reach us before we left.¹⁷ We decided, notwithstanding the bad news of the fall of Samarenda, we would proceed with our plan, taking 28 days' food supplies in case we were forced to retreat by the track, or by finding the Japs had got up the river, and endeavour to make the highest-up Dutch Post, a place named Long Eran, some 400 miles up the Mahakam River. The Dutch party had not arrived at Long Noyan [Nawang] before we departed, so it was arranged that should they be fit enough, and desire to come on with us, they send a runner after us, when we would wait for them. We feared if we delayed too long, the relays of bearers and guides would not wait or be at their various rendezvous, thereby compelling our return. We also arranged to send back a report as to the possibilities of the track, for the party desiring to follow us. Briefly, the track proved almost impossible, but

we eventually got through and down to Long Eran. It had been planned to make this place if possible, and there to re-equip ourselves with food, etc., then to make across to another river, the Berita [Barito or Bandjar], which was at that time still open, and so arrive at Banjarmasin, at the mouth of it. This entailed another two months of jungle and river, and as it would have probably [...] by then have fallen, we planned it so as to side-track it, and along the coast get hold of a small boat, getting away either to Java or to North Australia. However, from this perilous project we were saved, for at Long Eran we found that a further day's journey by fast launch down-river (the Dutch Controller's Launch) was an Aerodrome—this [was] supposed to be secret, but already bombed by the Japs. All planes had been withdrawn to Java, but the 'drome and the river to within 50 kilometres of it was being held by a Dutch Force of 600 Infantry, who were kept in contact with Java by a 'plane crossing two-ways at night time, every fourth or fifth night. We proceeded on to this place and reached it 18 days after leaving Long Noyan [Nawang], and were fortunate enough to get a Dutch troop 'plane out the same night, taking off at 4 a.m. After an exciting crossing of the Java Sea we arrived at Bandoeng [Bandung] at 10.30 a.m. on the 18th February, thence by Commercial 'plane flew to Batavia, from whence I cabled you [H. D. Aplin, Sarawak government agent]. I was further fortunate enough to get an embarkation order the same night, enabling me to embark at mid-day at Tanjong Priok; from this same point we sailed at 4.30 p.m., and after an eventful but safe voyage arrived in Fremantle on February 28th—[64] days after leaving Salim, 54 nights of which were spent in the jungle, and during which time I lost over two stone weight[.] However, except for a fair sample of jungle sores, mainly leech-bites turned septic, which proved very difficult to clear up, and which kept me under the Doctor until the end of March, I was fortunate enough to get through without any sickness whatever. Jacks left Trilijap [*sic*: Tjilatjap] a few days later than myself, and arrived in Perth on March 7th, and as far as I know we are the only two who have got out. Anderson joined the

Navy in Tanjong Priok; Schotling, being a Dutchman, was conscripted by the Dutch Forces. Walter (so Jacks informed me) was sick in Hospital in Batavia when he (Jacks) got away. . . .

DOCUMENT 33

"We three together well love—Elam."

"Letters, Cables, etc., to and from home, 1939–1945," Papers of E. H. Elam, Mss Pac s 65. RHL.

Sarawak—BULLETIN 1, 24TH DECEMBER 1941

Mr. [J. A.] Smith of Sarawak Government Government Office telephoned us on Tuesday December 23rd, that Kuching had been bombed and machine gunned by the Japs.

It appears that some 15 Jap Aeroplanes flew over the town and harbour, but did not cause any great damage in the residential part of the town.

A cable from Sarawak that all the white people are quite safe and unharmed.

Lisa [Elizabeth Elam, née Midgley] and her baby [Susan Elam] and Edgar [H. Elam] are still at Kuching and as Edgar is in the Defence Forces it must mean that Lisa and her baby are alone with a Chinese amah and the Chinese Cook during the time that these happenings occurred.

426—[letter] Sarawak Government Offices

Millbank House,
Westminster, S.W. 1
22nd December 1941

My dear Midgley,

We have received a cable that Kuching was attacked by enemy aeroplanes on the 19th instant, but that all the Europeans are safe.

We will let you hear of any further information we may receive.

Yours sincerely,

Harold E. Midgley Esq. [J.A. Smith]

428— 19.12.41

SARAWAK

Secretary of State Singapore wishes to advi[s]e all friends and relatives all well and contented. Full protection taken. Position is not unsatisfactory. Mr. & Mrs. Midgley, 161 [Quorn] are on the list to receive copies of future similar cablegrams.

429—[Smith to Midgley]

COPY OF CABLE SENT FROM SINGAPORE

27TH DECEMBER, 1941

Kuching is believed now to be in enemy hands and all male Europeans [?] been interned [?] most women having been previously dispersed out of the town. Other races apparently unmolested in the interior of the [F]irst Division fighting may be continuing[.] Singapore is still in telegraphic communication with Sibü.

430—[letter from Midgley to ?] Quorn Country Club

Quorn.

January 6th, 1942.

We are happy to tell you that word has now been received through the Sarawak Government in London that "Mr. & Mrs. Elam are safe."

The relief is tremendous after the nightmare of anxiety when one realises the difficult and tropical conditions existing for anyone who is away from their home base, and while the news further adds that no information is available as to their present whereabouts, or the next moves, we [are] also further advised that the Australian Government have offered all possible assistance in connection with the Sarawak Evacuees.

The message was dated January 5th so that the 19 days since first bombing and machine gunning of Kuching and the subsequent occupation of Japs two or three days later without any Defence Measures being undertaken in respect of sea or air has arrived at the present stage which at the moment is more satisfactory.

We now await further news of the destination and health of the baby which we will pass on when revealed.

431—Cable from Singapore as dictated over the 'phone by Miss Branson as phoned from Mr. Smith, Sarawak Government.

Sent from Singapore 27th December.

Kuching in enemy hands [and] all male Europeans expected to have been interned most women having been previously dispersed out of town. Other races apparently unmoled. In the interior [F]irst [D]ivision fighting may be continuing. Singapore is still in telegraphic communication with Sibu.

Anderson O.K.

January 8th, 1942.

BULLETIN NO. 4

William Jacks have had a cable from Singapore stating that Mr. & Mrs. Elam are reported safe at Pontianak in Dutch Borneo. Miss Branson has had a conversation with the Sarawak Government (Mr. Smith) who has also had a cable and mentions the baby is with Mr. & Mrs. Elam.

Pontianak is on the West Coast of Borneo on the Equator, and probably within 400 miles of Singapore, and is connected by Submarine cable to Batavia in Java.

It seems possible that further evacuation is being foreshadowed in which the Australian Government have indicated their wish to help as probably about 100 white refugees may have been conveyed to Pontianak, and probably by easy stages they will go across to Java, and then subsequently to Port Darwin, and thence to Perth.

Copy VliegMail.

Letter 140. HOTEL DES INDES,

BATAVIA-C.,

JAVA.

January 24th, 1942.

My Darlings,

How very difficult it is to start and tell you all the awful happenings during the last month. Time without number I have thought of you all and known how desperately worried you must have been when you heard over the radio of the invasion of Kuching by the yellow devils.

On Dec. 19th the yellow swine came over and did their dirt. It was all most unpleasant while it lasted. They did their usual Axis trick of machine-gunning houses and defenceless women and children. After that raid it was decided to get women and children (the few left) out of Kuching, so we were sent to Simanggang in the 2nd Division, taking a lot of our belongings with us, thinking that perhaps in 3 or 4 months time we would return.

As you know, events moved very fast, and when Kuching was attacked, we were sent right up country, within easy reach of the Dutch border. We had to cut down luggage and only take really necessary things.

Susan has stood up to the whole racket amazingly well, and of course has been very spoilt, and I am having to pay for it now, but she is well and that is all that matters.

Of course, I was terribly worried about Edgar, as the wireless at Kuching was one of the first things to shut down, so we could get no news of any kind. At times I got very down, but Susan kept me so busy that I hardly had time to think, and I knew I must keep up for her sake; also I lived on hope.

It was the most awful Xmas mentally I have ever known. The lads at Simanggang [Simanggang] were grand, keeping our spirits up and did all to keep us full of good cheer. Bob Shelters the D.O.¹⁸ I knew very well from the 3rd Division days. Susan and I stayed with him and he was wonderful to us.

After a week in Simangang we pushed off on Dec. 29th for Engkilik [*sic*; Engkilili]. That night we were told to cut down our luggage, as the next day we were to go by outboard to Labah Antu [*sic*; Lubok Antu], then on Dec. 31st we had a day's walk over the Border. Our party was 17 in all, 6 children counting Susan, the rest women and Father [J.] Paisl[e]y of the S.P.G. Mission, who had been sent to look after us from Kuching, and had intended to return, but this was not possible. He looked after us all splendidly and under all trials and difficulties none grumbled. Ryakes [Dakys?] carried the children and our luggage and we all managed the 15 mile walk through Jungle very well. The last part was rather difficult; we walked in water well up to the top of our legs. If it all was not so awful it would have been a great adventure.

However, our journey to Pontianak took a week. We travelled in comfort in comparison with those who had the 3 days trek from Kuching.

At present we are not allowed to give much out. This is understandable, but one day we will tell you all our experience. We have lost everything, but what does that matter. We are alive, cheerful and well.

I must admit since arriving here, where Mr. Pitt Hardacre [Sarawak government agent; a member of the Allied Intelligence Bureau in Java] met us and arranged Hotels, we have lived like fighting cocks, everyone *so* very helpful and kind. Naturally Susan caused quite a lot of interest when they realized all the travelling she had done for one so small. Pitt (Hardacre) did marvels getting us away from Pontianak, as we might be there to this day, if he had not pulled [as] many string[s as] possible to get a plane to get us out. I loved the plane journey. We had a grand trip. Susan slept most of the way. She has now been in every form of transport, except a train.

What a joy it was to get your cable yesterday. Naturally I know you long for details, but Darlings, later I can give you more. The week here in Batavia has been a busy one collecting things together again, and I have not had much time for letter writing. To be

truthful, I have not felt like it, and I feel sure you will understand. I do get dreadful waves of depression thinking of our lovely home in Kuching and all the things we have left everywhere, but we are better off than the people in Penang, who left in quarter of an hour and I believe arrived at their new country in just the things they stood up in. We did at least have several changes of clothes, but all bits and treasures have gone. It is hard, but we are glad to be alive.

Of course we have no news of how things are going on in Sarawak, but our Dutch Allies are doing grand work and sink everything within sight which belong to the yellow devils.

We of course do not know when the next move is to come and I dread leaving Edgar. I don't feel very brave about this, but it has got to be so. All here are so confident and hopeful that the tide will soon turn. I wish I felt the same. Personally I think it will be a long drawn out affair, but of the final result I have no doubt that victory is for all the Allies. As you know, I am no pessimist, and my depression at times I put down to the reaction of the past month. As you know, I can get through any difficulty, but I feel it later.

By the time this reaches you, Susan and I should be in Sydney, Australia. For the present I am making that my headquarters, as the Government have an Agency there, so they will get first hand news of Edgar and the boys. They don't know what their jobs are at present. Anyway, they are staying here for the moment. The address of the Government Offices is 60, Hunter Street, Sydney, but Edgar is sure to cable you again, and I will on arrival in Australia. My present idea is to take a small furnished flat and save as much as possible, and so try and collect another home together. Edgar has been very, very generous and has allotted me 375 dollars, well over half of his salary. He assures me he will not need much.

Do you know that Ah Kit, my Cook, came all the way to Pontianak with me. He was marvellous and the care he gave both Susan and myself, especially the former, has amazed everyone. We had to leave him in Pontianak, but booked him a passage here on the next ship. So far he has not arrived. I want to take him to Australia and he said he would come, but I think the powers in charge

are very sticky about male Chinese entering Australia. However, we are going to try, as he would be worth his weight in gold to me. He cooks, adores Susan and has been more help than an Amah.

This is a lovely city, and glorious shops, but very expensive. I have bought very little, as it is hot when we arrive in Australia, and also things are cheaper and the exchange more in our favour.

27/1/1942. The times I have tried to finish this letter have been numerous, but with one thing and another the days are very full and busy. It looks as if we shall be off any day now, so I am busy getting in the last bits and pieces.

This is a very scrappy letter and I know there must be a thousand and one things you want to know, and I want to tell you. When time permits I intend to write you a full account of all the happenings, but I know you are satisfied at present we are well and safe. It is awful to think we have lost everything, clothes, linen, glass, china, silver, photos, every single thing, but I suppose it is no worse than those who have been bombed out of house and home. I have no photos of you all now, so please send some at the first possible chance.

(Contd.)

Well darlings, cheerio for the present. Do not worry, these yellow swine will never get us down.

With fondest love from us three,
Yours as always,

LIZ.

[Undated]

Dear Mr. & Mrs. Midgley,

I started my last letter to you on Dec. 19th, but I don't suppose you received it, because I never posted it! Shortly after that date, as you know, things started to move pretty quickly.

Lisa moved off on the night of the 20th and the balloon went up on the 23rd. I cannot describe everything. One day I will relate it to you. The main thing as far as I was concerned was that Lisa and

Susan got through safely, and we joined up again at Pontianak, where we had a ghastly wait of 16 days until a plane came to fetch us.

Susan had no bad effects from her long journey, both through the jungle and in the air, and Lisa was the whole time simply wonderful. All the other women told me of her grit and determination and also of her good cheer and unselfishness. What some of the women put up with only they themselves know. Anyhow, we have now been here a week and I hop[e] Lisa will shortly be able to move on to Australia.

I have been allotted a certain duty which will necessitate a temporary separation, but I don't think for long, in spite of the rather gloomy aspect of the War out here at present, as I am perfectly certain that the yellow belly is going to get the surprise of his life very shortly—not so very far distant.

We were so pleased to get your telegram this morning and to know you were all well. It is very sad to think of all our things in the house gone—such lovely stuff so carefully cared for, but we mustn't worry too much about that. Lisa has a few dresses, etc, and Susan has her things (in part), though the Rajah's gift pram was left somewhere in the jungle! After this was [war?] I'm going to every pawn-shop in Tokyo to look for my lost property!

We are so pleased to hear what hell the Russians are giving Jerry [the Germans] and we do hope that Libya will prove Italy's complete rout.

For the last week we have been living in the lap of luxury, which is all wrong, but we all needed some fattening up, as every one of the party of 86 had lost much weight. We volunteers were sorry to part with our Indian Army [2nd/15th Punjab Regiment] friends, but we had served our purpose and so the C.O. sent us on to the coast for us to find other jobs where we would be more useful. Some, however, have stayed, having had previous military experience.

Well, Lisa will need space, so I must [be] away. Don't worry, we are very well, and though poorer, still as determined as ever to see

this thing through. My best love to you all and I'm really proud of your Daughter (and Grand-daughter). Bye-bye.

Your loving Son,

EDGAR

434—

Bulletin No. 5

"The Times"—Jan. 16th, 1942.

Fighting on Sarawak Frontier.

From a Dutch Correspondent.

The fighting on the Sarawak frontier presumably means that small Japanese units from Sarawak are attempting to make their way along the west coast of Borneo in the direction of Pontianak, the Dutch capital, which has already been subjected to violent air attacks. These clashes on land can only be on a very small scale, on account of the impassability of the coastal plains. The main Japanese attacks southwards must be sea and air-borne.

435—

BULLETIN NO. 5

January 20th, 1942.

Following the previous news of January 8th that Mr. and Mrs. Elam and Susan were reported safe at Pontianak you will probably have seen in the paper that the Japs have been heavily bombing and raiding this place so that the position continued in some anxiety. Improved news is now to hand from a cable sent personally from Edgar as follows:—

Sent from Batavia Centrum.

No date of despatch.

Date received Erith 17th January 1942.

Cable.

"Safe all well Lisa Susan proceeding further later.

Elam."

This means they have crossed the difficult sea between Pontianak and Java.

The further meaning may be that Edgar is remaining to probably be of service to the general staff as he has knowledge of local language and that Lisa and Susan will in due course proceed to Australia.

We are cabling them to Batavia, and now await with more peace of mind for further news when they reach the continent of Australia.

H. E. Midgley.

BULLETIN NO. 6. 13.2.42

We are very delighted to inform you that a further cable has been received from Lisa, shortly as follows:—Handed in at Batavia Centrum on February 8th, the first portion is a birthday greeting to me, which I think is rather wonderful when they are themselves in so extremely precarious a position, but the cable goes on to say:—"We three together well love—Elam." I am replying to it with a further cable this week as they do not mention receiving the one I sent them a month ago. The commencement of bombing by the Japs of Batavia is disquieting especially as there are more than 6,000 women and children refugees from Singapore now at Batavia. We have no information as to why they have not been able to be transported to Australia but hope that some further news may become available in the near future. It is anyway rather satisfactory that they are all together and well.

H. E. Midgley.

23/2/1942

BULLETIN NO. 7

Word has just come through from Mr. Smith, Secretary of the Sarawak Government Offices in London, that about 10 am. this morning a cable was received that our Daughter, with her Husband, Mr. Elam, and Baby Susan, are on their way to Australia.

This obviously means they are going by boat and therefore heading for Perth or Adelaide, as a large number of people from Sarawak have been evacuated by boat and air to Perth.

With the Jap activity at Darwin the airway route is not now available for civilian evacuation, so this tends to confirm our view that they are going by boat all the way, and also, as you would read, Darwin civilians are already being evacuated.

With the safe arrival of Lisa and family in Australia, even with further Jap activities, they will anyway be in a temperate climate and amongst their own people.

The position as arising brings the much desired relief to all our anxieties.

H. E. Midgley

8/3/1942

BULLETIN NO. 8.

Word has come through on 5th March, 1942, that Lisa and Family have arrived in Australia.

In advance of further details, the following time-table of events if set out, as obtained by cable during the past 3 months, which may be of interest.

Lisa and her Husband were living at Kuching, Sarawak, with Baby Susan, born 27th August, 1941.

Dec. 7, 1941. War declared by Japan.

Dec. 14, 1941. Lisa posted final letter (No.139) received 2/3/1942 (11 weeks), which gave the news that they were still hopeful, but the anticipation of Japanese activities was now fairly certain in their minds and she reported the Baby was a little disturbed, having been recently vaccinated.

Dec. 19, 1941. Kuching bombed and machine-gunned by the Japs.

Dec. 23, 1941. -do- -do-

- Dec. 25, 1941.* Kuching invaded and in enemy hands. Edgar, Lisa and Susan dispersed in the country. This was a period of great anxiety, as the early Monsoon was in progress.
- Jan. 2, 1942 to* Cable received of evacuation—news "All safe," but no
- Jan. 5, 1942.* information re whereabouts.
- Jan. 7, 1942.* Cable received from William Jacks, Singapore, that Edgar, Lisa and Susan were safe at Pontianak, Borneo.
- Jan. 16, 1942.* Information in the Press of daily attacks by the Japs on Pontianak.
- Jan. 17, 1942.* Cable received Sarawak Government "Family arrived Batavia, Java, all well."
- Feb. 7, 1942.* Birthday Greetings cable from Lisa, with news "All well at Batavia."
- Feb. 23, 1942.* Cable Sarawak Government "All three on their way to Australia," (and we rather expected they had departed some few days previously).
- Mar. 2, 1942.* Received Letter 139 from Lisa, posted Kuching 14/12/1941.
- Mar. 3, 1942.* Dutch applying "Scorched earth" to Batavia.
- Mar. 4, 1942.* Japs investing [*sic*; infesting] Batavia.
- Mar. 5, 1942.* Cable received Sarawak Government "Safe arrival Lisa and Baby in Australia."
- The above period is approximately 3 months[.]

COPY

SYDNEY.

March 8th, 1942.

Dear Mr. & Mrs. Midgley,

We have now got to Aussie-land and it is going to take more than a Jap to shift us from here. Java was very disappointing as I had to hang around attached to the S.W. Pacific Command who

could not or would not give us anything to do. We were there one month. Bandoeng, Army H.Q., did nothing, so I applied to the Navy where I was doing a Volunteer Cyphers job. They could only offer me a permanent cypher job but that was very unattractive so I went to the R.A.F. who owing to the influx of personnel from Malaya were unable to place me for 6 weeks and advised me to get down here. So in a few hours I booked myself a passage and came down here steerage class, there being nothing else available.

Lisa had her passage on a slap up Dutch Liner which was fully booked so we had to proceed independently. However, there were some 20 odd Sarawakians on the same ship as Lisa and she and Susan arrived safely yesterday, 24 hours after me. Both are very well and all had an uneventful trip down—about the last ships to leave Java that did not get some eggs chucked at them.

Susan can now sit up and she is getting on well and the trip has done her a world of good. Batavia and the air raid siren and being carted to shelters at all times of the day and night was beginning to tell. I am so pleased to see her so more settled (also the Mother).

It is good to be amongst one's own race again and here one feels confident having all white around one. The Indonesian is not yet up to the bomb and Tommygun and the whole way through we have found no labour available after the first bomb fell. Labour gangs as well as the fighting services must be all white.

Lisa will settle down here; our Government Offices are here, 60, Hunter Street[.] I have applied for a job in the R.A.A.F. I have my first interview tomorrow and may have to go to Melbourne shortly. I do hope they will not keep me hanging around too long, as I have been released by our Government for active service and now want to get on to the job. Our Government are continuing to pay us, but when I get another job the Government makes up the difference between the pay of that job and my Civil Service pay if the former is less. Very generous of the Supreme Council, as naturally we have no income now except from investments.

I had to wire you asking you to ask Stringer to send me £25 as we have got to re-wardrobe ourselves a bit. All our savings!! not

very many, was lost in Kuching, and we have our salary only to live on—perfectly adequate when we have got re-stocked. I have lost Stringer's new address. It used to be 228, Finchley Road, London, but he moved from there about 9 months ago and has started in Colchester. His home address is the Colne Valley—village of Colne, I believe.

Well, things look pretty black out here but believe me the old Jap has a rude fright coming to him shortly. Anyhow, we won't discuss the War. You have all the news and understand the whole War effort much better than we do. If you see Roosevelt you might tell him and his Yanks to get a move on!!

I'll leave the rest of the page for Lisa. Bye-bye for now. Keep well and look after yourselves. Keep on cracking old Hit[ler] harder and harder and after he collapses it will only be a matter of a few months to finish old Oshimoto off. Best love,
Your loving Son,

EDGAR.

24/3/1942

BULLETIN NO. 9

To date, we have now received three cables from Lisa, Edgar and Susan, of their safe arrival in Sydney, Australia, and that they are well in health.

In a discussion with Mr. Smith of the London Office, Sarawak Government, he mentioned that the Rajah was reported at the Oriental Hotel, Melbourne, though it was expected that the Sarawak Provisional Government was being set up at Sydney.

Mr. Smith also advised me that in discussion with Mr. [H. D.] Aplin [Sarawak government agent], who had resided many years in Sarawak, it was clear that when Lisa and Edgar were dispersed in the open country in December, and after the Japs had invaded the Colony, they would have to trek along jungle paths in the Monsoon into Borneo to Samba[s], the only connection being these jungle paths, and the distance would be from 40 to 50 miles, so that

their walking this distance with Susan and many other refugees, would be a period of great stress.

At Samba[s] a mud road is in existence for some 50 miles to Pontianak, and it was expected that they would be able to get some conveyance for this 50 mile stage of the journey, though from the above it would be clear that the privations and stress of the escape from Sarawak to Pontianak would be extremely severe.

The Japs began to bomb Samba[s] and Pontianak almost immediately afterwards, and maintained this bombing daily, so that their further escape from Pontianak by boat to Batavia enabled them to get away before the occupation by the Japs of Pontianak.

The subsequent period in Batavia, by which time the Japs were raiding the Town and the surrounding country, would again bring these difficulties and dangers to them, and subsequent embarkation on a refugee ship, with a final destination at Sydney, brings their 3 months period to the present phase of their being at 60, Hunter Steet, Sydney, where they are now resting and recovering.

We expect our first letter from Sydney may be received about the middle to the end of May, when opportunity will be taken of passing on the news as received.

H. E. MIDGLEY.

25/3/1942

BULLETIN NO. 10

Although immediately following Bulletin No.9, we have received a letter from Lisa and Edgar, written by each of them from Batavia, Java, posted on the 24th January, 1942, so that this has taken the incredibly short time of two months.

The letter describes their privations and confirms our Bulletin No.9, that they had to walk through jungle paths from Kuching to Samba[s], and in this trek they had to abandon the very nice pram which they had received a week before the invasion from the Rajah of Sarawak as a personal present to celebrate the arrival of Susan.

They then got a motor car to help them from Samba[s] to Pontianak, and arrived with only the clothes in which they were standing.

Edgar writes his appreciation of the marvellous courage and grit with which Lisa stood it all in the strenuous experience.

Through some special help of local people and an Official from Sarawak, they got a 'plane, which took them from Pontianak to Batavia, Java. This must have been a God-send from otherwise travelling by steamer across the submarine-infested Java Sea.

The letter concludes with comments by Edgar, full of spirit from both of them, and a characteristic note that he will search all pawn-shops in the Archipelago and Singapore to recover their lost belongings, which must have been immediately looted at Kuching.

It is also rather marvellous that the Baby should have withstood the amazing and trying experiences so well, as in their later cables they confirm their safe arrival and good health of all three of them at Sydney.

H. E. MIDGLEY.

23rd May, 1942.

BULLETIN NO. 11

An opportunity has been afforded me of meeting Mr. [L. P.] Moscrop [Rubber Regulation Department, Sarikei], who has recently arrived in England from Australia and he actually was with Lisa and Edgar as recently as the 19th March, 1942.

He also was an Engineer in the Sarawak Government (some 22 years service) and was often with Lisa and Edgar in their respective jobs in the interior of Sarawak. As my previous memoranda described Lisa's journey through the Jungle and Mr. Moscrop with other men made the same journey completely on foot, doing the 90 miles in 11 days, a week behind Lisa in her journey with 16 women and a number of children, and he explained to me in detail the great hardships of the journey, following jungle paths and cutting

through quite deep water and being pestered with the insects, leeches and mosquitoes, and especially at night time, when they were hiding in the jungle until darkness before entering a village for the night's rest.

The Japs were all over the place and they had to exercise the greatest caution in making contact with the villages, though they got good service from the Natives during the period of the night time.

Mr. Moscrop says it is still a point of great wonder and amazement how Lisa and the other women successfully made the journey without any casualties from the border of Borneo to Pontianak, so much of the journey being made on foot until they reached the made road some 40 miles from Pontianak.

Mr. Moscrop was with Lisa and Edgar and Susan in Pontianak during the heavy bombing there for 16 days, and while Lisa and Susan made the journey by air, the men followed in a boat, taking some 4 1/2 days for the journey which Lisa did in 4 hours.

They were all together at Batavia under very difficult conditions at times, and Mr. Moscrop accompanied Lisa and Susan on the Dutch Liner, which took them round the south of Australia to Sydney.

The general news from Mr. Moscrop is that Lisa was full of courage and accomplished all she went through by strong character and guts and that she is now very well and happy at Sydney, and Edgar is expecting to join up in an Administration job in the R.A.A.F.

We have had two or three letters from Batavia and Sydney, the final letter being posted some time in April 1942 and received by us on the 23rd, is quite cheerful and includes a delightful snapshot of Lisa and Susan taken on the Liner from Batavia to Sydney.

With the additional particulars given us by Mr. Moscrop we are more than ever grateful that Lisa and Edgar and Susan have come through their great difficulties over a period of some 3 months so successfully.

6 or 7 May, 1942

D. Kerr, Esq.
Cannon Croft,
Pinner
Middlesex

My dear Douglas,

. . . How interesting that our Granddaughters are both named Susan. It will be very pleasant when we have our Grand-child with us. Susan Elam was born the 27th August, 1941, so that she was approaching 4 months old when Lisa did her trek and they were practically a month on the way and then a month getting to Australia—actually 3 months in all from the invasion of the Japs into Sarawak, to their reaching Sydney. . . .

Yours sincerely
(Sigd.)

[H. E. MIDGLEY]

QUORN COUNTRY CLUB,
QUORN,
LEICESTERSHIRE.

9th June, 1942.

Dear Miss Crittall & Miss Olive,

I have waited some time so that I could give you a more complete story, but I am attaching for your information a copy of a letter from Lisa, also a copy of a letter from her Husband, and copies of my Bulletins about her journeys.

I have been sending Bulletins, which have now reached up to No. 11, to her many relations and friends, setting out the information as and when it was available, which of course deals with the time when we were having a most anxious time when the Japs over-ran Sarawak last December, and Lisa and her Baby were evacuated into the open country in a first endeavour to avoid contact with the Japs. Then the occupation by the Japs became general, and Lisa was evacuated, or rather taken round the coast line

from Kuching to the border of Borneo, and then she, with 16 other women and small children, went a perilous journey of some 90 miles through the Jungle, of which 40 was done on foot through most trying Jungle paths.

The reports show that Lisa was most courageous and really kept everybody's spirits up, and I have since met men who followed them a week later and they all expressed the greatest admiration and wonder that the women were able to get through practically on their own.

They had a dreadful time at Pontianak, where they were bombed ceaselessly and machine-gunned for some 16 days; but they finally got to Batavia, and now Lisa is settled in Sydney for, I expect, the duration.

I hope to enclose a snapshot taken by a War Correspondent of them on the Liner from Batavia round Australia to Sydney, which really shows Lisa in a very happy state, and the child apparently no worse for their hazardous journeys.

It obviously was a most anxious time during the 3 months from December to March, and it is a great joy to us that she should come through so well, and you will both, I know, be very happy that she should have developed so high a character and be so helpful to others, and in this you had a big share in her upbringing.

With best thanks for all you did for our Daughters, and trusting that you are all well settled in your new address. . . .

2/2/1943

MEMORANDUM TO MR. BATE RE
MR. & MRS. MIDGLEY'S DAUGHTER,

Mrs. Elizabeth Elam, Now Resident at 2, Westminster,
344, Edgecliffe Road, Woolahra, Sydney, Australia.

Our Daughter was married nearly 4 years ago and proceeded at once to Sarawak with her Husband, Mr. H. Edgar H. Elam, who has had some 15 years service in the Sarawak Government.

Shortly before the War they were domiciled at Kuching, and their baby Daughter was born in August 1941. Our Daughter was in the Capital when the Japs arrived and had a strenuous and exciting time with other women getting through the Jungle to Pontianak and ultimately by air to Java, and finally by Steamer to Sydney, where she is now resident.

Her Husband, Mr. Elam, has since joined the Royal Australian Air Force and has obtained a Commission in the Administrative Service, and after training has been posted at Ballarat and has now been transferred to Hamilton.

Mr. Elam occasionally gets to Melbourne for Leave and is in touch with Messrs. Barlow & Retallack, our Agents, and naturally when longer leave is available he goes back to our Daughter at Sydney.

We would very much appreciate any possible contact you may be able to make with either our Daughter, Mrs. Elam, or Mr. Elam, that you may give them good news of Mrs. Midgley and myself and from your personal contact you can say we are doing very well and are very happy in the receipt of letters and telegrams and photographs of their well being, and also of the undoubted progress Baby Susan is making.

Our latest letters were written on the 24th November (No.155) and were received in 57 days on January 22nd, and we have had cables also about the 18th January indicating their satisfactory well being[.]

Mrs. Midgley and I both feel that if you could get a message to our Daughter or Son-in-Law of your contact with us, it would be refreshing and of interest to them.

With sincere good wishes for your own safe return and that you will be happy in the re-union with your Wife and Family,
Yours sincerely,

H. E. MIDGLEY.

DOCUMENT 34

The Retreat of the 2nd/15th Punjab Regiment to Dutch Borneo

J. L. Noakes, "Report upon Defence Measures Adopted in Sarawak from June 1941 to the Occupation in December 1941 by Imperial Japanese Forces; Also an Account of the Movement of British and Sarawak Military Forces during the Japanese Invasion of Sarawak," 15 February 1946. MSS Pac.s.62. RHL. Section XX, pp. 73-76.

G. The Retreat to Dutch Borneo

1. The Japanese penetrated to 3rd Mile, Rock Road, very quickly. Some were on foot but the forward parties used vehicles found in the town. Probably the forward (Samariang) party did not number more than 300 men at 3.30 p.m. By 5 p.m. probably another 300 had arrived and by 6 p.m. there would be further reinforcements of perhaps another 300. . . . They did not appear to have any mechanised equipment—at least during the period 3.30 p.m. to 6 p.m. O/C Troops had prepared defences at the Landing Ground and it appeared that his policy was to fall back on this area as the Japanese advanced, and to retreat along Batu Kitang Road to Bau and Dutch Borneo as the enemy applied pressure. The first known brush with local troops occurred at 5.30 p.m. on 24th when a forward Japanese patrol met a machine-gun unit at 3rd Mile . . . Penrisson Road.

2. 2nd Lieut. B. J. C. Spurway (Sarawak Volunteers) in charge of No. 4 Company, was stationed at the Batu Kawa-Penrisson Road junction (3rd Mile) with about 38 Sarawak Constabulary. 2nd. Lt. J. A. G. Benson (Sarawak Volunteers) was also with him. At 3.30 p.m. the officers were informed by refugees from the town that the Japanese flag was flying from Astana. Sergeant R. S. Sagar was sent to Field Headquarters with this information. At 4.30 p.m. a Punjabi Detachment and an 18 pounder gun of A Company passed through towards the Landing Ground. This gun may have been

one of the two at Tanjong Bintawak, which position S. M. Stafford state[d] was not held . . . by the Punjabis. Lieut. Spurway arranged his men in two lorries directed towards the Landing Ground. The Party of Constabulary in the first lorry endeavoured to depart in defiance of Lieut. Spurway's orders, but he t[h]reatened them with a Tho[m]pson gun and they desisted. At 5 p.m. the men were moved off, but Lieutenants Spurway and Benson mounted two Lewis guns on a lorry and waited.

3. At 5.30 p.m. four vehicles appeared and stopped short of the corner. Japanese soldiers got out and examined the area and when they perceived Lieut. Spurway's lorry, one car made for it. At that moment a Bren Gun Carrier arrived from the Landing Ground, but the driver turned and made off back to the Landing Ground when he perceived the forward vehicles. Lts. Spurway and Benson opened up with their machine guns and stopped the pursuing car. They then continued to the Landing Ground, and reported at Field Headquarters at 6 p.m. Their force had been reduced by this time from 75 Volunteers and 38 Constabulary to about 10. Most of their men had deserted.

THE PENDING AND BUKIT BIAWAK DETACHMENT.

4. . . . [A] force of Punjabis was stationed at Pending and Bukit Biawak, which points were about half a mile apart. Captain P. Y. Fairburn was in charge. The Pending force was responsible for the destruction of M. L. "Jean" . . . 18 pounder guns were mounted at both points.

5. It is thought that there was no action against the Japanese at either of these points . . . and the force was withdrawn before the Japanese entered the Sarawak River at Lintang.

6. Captain G. S. Walker . . . has stated that the Pending Jetty was mined, and an arrangement existed whereby O/C Troops would inform him of enemy approach in order that he might destroy his vessel and escape. It was also agreed between the Secretary for Defence and O/C Troops that the Pending Detachment would destroy the Pending oil stocks before withdrawal.

7. Captain Walker has stated that he visited Pending at 2 p.m. on the 24th, as he had received no information from O/C Troops and was anxious. He found the post deserted. Captain Fairburn and his force had withdrawn leaving the jetty intact and the oil stocks undisturbed. He had heard no firing from Pending or Biawak except the one burst at 11 a.m. when M. L. "Jean" was, unfortunately destroyed. . . . He saw an outboard motor at the jetty and two Punjabi lorries, apparently in good order, overturned at the side of the road towards Kuching.

8. It is concluded that the Punjabis left hurriedly from Pending and Bukit Biawak some time between noon and 2 p.m. on the 24th. They never engaged the Japanese, failed to destroy the jetty and oil stocks and left Captain Walker in the lurch. (He, however, took the initiative and scuttled his ship, s.s. "Shinai"). The Secretary for Defence learnt of the withdrawal for the first time when he met Captain Walker in prison several days later.

THE BUKIT SIOL DETACHMENT

9. . . . 2nd Lieut. J. H. Farwell in charge received no communication from O/C Troops on the 24th. In the evening he decided to withdraw to the main force as he was certain he was isolated. Accordingly the Detachment took Astana Road to Matang Road and thence to Satok Bridge, where it ran into a Japanese guard on the bridge. Fire was exchanged and the Punjabis retired along the Matang Road to Sungai Tengah and thence to Siniawan. It should be noted that O/C Troops sent Mr. J. O. Gilbert to Batu Kawa on the 25th to endeavour to locate the Detachment, but without success. . . .

10. The Detachment walked into the Japanese lines at Siniawan on the 28th, and had no option but to surrender. Lieut. Farwell was taken to the Central Police Station on the 31st . . . and his men (Sikhs) were imprisoned in Kuching Gaol. [H]e was taken to "Zaida" Internment Camp on the 8th January 1942 . . .

11. Lieut. Farwell's plan to rejoin the main force by going to Siniawan was reasonable. He did not know that a general withdrawal had taken place.

EVENTS AT THE LANDING GROUND AND
AT BATU KITANG

12. Firing commenced at the Landing Ground at 7 p.m. on the 24th and continued throughout the night with heavy bursts followed by intermittent firing. At Force Headquarters were:—O/C Troops; Major Milligan, Captain B. G. Cahusac, 2nd Lieuts. Elam and Dant, and Sergeants E. W. Reynolds and J. Feeley. At 3.30 a.m. on the 25th O/C Troops ordered withdrawal to Battalion Headquarters at the Batu Kitang-Penrisson Roads Junction. Firing ceased at dawn.

13. Shortly after 9.30 a.m. on the 25th the Indian General Hospital staff received orders to proceed to Siniawan under Volunteer escort. O/C Troops was ordered to establish two machine-gun posts, one at Kranji and one at T.T. Durian, to cover the retreat of the main forces.

14. The rear Company of Volunteers crossed the Batu Kitang Ferry at 1.30 p.m. Shortly afterwards, the retreating Punjabis opened fire on some harmless native boats coming up-river and as a result the local native ferrymen ran away. From then onwards a state of chaos reigned at the crossing. The Punjabis soldiers were useless on the ferry and finally it was abandoned and sunk. The main body began to arrive to add to the confusion. Major R. E. Edwards (Sarawak Volunteers) remained at the crossing to assist in ferrying the troops. He succeeded by bribing two Malays with outboard motors and [?] to paddle native boats. The last troops crossed shortly after dark.

15. Early that afternoon (25th) Mr. J. O. Gilbert was sent with a small party of Punjabis by outboard motor boat from Batu Kitang to Batu Kawa, with orders to locate 2nd. Lieut. J. H. Farwell and Detachment, if possible. . . . He returned, unsuccessful, in the evening.

16. 2nd. Lieut. D. A. Hodges, in charge of "C" Company of the 2nd/15th Punjab Regiment, was ordered to take up a position at "China Post" near the Landing Ground, commanding the main road approach from Kuching to cover the withdrawal of the main force from the Landing Ground defences. Lieut. Hodges asked for one European to remain with him and Mr. J. M. Crawford (of the

Sarawak Coastguards) volunteered. The position was occupied at 1 p.m. on the 25th. Lieut. Hodges was ordered to hold the post for two hours, and Bren Gun Carriers would be sent to evacuate his Company. The Carriers never appeared. Desultory fire was exchanged with Japanese patrols till about 4 p.m., when heavy Japanese fire from all quarters showed that the post was surrounded. Lieut. Hodges then surrendered.

17. During the action one Punjabi was killed and two others were wounded. When the surrender took place the Japanese bayoneted the wounded through the back. Lieut. Hodges estimated the Japanese casualties to be about 200, but Mr. Crawford states he saw only one dead Japanese soldier.

THE IMPRISONMENT OF "C" COMPANY, 2ND/15TH PUNJAB REGIMENT

18. The captives ... were roped in a brutal manner and kept at 4 1/2 Mile, Penrisson Road, during the night of 25th/26th. At 2 p.m. on the 26th they were taken to Kuching Gaol and thrown into the cells, where they remained until the 9th January 1942, when Lieut. Hodges and Mr. Crawford were moved to "Zaida" Internment Camp. ... Presumably the Indian soldiers were kept at the gaol for some time. Lieut. Hodges saw Captain Mataulmulk of his Regiment, visit and talk to the Indian prisoners several times during his period in gaol. ...

THE RETREAT ALONG THE BAU-TAUDONG ROAD TO DUTCH BORNEO

21. The following extracts are given from Major R. E. Edwards' (Sarawak Volunteers) diary in continuation of the narrative interrupted at para 14:—

"December 25th.

Walked towards Bau—arriving about 10 p.m. MacArthur (Captain 2nd/15th) was organising traffic for Krokong—roads in very bad state. About midnight pressed on still further—entire force in some chaos. Ultimately stopped about 2.30 a.m. between Bau and

Krokong. Slept in empty house by roadside. Indian General Hospital and guard had already pushed on to border.

26th.

Balance of advance party of Volunteers (Newman, Harnack, Sergel, Gilbert and Dant) left about 5.30 a.m. to prepare kampongs for arrival of main body of Punjabis. Passed through Krokong and reached Dutch at noon, where waited for main body. Volunteers had no food—Indians had thrown their rations away. Natives very good and helpful, providing tapioca, fruit, coconuts, etc. Spent night at Serabok.

27th.

Filthy day's march—conditions very bad. Very heavy rain track almost impassable in places. Jagoi Babang reached early afternoon and after short rest main party went on through Siloeas, a rear-guard party and stragglers, under Captain Fairburn, myself and Sgt. Sagar, remaining at Risau for the night.

28th.

Another very bad day. Rear guard reached Siloeas as main party left for Sangga[u]. First Dutch troops under Lieut. Hermans, contacted this day by main party at Siloeas. Main party reached Sanggan late at night.

29th.

Main party reached Singkawang II Aerodrome and went into quarters. Europeans of local forces (excepting Captain Newman, Captain Large and Lieut. Spurway who went in with main party at request of O/C Troops) proceeded direct by motor transport to Bengkayang, arriving at 2 p.m.

30th.

Bengkayang party left early and reached Singkawang at 11 a.m. Arrived at Pontianak at 2.30 p.m. Rear party passed through Sunggau and arrived at Singkawang II. Requested by O/C Troops to remain with the Regiment and take over the duties of liaison officer with Dutch Headquarters."

22. These extracts give some idea of the retreat. Full details are not available. From this and other accounts received it is clear that the retreat lacked order. The road from Batu Kitang was said to have been strewn with arms, ammunition, foodstuffs and equipment. The large oil stocks at Siniawan were not destroyed . . . and vehicles were discarded in running order. No delaying action appears to have been attempted and no mines were laid, though there was plenty of time as the Japanese were wary and did not reach Siniawan till the 27th or 28th, although a narrow defile at Krokong was blocked by jamming Carriers into it and immobilising them. Internees in Kuching had first-hand evidence of the large amount of British transport equipment, etc., that had been discarded, when they saw lorries, Bren Gun Carriers, lorry loads of rifles, ammunition and equipment, oil and two field guns, being taken into Kuching for many days after the retreat commenced.

DOCUMENT 35

Operations of the 2nd/15th Punjab Regiment in Dutch Borneo and Their Capitulation

J. L. Noakes, "Report upon Defence Measures Adopted in Sarawak from June 1941 to the Occupation in December 1941 by Imperial Japanese Forces; Also an Account of the Movement of British and Sarawak Military Forces during the Japanese Invasion of Sarawak," 15 February 1946. MSS Pac.s.62. RHL. Section XXII, pp. 83-85.

1. Most of the following information has been collected from prisoners of war who were with the Battalion in Dutch Borneo. It should not be regarded as authorities [*sic*; authoritative] but it is hoped that it is an accurate summary.

2. . . . [I]t is recorded that the main party arrived at Singkawang II Aerodrome on 29th December 1941 and went into quarters. The rear party arrived the following day.

3. On 4th January 1942 one Company, with Captain [F. W. G.] Crossland[,] Captain [B. C.] Cahusac and Captain (later 2nd Lieut.)

[R. W.] Large, moved to Siloeas with a party of Dutch Troops under Col. Gortmans. Another Company, under Captain Chapman, took over the river defences and machine gun posts at Sanggau.

4. The period between 4th and 24th January 1942 was spent in patrol activities on the Dutch border and in strengthening the Sanggau defences. Enemy pressure gradually increased and after a number of encounters the troops withdrew to the Sanggau defences. During the period it was realised that a scheme was necessary for withdrawal, as a last resort, to the south-west coast of Borneo. For this reason 2nd. Lieuts. [W.] Harnack, [C. S.] Sergel and [D. B.] Stewart and Messrs. A. E. A. Edwards and [F. H.] Wright were recalled from Pontianak . . . in order to carry out reconnaissance and, if necessary, guide the troops to the south-west coast.

5. The expected attack on Sangga[u] and the Aerodrome materialise[d] on 24th January 194[2]. The Sangga[u] position was very strongly held but it was realised that our forces could not possibly hold out against a determined encircling movement and there was serious danger of the Sanggau garrison being cut off. This did, in fact, happen and it was only by good fortune that the Sanggau losses were light. Our forces then withdrew to the Sanggau Ledo position, but this, in turn, had to be abandoned because Japanese troops had landed at Mempawah and were driving swiftly northwards to Bengkawang in the rear of the Allied Forces.

6. The Allied Forces commenced a general retreat via Darit, Nyabang, Sanggau (Kepuas) and Sekudan to Nanga Pinoh, which was reached on the night of the 2nd February. At this place the British and Dutch troops parted company and the Punjabis prepared for a trek across [Dutch] Borneo.

7. The force was divided into two columns, "A" and "B." It was arranged that *A* Column should rendezvous [*sic*: rendezvous] at Pengkalan Boem and *B* Column at Khota Besi above Sanpit. Indian General Headquarters was advised, and planned to evacuate the two Columns from these two points by ship to Java.

8. *B* Column reached Sungai Besi on the 5th March. Two days later Malays on bicycles brought news that Japanese had landed down river and were making rapid progress on bicycles towards Sungai Besi. The Column moved to positions across Sungai Sem-

pit, suffering some casualties [*sic*; casualties] and Captain Cahusac ... was taken prisoner. An hour later the attack died down and it was realised that an exploratory movement was in progress, so the Column withdrew along a footpath by the river back to Sempit, where an advance party under Lieut. Sergel, had requisitioned two motor launches. These were loaded with the remnants of the Column and taken up river to Kuala Kawayang. There a march was made through jungle to Rantau Puloet, where news was obtained of the capitulation of Java. *B* Column joined *A* Column at Pangkalan Boem on 30th March. Previously O/C Troops had sent a message of surrender to the Japanese, and on the 31st March Japanese Marines arrived to take the force prisoner. The surrendered force left Koemi on the 5th April in a Japanese Mine-Layer for Batavia, there to be imprisoned in Tanjong Priok Prisoner-of-War Camp.

9. It has been reported that Lieuts. Harnack, Newman, Sergel, Stewart, Wright and A. E. A. Edwards, all of the Sarawak Civil Service left the 2nd/15th Punjab Regiment at a point east of Sempit on about 24th March 1942. O/C Troops, (Lt. Col. Lane) had expressed his intention to surrender to the enemy (formal surrender was made on the 1st. April) and refused to grant these men permission to leave. Though they disobeyed his orders, he knew of their intention and made no move to restrain them. He covered their action later by reporting them as missing to the Japanese after formal surrender. The six men intended to make their way to the Kelabit country in ULU Limbang, Sarawak. They carried rifles, revolvers, ammunition, a little Dutch money and about \$1500 in Sarawak currency.

10. The following report has been received through the R. C. Bishop of West Borneo. It was made to him by a Dutch R. C. Priest from Sijiram (18 kilometres south-west of Semitau in Dutch Borneo) and passed to Mr. Dahaan (Assistant R[e]sident of Pontianak) who translated it for the Secretary for Defence:—

In the beginning of May 1942, three Englishmen crossed the Embahoe District from the south-west and arrived safely at Djongkong. These men informed the people of Djongkong that more Englishmen would follow (it is not clear if this informa-

tion was given before or after the arrival of other Englishmen). A plot was formed by six people (probably Malays). The ring-leader was a gambler named Koenoen (Kunum). The three Englishmen (said by some to be three and by others to be six by this time) were deceived as follows:—

The English wished to proceed by boat and asked for men and transport, but the Malays feigned fear because of the presence of firearms. To calm their fears it was agreed that all firearms, including revolvers, should be loaded into the first sampan, which then left. The English followed in a second boat but were soon taken on a different route and when a convenient place had been found the English were murdered. The murderers obtained not only firearms but much Sarawak money, which led the natives to believe that the victims had been traders. The weapons were sold and the people of the Embahoe District reported the case to the Demang (Native Officer) of Semitau or Selimbau (not certain) who made an examination and confiscated the weapons. The case has aroused much consternation in the District.

11. The R. C. Bishop, R. C. Priest and Mr Dahaan had no knowledge of the movement of the six Officers at the time of making the report and passing it to the Secretary for Defence. Thus it would appear from the report that the six Officers were killed by Dutch Malays. No other news of them has come through and it is reasonable to identify them with the persons murdered. Nevertheless, experience has proved the unreliability of reports received in P.O.W. Camps and it would be as well to treat this one with reserve until a thorough investigation can be made.

12. The following Sarawak Europeans were captured with the remnants of the 2nd Battalion (see para 9):—

2nd Lieut.	R. W. Large
" "	R. E. Edwards
" "	B. J. C. Spurway

13. A Detachment of Prisoners-of-War, called the Java Detachment and numbering about 1000 Officers and men left Tanjong Priok on about 22nd September 1942, for Singapore. It stayed

about two weeks and then, on 13th October, arrived at Batu Lintang Camp. Among the party were the following Officers and men who were stationed in Sarawak prior to the Japanese invasion:—

2nd. Lieut. R. E. Edwards, formerly O/C and Major Sarawak Volunteers
 2nd. Lieut. B. J. C. Spurway, formerly 2nd. Lieut. Sarawak Volunteers
 2nd. Lieut. A. D. Dant, formerly 2nd. Lieut. Sarawak Volunteers.
 Capt. F. W. G. Crossland, of 2nd/15th Punjab Regiment
 Capt. N. C. MacArthur " " " " "
 Capt. J. E. S. Temple " " " " "
 Lieut. W. St. P. M. Hancock, Royal Engineers
 Sgt. J. Feeley, East Yorks Regiment
 Sgt. E. W. Reynolds, Loyal Regiment
 Corporal C. P. Kirkland, (611680 R.A.F.)

14. Sappers Green and A. Honeysett of the Royal Engineers, and Private Findlay of the Loyal Regiment, were left in Kuching Hospital when the retreat of 25th December 1941 commenced. Sapper Green had lost a leg by amputation following upon wounds received on H.M.S. "LIPIS". . . . Sapper Honeysett was sent to Zaida Internment Camp in mid-January 1942, and the two others came to the Pandungan Internment Camp about June 1942. The three men were returned to the Batu Lintang P.O.W. Camp when it was formed.

15. Aircraftman J. Pasquill (1065221) and E. Hodgson (1060175) of the R. A. F. Detachment of Bukit Stabar Landing Ground . . . were sent to Pontianak on duty by O/C Troops in January 1942. They were captured when the Japanese entered Pontianak and subsequently arrived at Batu Lintang Camp about mid-July. Corporal Kirkland, in charge of the Detachment, is mentioned in para 13. The remaining members, Aircraft men K. Deakin (951048), H. Chippendale (978867) and D. Shuttleworth (1074216) were left in Tanjong Priok Camp when the "Java Detachment" (See para 13) was moved on 13th October 1942.

DOCUMENT 36
"Not at their post . . ."

J. L. Noakes, "Report upon Defence Measures Adopted in Sarawak from June 1941 to the Occupation in December 1941 by Imperial Japanese Forces; Also an Account of the Movement of British and Sarawak Military Forces during the Japanese Invasion of Sarawak," 15 February 1946. MSS Pac.s.62. RHL. Section XX, pp. 54, 65, 68-69, and 70.

CASE NO. 1 DESERTION

Malay Volunteers Deserted by their European Officers

14. At about 8.30 a.m. the District Officer (Mr. D. C. White) received a telephone call from his office informing him that a number of the Malay Volunteers were there and waiting to see him. He met them at his office with the Resident (Mr. R. G. Aikman) and Mr. E. Banks. The Malays stated, through their spokesman Haji Yusuf and Muhd. Din, that they had been deserted by their Officers and they wished to lay down their arms. They were told that they should return to their Headquarters in the Hok[k]ien School, pile arms and await orders. Mr. Banks then went in search of 2nd. Lieut J. A. G. Benson.

15. Later the District Officer visited the Volunteers Headquarters and found it entirely deserted.

CASE NO. 2 DESERTION

G. T. Myles, Evacuation Officer to A.R.P. Department

79. Mr. Myles was Evacuation Officer to the Air Raid Precautions Department, in addition to his other duties as Executive and Waterworks Engineer in the Public Works Department. Mr. Ricketts was a Sarawak Civil Service Pensioner. He was aged and in ill health. His daughters, Miss L. and Miss A. Ricketts, were Voluntary Workers in the Medical Auxiliary Service and Miss A. Rick-

etts was employed in the Air Raid Precautions Department. The other girl and Master H. Ricketts were unemployed.

80. At 1.30 p.m. on the 24th. the party of five left Kuching for Siniawan. Mr. Myles did not inform the Secretary for Defence that he was leaving, but it is thought that he was concerned for the safety of the Ricketts family and probably he intended to return when he had taken them to what he considered to be a place of safety, as he took no personal effects. It is believed that Mr. Ricketts refused to go beyond Siniawan and his family stayed with him, but Mr. Myles parted from them on the 25th. when he accompanied the retreating troops into Dutch Borneo. It is not known how long the children stayed in Siniawan, but Mr. Ricketts was interned in the Central Police Station on the 28th. . . . The children are reported to have gone to Simanggang and to have returned, penniless, to Kuching later. They requested the Japanese to intern them as their father was very ill in hospital and they had no means of support, but Major Suga, O/C Internment Camp, arranged work for the girls in the General Hospital.

CASE NO. 3 DESERTION

W. J. Chater, Transport Officer in Passive Defence Service

128. The first officer [R. W. Chater] was Superintendent of the Government Printing Office; the second officer [W. J. Chater] was his father's assistant but he was also Transport Officer in the Passive Defence Service. Mr. [T. C.] Leaman was an assistant in the Food Control Office. . . .

129. It is reported that all three left Kuching for Serian at about 11 a.m. on the 24th. They made their way overland to Pontianak via Sanggau, arriving on 3rd January 1942.

130. As Mr. Parker escaped by the same route as this group it is probable that Mr. Leaman had Mr. Parker's permission to leave and it is possible that they travelled some of the way together. Mr. R. W. Chater was an elderly person who was not required to stay in Kuching and was justified in leaving, but Mr. W. J. Chater held an appointment in the Air Raid Precautions organisation and was not justified in fleeing. The Director of Air Raid Precautions was

adamant that all such officers should continue their duties, at least until he gave them permission to leave, and Mr. W. J. Chater did not seek such permission either from him or from the District Warden. It should be recorded in extenuation, however, that he had an elderly father to consider.

CASE NO. 4 DESERTION

J. Adams, entrusted with the care of a Radio Transmitter

132. Mr. Adams, like the four aforementioned men, was a Sarawak Oilfields Limited officer. . . . He joined the Posts and Telegraphs Department on the 18th December 1941. At between 2 and 3 a.m. on the 24th, Mr. Tait (Postmaster-General) took Mr. Adams a part of the way to the 2 1/2 mile D/F Station. He gave Mr. Adams a key and told him to go to a dwelling near the destroyed Station and stand guard over a transmitter secreted there.

133. At daylight on the 24th, an Asiatic wireless operator who was to use the transmitter, told Mr. Tait that Mr. Adams had "run away" and the building was locked. Mr. Tait effected entry with [a] hacksaw. He did not see Mr. Adams again.

134. Mr. Adams arrived in Pontianak on 31st December 1941.

CASE NO. 5 DESERTION

C. Corbin, in charge of Electric Power Station and a Member of in Passive Defence Service

138. Mr. Corbin was Manager of the Sarawak Electricity Supply Company, Limited, and Mr. Phillips was his Kuching Assistant. Mr. Corbin disappeared from Kuching early on the morning of the 24th and Mr. Phillips came to the Secretary for Defence for help to find him. However, Mr. Corbin, who had been on a trip along Simanggang Road, appeared towards noon. At about noon, both officers left without the knowledge of the Secretary for Defence. Mr. Phillips arrived at Pontianak on December 30th, while Mr. Corbin went overland to join his wife coming from Simanggang, and arrived on 4th January 1942.

139. Mr. Corbin was a member of the Passive Defence Services, but it is not certain if Mr. Phillips was also.

DOCUMENT 37 *A Change of Loyalty*

J. L. Noakes, "Report upon Defence Measures Adopted in Sarawak from June 1941 to the Occupation in December 1941 by Imperial Japanese Forces; Also an Account of the Movement of British and Sarawak Military Forces during the Japanese Invasion of Sarawak," 15 February 1946. MSS Pac.s.62. RHL. Section XX, pp. 75-76.

ACTING CAPTAIN MATAULMULK

19. Suspicion surrounds the movements and actions of Acting Captain Mataulmulk (King's Commission) of the 2nd/15th Punjab Regiment. Lieut. Wan Bujang (Sarawak Rangers) is known to have joined the Japanese very soon after their arrival and he was on very friendly terms with Captain Mataulmulk. Rumour has it that Captain Mataulmulk surrendered, without fighting, with his Company to the Japanese on 25th December 1941. He appeared to be a free man from that time and is known to have visited Sungai Tengah Estate with a Japanese force and the anti-British agent Lal Chand, on 27th December, to locate Punjabi ammunition dumps ... the whereabouts of which were fully known to this officer.¹⁹ He is also suspected of attempting to persuade Indian soldiers from their allegiance to the British.

20. O/C Troops knew that Captain Mataulmulk was unsympathetic to British interests, prior to the Japanese invasion of Sarawak. He was a member of a high Indian family and his early divergence was known and disapproved of by his uncle, the Ruler of Chitral. General [Sir Archibald] Wavell [head, Allied Intelligence Bureau in Java] is known to have communicated personally with O/C Troops on this subject later when the 2nd/15th Punjab Regiment was operating in Dutch Borneo.

Notes

INTRODUCTION

1. The Bukit Stabar Landing Ground was also referred to as the 7th Mile Landing Ground (or Airstrip) by virtue of its location at the 7th Milestone south of Kuching town.

2. According to the Treaty of 1888, Britain pledged to protect Sarawak from external enemies and to handle its foreign relations while respecting the sovereignty of the Brooke rajahs as independent rulers who exercised full control of all internal administration. See Article 1 "Agreement between Her Majesty's Government and Charles Brooke, Second Rajah Of Sarawak," 5 September 1888, reproduced as Appendix B in Anthony Brooke, *The Facts about Sarawak: A Documented Account of the Cession to Britain in 1946*, Bombay, 1947; reprint Singapore: Summer Times, 1983.

3. See K. D. Shargava and K. N. V. Sastri, *Official History of the Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War, 1939-45: Campaigns in South-East Asia, 1941-42*, Combined Inter-Services Historical Section India & Pakistan, City Orient Longmans, 1960, p. 370.

4. This unit was under the overall command of the 18th Division (Lieutenant-General Renya Mutaguchi) and was entrusted with operations in British Borneo. See *ibid.*, pp. 411-12.

5. Colonel Itsu Ogawa and Lieutenant-Colonel Ino Sei, "Borneo Operations (Kawaguchi Detachment) 1941-1942," Japanese Studies in World War II, IWM, Box 6 AL 1099, p. 254.

6. As early as August 1941, partial implementation of the denial scheme had effectively reduced production by 70 percent. See Lionel Wigmore, *The Japanese Thrust*, Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1957, pp. 179-80.

7. For the operations of the 2nd/15th Punjab, see Shargava and Sastri, *Indian Armed Forces*, pp. 374-80; A. E. Percival, *The War in Malaya*, Lon-

don: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1949, pp. 165-75; and, A. V. M. Horton, "A Note on the British Retreat from Kuching, 1941-1942," *SMJ*, Vol. 36, No. 57, December 1986, pp. 241-49.

According to Lionel Wigmore, the 2nd/15th Punjab Regiment was "compelled to surrender on 9th March"; Horton, however, maintained that the remnants of the regiment organized into guerilla units in South Borneo to harrass the enemy, and these men only gave up the struggle on 3 April after the fall of Java, when all Allied forces were compelled to surrender. See Wigmore, *The Japanese Thrust*, p. 181, n. 5; and, Horton, "British Retreat," p. 246.

8. In late 1943, the headquarters was removed to Jesselton which was better positioned in the event of an Allied invasion. Dutch Borneo, on the other hand, was administered separately by the Japanese Navy.

9. At midday on 19 December 1941, Kuching experienced its first air raid when from fifteen to seventeen Japanese planes bombed the town and the landing ground at the 7th Mile. The number of casualties is uncertain, estimates range from 80 to 100, all reportedly civilians. Mukah and Sibu were also bombed on 23 and 25 December respectively. See Shargava and Sastri, *Indian Armed Forces*, pp. 376-77; Leonard Edwards and Peter W. Stevens, *Short Histories of the Lawas and Kanowit Districts*, Kuching: Borneo Literature Bureau, 1971, p. 161; and "The Japanese Occupation: Extracts from a Broadcast Interview with Tan Sri Ong Kee Hui by Christopher Chan on 14 February 1975," *JMHSSB*, No. 3, December 1976, p. 4.

10. According to one account, Dutch submarines torpedoed the four transports off Kuching while another source maintains that they were sunk by Dutch aircraft. See Wigmore, *The Japanese Thrust*, p. 180, and R. H. W. Reece, *The Name of Brooke: The End of White Rajah Rule in Sarawak*, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 143.

11. In many parts of the country, the prewar administration was maintained, excluding the presence of the European officer. The native officer, often a Malay, assumed full control, subject only to the occasional visit of his Japanese superior. The situation in Kanowit and Lawas is representative of other districts. See Edwards and Steven, *Lawas and Kanowit*, pp. 49-50, 51, 161-62.

12. See Vinson H. Sutlive, Jr., *Tun Jugah of Sarawak: Colonialism and Iban Response*, Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit Fajar Bakti for Sarawak Literary Society, 1992, pp. 102-3.

13. *Towkay* is a term in the Chinese Hokkien dialect which denotes a successful and well-to-do businessman.

14. See *ST*, 19 January 1946 and 21 February 1950.

15. *ST*, 13 December 1970.

16. See Reece, *Name of Brooke*, p. 144.

17. For MacArthur's plans and their alterations, see John Robertson, *Australia at War, 1939-1945*, Melbourne: William Heinemann, 1981, pp. 177-78. For the sources of detailed intelligence reports and military plans prior to the invasion, see Simon Francis, "Wartime Intelligence Reports on Borneo," *BRB*, Vol. 25, 1993, pp. 137-41. Most of the documents in Francis's list are at the Public Record Office (PRO), Kew, England.

18. For the reoccupation of Sarawak, see John Robertson, *Australia at War*, pp. 178-81; and, S. Woodburn Kirby, *The War against Japan*, Volume 1: *The Loss of Singapore*, London: H.M.S.O., 1957, pp. 179-80.

19. For instance, Semut 1, under the command of Major Tom Harrisson, accounted for "over 1,000 Japanese killed" out of the "Z" total enemy killed of 1,700.

Harrison, who after the war became government ethnologist and curator of the Sarawak Museum, wrote a lively account of Semut Operation. See Tom Harrisson, *World Within: A Borneo Story*, London: The Cresset Press, 1959. Chong Ah Onn, one of Harrisson's many Chinese "flitters," recorded his involvement in assisting Semut activities in a series of articles published in the *Sarawak Gazette*. See Chong Ah Onn, "1943-46, Fifth Division, Sarawak," parts 1-3, *Sarawak Gazette*, 29 November 1952, pp. 263-65; 31 December 1952, pp. 283-87; 30 January 1953, pp. 11-13.

The most recent account of Semut Operation is Bob Long's *Operation Semut 1: "Z" Special Unit's Secret War; Soldiering with the Head-Hunters of Borneo*, Maryborough, Victoria: Australian Print Group, 1989. This is a compilation of the recollections of Australian and New Zealand operatives regarding their experiences.

20. See Edwards and Stevens, *Lawas and Kanowit Districts*, pp. 60-62; and, Harrisson, *World Within*, pp. 291-92.

21. See *Sarawak Gazette*, 30 September 1955, p. 214.

CHAPTER 1

1. See Eric Robertson, *Japanese File: Pre-War Japanese Penetration in Southeast Asia*, Hong Kong: Heinemann, 1979.

2. Koichiro Ishihara emphasized the economic importance of Borneo, and his writings, together with those of other members of the Showa Kenkyukai, to a certain extent influenced the planners of the Japanese military. See Joyce C. Lebra, *Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere*

in *World War II: Selected Readings and Documents*, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1975, pp. 44-5, 64-7, 99-103 and 116-17. Also, see John Robertson, *Australia at War*, pp. 62-63 and 68-9; and, S. Woodburn Kirby, *The War against Japan*, Volume I, pp. 477-8 and 481-3.

3. Mitsubishi, one of the prewar *zaibatsu* (conglomerate of companies), during the 1920s and 1930s had investments and commercial ventures in Southeast Asia. The Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha and its subsidiaries were engaged in a variety of commercial enterprises from managing rubber plantations to trade in consumer goods. See Robertson, *Japanese File*, passim.

4. The "China Incident" of July 1937 was a series of outbreaks of hostilities between Chinese soldiers and Japanese troops stationed in the Tientsin-Peiping area. Both parties claimed they fired in self-defense. In any case, the violence escalated and resulted in the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45).

5. Source could not determine for certain if the proposals put forth by the Institute were given serious attention by the Japanese government.

6. The Axis Powers were Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, and their allies. Japan was a late-comer in this loose alliance, joining Germany and Italy only in 1940.

CHAPTER 2

1. S. Baring-Gould and C. A. Bampfylde, *A History of Sarawak under Its Two White Rajahs, 1839-1908*, London: Henry Sotheran, 1909, p. 301.

2. A. E. Percival, *The War in Malaya*, London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1949, p. 94.

3. When James Brooke became rajah of Sarawak, he restored his former adversaries of the late 1836-40 Sarawak revolt, the Malay Datus, and enlisted them into his government as native advisers with whom he consulted informally. In 1855, acting upon the advice given by his friend and supporter, Lord Grey, a council of state called the Supreme Council was established which institutionalized the practice of consulting native opinion. See T. Stirling Boyd, "The Law and Constitution of Sarawak," typescript, 1934, MSS Pac.s.86, RHL, Box 4 Item II, pp. 29-32; and, R. J. Pole-Evans, "The Supreme Council, Sarawak," *SMJ*, Vol. VII, No. 7, June 1956, pp. 98-108.

4. Nevertheless, the Japanese, despite the lack of geological records, successfully drilled sixteen new wells with production of the Miri and Seria fields equaling half prewar production by August 1945. Wartime

production in the two oil fields totalled 11,498,000 barrels. See G. C. Harper, *The Discovery and Development of the Seria Oilfields*, Brunei: Brunei Museum, 1975, p. 21. Also, see DOCUMENT 43.

CHAPTER 3

1. A rubber estate located to the southeast of Kuching owned and managed by a Japanese company, Nissa Shokai. Established around 1900, Nissa Shokai was a general goods shop specializing in wholesale and retail of Japanese goods and foodstuff. When rubber became an important export commodity during the 1910s, it acquired land near the Samarahan River to open an estate, aptly named after the area. See Ooi Keat Gin, "An Economic History of Sarawak during the Period of Brooke Rule, 1841-1941," Ph.D. thesis, University of Hull, 1995, pp. 313 and 372.

2. See DOCUMENT 28.

3. Ibid.

4. See DOCUMENT 27.

5. See DOCUMENT 20.

6. See DOCUMENT 30.

7. See DOCUMENT 20.

8. See DOCUMENTS 19, 21, 35, and 36.

9. Until May 1941, Archer served as chief secretary to the Brooke government. He was succeeded by Cyril Drummond Le Gros Clark.

10. See DOCUMENT 12.

11. Sections 'B' and 'C' of DOCUMENT 19 should be read in conjunction with DOCUMENT 9 in Chapter 2.

12. See DOCUMENT 15.

13. Goebilt was a rubber extractive factory at Tanjong Batu owned by the British Malaysian Rubber Manufacturing Company. Its major investors were Robert Goelet and Cornelius Vanderbilt, two American magnates, thus the name "Goebilt." See Ooi, "An Economic History of Sarawak," pp. 308-11.

14. It was highly likely that these Dutch aircrafts bombed the Japanese warships as mentioned in Section 'E' para 2 above.

15. "Five-foot-way" is a corridor measuring about five feet (1.5 metres) wide in front of Chinese shophouses. It allows a space between the front door of the shophouse and the street outside. At the same time the five-foot-way provides a sheltered passageway for pedestrians.

16. See DOCUMENT 17.

17. Noakes purposely left spaces for the evidence of individuals "that has not yet been received" (Preface). However, such spaces remained blank as these named individuals apparently failed to contact Noakes or vice versa. Therefore their version of events remains untold.

18. See DOCUMENT 30.

19. Ibid.

20. For the probable fate of this officer see Chapter 4, DOCUMENT 35.

CHAPTER 4

1. This refers to the writer, W. G. Morison, assistant district officer of Sarikei, and four other men as follows: W. S. B. Buck (assistant censor, Sarikei), C. B. Murray (lands and survey department, Sarikei), L. P. Moscrop (rubber regulation officer, Third Division, District Warden for A.R.P.), and Father C. Quaddeker (R. C. Mission, Sarikei).

2. The group from the Second Division were: G. R. H. Arundell (resident, Second Division), A. J. N. Richards (district officer, Betong), A. E. A. Edwards (lands and survey department, Simanggang), B. A. Reeves (superintendent, lands and survey department, Second Division, Simanggang), W. O. Jongklass (rubber regulation officer, Second Division), and A. R. Snelus (district officer, Simanggang).

3. Tuanku Bujang was a member of the *perabangan* class (sons of Datus) of Sibul. He was a Brooke native officer, however, he cooperated with the Japanese upon their arrival in Sibul. He was appointed a *ken sanji* (councillor) of the Japanese-sponsored *Ken Sanjikai*, the Prefectural Advisory Council.

4. See DOCUMENT 30.

5. The military authorities in their policy of indirect rule had co-opted the local educated Iban elite into the administration. Eliab Bay was the most prominent among this group who collaborated with the Japanese.

6. Juing Insol was a Saribas Iban who was recruited into the police just before the war. There were few Ibans in the police force then. Like Eliab Bay, he also gained Japanese favor and confidence and worked with the occupying forces.

7. K. H. Digby believed that Arundell was betrayed by Iban ex-convicts and massacred by the Japanese in the Upper Batang Ai. See K. H. Digby, *Lawyer in the Wilderness*, Cornell University Southeast Asia Program Data Paper No. 114, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, October 1980, pp. 76-9.

8. For the flight of Europeans from Kapit into the interior, see Section 'F'.

9. See Chapter 3, DOCUMENT 17.

10. See DOCUMENT 32.

11. See DOCUMENT 28.

12. For Parry's escape, see Chapter 3, DOCUMENT 17, and Chapter 4, DOCUMENT 24.

13. For the arrest of the seven other Europeans and their internment, see DOCUMENT 26.

14. The forced landing of a Dutch Dornier Flying Boat, the rescue of four of the crew of five and the subsequent death of one of the four, is described in Chapter 3, DOCUMENT 17.

15. For the subsequent movements of these officers, see DOCUMENT 35.

16. MacBryan was the charismatic and highly controversial figure in Rajah Vyner's government. For the role played by MacBryan in Sarawak politics, see Reece, *The Name of Brooke*, especially chapter 2.

17. As a postscript, McKerracher suspected that one of the "Britishers" was Hudden, district officer of Baram, stationed at Marudi. Hudden apparently disappeared, allegedly murdered. See Chapter 7, DOCUMENT 75.

18. Mrs. Elizabeth Elam incorrectly names Bob Shelters as the district officer (D.O.) at Simanggang. In fact A. R. Snelus was the district officer. Apparently the name "Shelters" does not appear on the list of Brooke officers; it is likely that he was attached to one of the European private companies. Or simply an error of transcription for Snelus.

19. See Chapter 3, DOCUMENT 20.